US President George W Bush failed to
achieve twin objectives of fewer restrictions and
more troops for Afghanistan at the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Riga this
week, shifting focus back to Iraq, where he
refuses to draw down military forces. The implicit
message to Taliban insurgents and their backers:
time can erode an already faltering alliance in
the long run.
NATO, in its first-ever
mission outside Europe, now has about 32,000
troops in Afghanistan battling an unexpectedly
robust
Taliban across the southern
and eastern back country. To the dismay of the
United States, Britain, Canada and the Netherlands
- member states that have borne the brunt of the
fighting - other countries have put caveats on how
and where their troops can be operate as militants
continue to make headway.
"Taliban and
al-Qaeda fighters, and drug fighters and criminal
elements and local warlords, remain active and
committed to destroying democracy in Afghanistan,"
Bush told assembled leaders. "For NATO to succeed,
the commanders on the ground must have the
resources and flexibility to do their jobs."
Officials responded that France, Germany,
Italy and Spain would ease some deployment
restrictions in case of security emergencies, but
would not commit troops to fight in hot zones down
south. Poland is the only country that has pledged
to send extra troops in the new year.
Bitterness is mounting among contributors
such as Canada, which provides 2,500 troops and
has had to shoulder a disproportionate amount of
hostilities in recent months. The two Canadian
soldiers killed on Monday by a suicide car bomb in
the rebel stronghold of Kandahar raised their
contingent's death toll to 36 this year, the
majority of which occurred after they moved to
southern provinces this summer.
"A country
like Canada ... has every right to expect that
their allies are at their back, which means if
they get into trouble, they can count on support
from all of NATO," Daniel Fried, US assistant
secretary of state in charge of European and
Eurasian affairs, told reporters. He pointedly
added that Canada was paying a "hard price" among
NATO members.
Germany, for its part,
boasts some 2,700 troops in Afghanistan but they
remain limited by their own government's mandate
to safer northern areas around Mazar-i-Sharif,
Kunduz and Faizabad. Observers say this
inconsistency could breed resentment among
international forces that must cooperate to beat
back the insurgency and fast-track reconstruction.
The feared symptom is that public opinion back
home vital to sustaining military involvement will
gradually sour in a prelude to withdrawal.
Regardless of whether adjustments are
made, a regrouped Taliban contingent estimated at
10,000 fighters is prepared to take the fight to
"surprising" levels against international forces
through the winter and on for as long as it takes
to bleed Western resolve. Commander Mullah
Obaidullah warned on Thursday that the possibility
of more NATO troops "does not worry the Taliban,
[but] rather will make it easier for our
combatants to attack them".
These are more
than fighting words. Suicide and roadside bombings
targeting foreign troops and government officials
have increased fourfold this year, up to 600 a
month, with violence recorded in all but two of
the country's 34 provinces. Officials say between
3,700 and 4,000 people have died in
insurgent-related violence this year, including at
least 186 coalition troops.
"After five
years of constantly fighting foreign troops, the
Taliban have become a strong military power of the
same levels as the most powerful army," said
Commander Obaidullah, who insisted that his
fighters could carry on for another 20 years if
necessary. Standing gun battles between Taliban
and NATO forces in Kandahar and Helmand provinces
over the summer - the fiercest since the
movement's government was toppled by a 2001 US-led
invasion - lend some ballast to this claim.
But the Taliban leadership is still
banking on asymmetrical tactics founded on
historical precedent to oust NATO forces. Two
successful, low-intensity campaigns against the
British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the
1980s have kept geographical advantages fresh in
mind. And the lawless Afghan-Pakistani borderlands
that have been a sanctuary to the hardline
movement and al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden to this
day serve as a rear base par excellence.
Mullah Dadullah, another top commander,
told Al-Jazeera in a July 2005 interview: "Our
tactics are now hit and run; we attack certain
locations, kill the enemies of Allah there, and
retreat to safe bases in the mountains to preserve
our mujahideen."
Pakistan's underhanded
support of the Taliban to destabilize its neighbor
is no secret in the Western intelligence
community, nor is the deep-seated corruption of an
Afghan government that includes warlords and other
officials with connections to the booming
narcotics industry. Afghanistan watchers say all
of these factors are interconnected and must be
dealt with in unison to rebuild a country
shattered by 30 years of war.
But as the
United States leads the call for more NATO troops
and firepower, critics counter that the Bush
administration's overemphasis on military spending
versus reconstruction aid has hamstrung efforts to
win hearts and minds. By some estimates, military
operations have cost US$82.5 billion since 2002,
compared with $7.3 billion spent on development -
a 900% disparity.
"In Afghanistan,
military force, understandably a vital part of a
counter-insurgency strategy, has for too long been
the only strategy and one that will lose any
utility if it is reduced to fighting for 'business
as usual'," says the latest report from the
International Crisis Group. "The desire for a
quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace
is what has brought Afghanistan to the present
increasingly dangerous situation."
Adding
fuel to the fire is record drug output, dubbed
Afghanistan's Achilles' heel by US Marine General
James Jones, a top NATO general. Narcotics now
account for about half of gross domestic product,
or $2.7 billion this year, and an even bigger
bumper crop is expected in 2007. The Taliban have
forsaken their anti-drug stance of the past for
arrangements of convenience with trafficking
networks and farmers in exchange for kickbacks to
fund their insurgency. This allows them to pay
well above what the fledgling national army and
police can offer.
Amid calls for more
robust action to combat the drug trade, US and
European efforts thus far have done little to
slash production and instead hurt the poor,
according to a new United Nations/World Bank
report. Farmers of means bribe local-government
officials for illicit growing rights, and those
lacking money go into debt once their crops are
destroyed. In some instances, farmers are
compelled to replant poppies to repay outstanding
debts; in others, government officials are said to
drive out competing cartels for a percentage.
UN investigators say it could take decades
to eliminate the problem, while the Taliban appear
to be growing stronger by the day.
Jason Motlagh is deputy foreign
editor at United Press International in
Washington, DC. He has reported freelance from
Saharan Africa, Asia and the Caribbean for various
US and European news media.
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2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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