SPEAKING
FREELY Tribal tribulations in
Afghanistan By Haroun Mir
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Much attention is
focused on the forthcoming jirga
(traditional council) that will be convened in the
Afghan city of Jalalabad once Afghanistan and
Pakistan agree to its terms and conditions. It
will comprise influential Pashtun figures from
both countries. Details of the jirga have
yet to be publicized, but already people are
questioning its political
value. Ostensibly the Kabul initiative is to
tackle bilateral issues between the countries.
In the absence of a democratic system,
consensus-building among different tribes through
jirgas has served Afghan rulers in their
most important political decisions. Traditionally,
the constituent elements of a jirga have
been important and influential figures in society,
such as tribal chieftains, spiritual leaders and
respected clergymen. Between them, they have
generally been complicit with the government's
decisions in exchange for privileges.
More
than three decades of conflicts has deeply changed
the socio-economic characteristics of Afghanistan.
The tribal chieftains have lost their influence to
mujahideen and Taliban commanders, many spiritual
leaders have left the country and moderate
clergymen across the country are being replaced by
young militant and politicized graduates of
Pakistan's madrassas (seminaries).
Therefore, a traditional jirga will
have less of a consensus-building role and more of
politicking one. The most recent jirga in
2003, which was convened to approve the draft of
the new Afghan constitution, faced major
challenges. Only Zalmay Khalilzad, then the US
ambassador and the special envoy of the US
president to Afghanistan, was able to force the
recalcitrant delegates in the jirga to a
political compromise. (Khalilzad, after a stint in
Iraq, is destined for the United Nations as the US
envoy there.)
But the situation in
Afghanistan now is much different. The Taliban and
their allies are much stronger and are active in
the whole south and east of the country. The level
of insurgency is at its highest since the Taliban
were ousted in 2001, and the absence of Afghan
security forces in some important
Pashtun-dominated provinces makes people obedient
to the Taliban.
In addition, Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence has significant
control over Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan, which
dates from the early years of the resistance
against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s.
Pakistan has also become a second home for
many Afghans in the border provinces. Therefore,
the government of Pakistan will have greater
influence over delegates at the proposed
jirga than the Afghan government.
The objective of General Pervez Musharraf,
Pakistan's president, at the jirga is
obvious: he wants to turn the conflict in
Afghanistan from the broader "war against terror"
into a local conflict. Musharraf falsely portrays
himself as a protector of Pashtun rights in
Afghanistan. During his most recent visit to the
US last October, he consistently maintained this
argument by referring to the conflict in
Afghanistan as a Pashtun struggle for greater
political representation.
Musharraf has
been able to sell his idea of a compromise with
the Taliban to US and British officials. He
portrays the conflict as a classical insurgency
against the presence of foreign troops. But
Afghanistan is in fact being used as an
ideological battleground in a struggle that will
not end with a political compromise.
Anyone who follows al-Qaeda and Taliban
statements will understand that they desire
absolute power. In their view, all democratic
mechanisms for a political settlement, such as
parliament or even a jirga, are
illegitimate.
Afghan President Hamid
Karzai, under massive pressure at home and abroad
over his lack of progress in bringing stability to
the country, is keen to find any political
solution. For the past couple of years, thus, the
government has worked hard to bring some Taliban
leaders to the negotiation table.
Contrary
to Musharraf's claims, Pashtuns in Afghanistan did
not boycott the Afghan presidential and
parliamentary elections. They are well represented
in all branches of the government. Maybe in the
eyes of Musharraf those who are represented in the
government and who collaborate with Karzai are not
"true" Pashtuns - only those who are with the
Taliban and who fight the coalition forces are
considered "true" Pashtuns.
Under pressure
from the Taliban, delegates in the jirga
will press for the withdrawal of coalition forces
from the south. They will also seek the
application of sharia as the official law, and in
exchange they will guarantee no more attacks on
government forces and institutions.
In the
absence of strong Afghan security forces, the
whole of the southern tribal zone will become a
semi-independent region, where al-Qaeda and the
Taliban will find a strong sanctuary. Pakistani
authorities will be able to divert international
pressure for their lack of cooperation in
Afghanistan by arguing that al-Qaeda and the
Taliban are issues with Pashtun tribes in
Afghanistan, and not with them.
Given the
current circumstances, it is highly unlikely that
Karzai will be able to persuade delegates at the
jirga to stop their support of the
insurgents and terrorist activists because the
Taliban movement imposes its will in Pashtun towns
and villages.
In effect, then, the
jirga will serve as a plebiscite for the
activities of the Taliban and their allies in
Afghanistan. In addition, with increasing
insurgent activity in the Pashtun areas, the whole
Pashtun tribal zone spanning the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan could become a legitimate
base for militant Islam and extremists.
Haroun Mir served for more than
five years as an aide to the late Ahmad Shah
Massoud, Afghanistan's former defense minister and
leader of the Northern Alliance. Haroun Mir
currently works as a consultant and political
analyst for SIG & Partners Afghanistan.
(Copyright 2007 Haroun Mir.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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