The completion last week
of a significant milestone in the construction of
one of India's largest hydroelectric projects, the
Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River, [1] was
greeted largely with indifference in the country
and abroad, even though it puts an end to one of
the longest-running controversies in the country's
modern history.
The contrast with China's
more majestic Three Gorges [2] project
is
quite stark, particularly in terms of
implementation speed, objectives and methods. The
wrenching shortage of physical infrastructure in
India cannot be resolved with an ambivalent
attitude toward such projects; therefore there is
much to learn from the Chinese approach in this
matter.
Local opposition Even
as the Indian project started in 1987, attempts at
resettling villagers affected by the dam
construction did not begin in earnest until about
four years later. In the case of China, resettling
most villagers was generally a simple affair,
although the menace of corruption proved
problematic in securing clearances. In the case of
India, the role of "professional protesters"
became more important, compounding the problems of
corruption and bureaucratic incompetence.
Opposition to both projects comes mainly
from people facing displacement in surrounding
villages. However, government authorities moved
quickly to effect resettlement of individuals in
China starting in the mid-1990s, in contrast to
the longer process required in the case of Indian
villagers.
The nature of India's
government, which allows an independent judiciary
to co-exist with an elected parliament and an
appointed bureaucracy (executive), has obvious
advantages in addressing imbalances. The contrasts
with China's unilateral approach, wherein all
three arms mentioned above are controlled by the
Communist Party, are stark, however, in terms of
implementation rather than in concept.
A
frequent complaint of protesters in India has been
about their inability to secure proper government
compensation, even after it is duly mandated by
local state governments, because of bureaucratic
corruption. While the problem of corruption is
equally endemic in China, the need to achieve
stated objectives by specific timelines provides a
more efficient framework. That said, it also
causes potential abuses of power, such as the
number of people reported "missing" because of
their opposition to the Three Gorges project.
Power to the people Dams are
controversial projects everywhere in the world,
because of their high environmental impact,
displacement of people and the large costs
required to be borne up front. In the case of such
countries as India and China, such hydroelectric
projects prove to be essential because of their
role in reducing dependence on non-renewable
sources of energy, as well as the efficiencies to
be had in the storage and distribution of fresh
water. In essence, dams are a compromise between
current costs and future benefits, and therefore
require adroit management of society's
expectations to have any chances of success.
The scale of people benefiting from both
these projects far outweighs the number of people
facing displacement in both countries. While the
Chinese Communist Party has managed to keep the
calculations fairly simple and straightforward for
the Three Gorges project, democratic India has had
to fudge its accounts to push its project through.
For China, the cost of the project has been
compared to the economic benefits in terms of
power generated and additional benefits from
regulating the shipping on the river.
In
the case of India, though, the calculations have
been skewed for various reasons. First, power and
irrigation benefits generated by dams cannot be
easily quantified because of extensive state
subsidies to farmers. These subsidies, on a range
of inputs including electricity and fertilizers,
must also be compared to the minimum price system
in effect for agricultural production. Any attempt
to cut farmers' subsidies have proved to be
politically suicidal, given the large number of
farmers in the country who vote the politicians
into power.
This is where political math
becomes more complicated - while a political party
espousing the cause of a hydroelectric project can
expect to lose the support of people displaced, it
cannot expect to gain patronage of people who
stand to benefit until after the project is
completed, by which time governments would have
changed hands more than a few times. In the
Narmada case above, a 20-year construction
automatically implies at least five governments
(not all serve their five-year terms).
The
heart of the opposition to such projects stems
from the lack of opportunities for farmers to
improve their lot. It is a strange feature of
India's economic growth that a number of regions
in the country have not enjoyed any
industrialization, much less the attendant
urbanization. Lacking employment opportunities in
towns and cities, most villagers tend to stay put,
and thus have greater reasons to fear displacement
that could imperil their already hand-to-mouth
existence.
Therein lies the Hobson's
choice for India, or at least its politicians. The
country's ability to grow its economy in a
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