Al-Qaeda refines its new fighting
spirit By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - As Washington prepares to
reposition itself in Iraq with more forces and
resources, al-Qaeda too is shaping its
transformation from an ideological movement into a
physical entity. This would serve as an umbrella
to unify resistance movements in preparation for a
decisive battle against the "infidel" West.
Away from the high-tech world and
sophisticated war machines, in the mountain
vastness of al-Qaeda's hideouts in the tribal areas
between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, this process is already well under
way. [1]
Al-Qaeda's harrowing experiences
after its retreat from Afghanistan in 2001 and
during military operations in the Pakistani tribal
areas of Waziristan cost it hundreds of arrests
and casualties.
As a result, al-Qaeda
reformed its tunnel vision and concluded that it
should concentrate fighters in small pockets to
establish tiny "kingdoms of heaven" all over the
Islamic world, instead of becoming involved in
global fights against US targets.
The
strategy finally began to pay off in 2006 in
Afghanistan and Iraq, where leading amirs
(commanders) are in place, although the losses of
foreign forces are fewer than al-Qaeda might have
expected. This process, therefore, is still in the
phase of implementation.
Crucially,
though, al-Qaeda has evolved from an "idea" with a
small group of followers into a tangible physical
entity, especially in Iraq, where the resistance
is on course to be fully taken over by al-Qaeda.
The execution of Saddam Hussein will help al-Qaeda
become the unifying force of all Iraqi warring
segments, very much like the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
Using Afghanistan and Iraq as
springboards, al-Qaeda aims to unite all
ideological allies under one strategic platform
where their thoughts become al-Qaeda's. This, it
is believed, will give them the courage to face
down the "demon" US war machine that has kept them
cowed in the past. The example is the new-found
harmony between Pashtun tribes and the Taliban in
Afghanistan and al-Qaeda and Sunni Arab tribes in
Iraq.
Al-Qaeda has targeted what it sees
as the repugnant association of ruling
establishments and Islamists in Muslim countries
such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. These
will be the new and broader fronts of wars fought
under a structured al-Qaeda command.
Reading between the lines of statements
issued last month by three pillars of al-Qaeda
confirms this development. These were made by Abu
Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq;
Taliban leader Mullah Omar from Afghanistan; and
Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's deputy leader.
Mullah Omar reaffirmed the Taliban's plan
for attacks in southwestern Afghanistan in the
spring as a prelude to laying siege to Kandahar
city and then unseating the US-backed
administration of President Hamid Karzai in Kabul.
Baghdadi's speech, delivered two days
before Saddam's hanging, points to al-Qaeda having
practically taken over command of the Iraqi
resistance. Any US idea of negotiating with former
Iraqi army generals for a ceasefire was dispelled.
This was reinforced by Zawahiri, who stressed that
al-Qaeda was the only player with whom the
occupation forces could talk in Iraq.
Significantly, though, Zawahiri warned of
the struggle being broadened to neighboring
regions once the Afghan and Iraqi struggles were
successful.
To do this al-Qaeda has had to
refine its appeal.
Al-Qaeda gained
immediate popularity in much of the Muslim world
after the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001.
Nevertheless, some jihadist groups maintained a
distance from al-Qaeda, despite its strong
anti-Americanism, and refused to provide it
support or protection.
There were various
reasons for this. In Pakistan, the jihadist groups
were close to the establishment and were not
permitted to associate with al-Qaeda. Others felt
that if they subscribed to al-Qaeda's program,
their specific causes, such as Kashmir, would be
harmed. This was true also of groups such as Hamas
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and outfits in
Asia.
Under the United States' squeeze and
international pressure as part of the "war on
terror", though, the armed struggles in Kashmir
and Palestine have slowed and the issue of harming
the immediate cause has become secondary. The
chill of distant enmity toward the US transformed
into immediate hatred, and al-Qaeda was ready to
harness these feelings.
The first
manifestation of this was the Pakistani military
operations in Waziristan from 2003 to last year to
root out "foreign elements" and al-Qaeda-linked
people. Many disengaged militants from the Kashmir
struggle were persuaded to join with al-Qaeda, and
they established strong pockets of resistance
against the Pakistan armed forces. This has proved
to be a valuable source of men, money and arms for
al-Qaeda.
This was the starting point of
al-Qaeda's transformation into a physical entity
to bring together myriad resistance movements for
its battle against the West.
The idea,
though, is not to draw individuals together under
one al-Qaeda banner. Rather, contradictions
between the various organizations, like Hamas and
the Muslim Brotherhood, the
Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan and the Jamaat-i-Islami,
will be reconciled, especially as al-Qaeda
considers that they indulge too much in election
politics.
The appeal will be wide open to
pro-Islamic segments in the ruling establishments
of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Pakistan to
side clearly with al-Qaeda.
First, though,
the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq have still to
be won.
