Page 4 of 5 SPEAKING
FREELY All along the watch
tower By Peter J Middlebrook
and Sharon M Miller
policy in the emerging
millennial order; in particular (i) that combined
civil-military operations are increasingly
perceived as vital for securing enduring stability
(ii) that the rejection of external "authority" by
an "insurgent" community will not be overcome
through the application of even greater military
might and "power-over", and (iii) that the
adoption of an alternative and inclusive policy;
with "openness" and "reconciliation" as guiding
features, is
perhaps a more logical path
to sustaining foreign policy aspirations in the
long run.
Yet, in the absence of a formal
peace agreement - because the Bonn process was
everything but that - and given that NATO forces
can do little more than prepare the terrain for a
political solution at best, growing concern about
the overall engagement rationale and tactics would
appear to be wholly justified.
Following
the withdrawal of US forces early in 2006, and
with operations currently under the UK-led NATO
contingent, the numbers of military personnel and
civilians affected by conflict now constitutes a
steadily rising tide; much to the irritation of
presidents Karzai, Pervez Musharraf and George W
Bush, as well as Blair. To achieve ISAF/NATO
mission objectives, the US and UK administrations
will need to rethink their policy towards the
south, and the Taliban in particular, as NATO
forces alone cannot be expected to provide a
panacea for what amounts to nothing short of civil
war.
Yet, having fought its way into
southern Afghanistan, British-led NATO forces now
face the even more complex task of creating an
enabling and enduring peace that also allows for
an orderly exit or handover of responsibilities.
Even given current Afghan military establishments,
without the continued support of ISAF/NATO and
PRTs on the ground the notion that the Afghan
state will any time soon be able to exercise
legitimate control over contested borders is
arguable at best, not least because certain
interests in Pakistan would clearly move to impede
the emergence of a powerful Afghan state to limit
the emergence of Pashtun nationalism.
What to do In the absence of a
formal peace agreement and border settlement plan,
questions must remain as to whether the current
approach of ISAF/NATO is in fact the one most
likely to lead to increased stability over the
longer term.
Without addressing the root
causes of the Durand Line Disagreement and the
reasons for simmering discontent, the current
peacekeeping initiative ultimately risks being
historically flawed. What is required is a far
bolder and pragmatic approach to overcoming a very
complex and contested history that continues to
dwell at the very heart of the problem itself; a
simmering civil war between rival political
entities that has not been nullified by the
establishment of an Afghan parliament and US$60
billion in international reconstruction and
security assistance.
That ISAF/NATO and
coalition forces are expected to assist in
fostering stability in the absence of a broad
track of political reconciliation only exposes the
international community to a high-risk military
strategy that is fundamentally ill-conceived.
Given that the threat posed toward Anglo-US
strategic interests north of Afghanistan by China
is substantial, (including the political pendulum
of Kazakhstan), and because Chinese foreign policy
is now firmly focused on consolidating links
toward Iran and beyond, creating a stable axis of
political, military and economic consensus between
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India at this moment of
history is vital. The authors reach the following
conclusion:
1. The current standoff
between state (Afghan and Pakistan) and non-state
actors (Taliban and Baloch etc.) constitutes
nothing short of civil war. Efforts that build
walls and not bridges between communities will
only bring increased resentment.
2. The
Taliban, terrorism, insurgency and the rise of the
opium economy are manifestations (not causes) of
historical grievances that were neither addressed
during the signature of the Durand Agreement of
1839 or the Bonn Agreement of 2001.
3. In
the absence of tenable alternatives, the Durand
Line simply must be enforced, as the evolution of
a greater Pashtunistan or greater Balochistan
would lead to the liquidation of both Pakistan and
Afghanistan in their modern sense, creating
political instability across the region that would
once again have a profound impact on the shape of
the global order.
4. That said, given that
the Durand Line is now seen as the enemy of
certain nationalistic interests, and given the
urgent need to embark along a track of
reconciliation, establishing a border commission
to develop a holistic border agreement based on
the Durand Line but signed by state and non-state
actors is absolutely critical. Such an agreement
would require a reconciliation process between
Afghanistan and Pakistan states and Pashtun,
Baloch, NWFP and FATA communities.
5.
Given that the presence of the Durand Line
continues to ignite nationalistic fervor, to
overcome the legacy of colonial discontent, and to
set the two countries on a path toward
reconciliation, a new agreement could be
undertaken, with a new name, even if the boundary
is fundamentally based around the Durand
agreement, yet reflecting that this is now a
bilateral agreement between both parties of the
current dispute. This would also serve to negate
the unnecessary politicization of the so called
"invisible" line thereby facilitating clear
delineation of border management responsibilities
to enhance the work of the current tripartite
commission; thereby bringing the border back under
the effective purview of international law.
Furthermore, such an agreement would form an
important part of the long overdue reconciliation
process.
6. Without a parallel track of
political diplomacy that seeks to overcome the
discontents of history, and in the total absence
of a peace and reconciliation process, the current
ISAF/NATO stabilization exercise is stop-gap at
best. Moreover, peacekeeping and counter
insurgency operations cannot substitute for failed
political diplomacy. Furthermore, a peace
agreement should be established between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, acceptable to India, and
brokered through the UN using the principle of
uti possidetis juris as the starting point
for reconciliation.
7. Given the contested
nature of the border area, it is impossible for
the international community to apportion
responsibility for lack of effective state control
over insurgency, terrorist, narcotics and
