Page 2 of 2 AFGHANISTAN'S
HIGHWAY TO HELL The winter of the Taliban's
content By Syed Saleem Shahzad
operations of insurgent hideouts
around Kabul. After such operations, the Taliban
are no longer a threat to carry out any
conventional armed strategy," Laity said.
He added that after Baaz Tsuka, the
Taliban were forced to leave their positions near
Kandahar. "They refused to fight with NATO and
withdrew from the Panjwai and Zari districts and
in some
cases they even left their
ammunition behind," Laity said.
Standing
by a map on the wall, Laity pointed to the Musay
Valley. "That valley had become a hub for
insurgents from where they used to send suicide
attackers to Kabul. We carried out massive
operations and arrested a number of Taliban
commanders and diehards. Now the valley is clear.
The Tagab Valley in the northeast was also in the
hands of insurgents. We carried out another
massive operation to clean up and now the valley
is clear of insurgents," Laity said.
Laity
listed other NATO successes and told Asia Times
Online of plans for the involvement of the Afghan
National Army and the Afghan National Police.
The point is, though, that Afghanistan is
not as simple as one operation such as Baaz Tsuka.
There is always another side to the story.
For instance, the Taliban don't see their
withdrawal from the Zari and Panjwai districts as
a reversal. They say they only pulled out after
striking an agreement under which control of the
area was handed over to tribal elders sympathetic
to the Taliban.
This is similar to the
deal struck in the Musa Qala district of Helmand
province last September - NATO and the Taliban
pulled back after power was handed to pro-Taliban
tribals (see Rough justice and blooming
poppies, Asia Times Online, December 7,
2006).
Such agreements are now common
throughout southwestern Afghanistan, and clearly
benefit the Taliban more than they do NATO,
despite the NATO interpretation.
"This
[Zari and Panjway] is a success of the Afghan
people, who at the end of the day got peace
through this agreement, and establishing peace is
the actual purpose of NATO forces in Afghanistan,"
Brigadier-General Richard Nugee, a NATO spokesman
at ISAF headquarters in Kabul, told Asia Times
Online.
"We spoke to the tribal elders and
told them the merits of cooperating with NATO
forces, which would promote a lot of
reconstruction work in the area, including health
facilities, roads and schools, and the demerits of
cooperating with the Taliban, which would only
bring devastation to the area and the Taliban
would always lose whenever they fought.
"As a result, the Taliban elders were
compliant and struck the peace agreement. Now we
will support the Afghan National Army, the Afghan
National Police and the Afghan National Auxiliary
Police to move into the area and establish the
writ of the Afghan government," Nugee said.
"Now the Taliban don't have much room for
their strategy and asymmetrical attacks are the
only way for them. These attacks do not harm NATO
forces much. Eighty percent of the victims of
these attacks are Afghans, and that is why various
polls show that Taliban popularity has gone down
to less than 10% in Afghanistan," Nugee said.
Not so fast ... But just as the
Taliban see their withdrawal from the Zari and
Panjway districts as benefiting their long-term
plans, they are not too concerned about the touted
NATO success in the Tagab Valley northeast of
Kabul, where they say the resistance is far from
eliminated.
The valley is in Kapisa
province, which is predominantly ethnic Tajik, and
connects with the harsh terrain of Kunar province,
which lies opposite Pakistan's Bajaur tribal
agency. During their 10-year occupation of
Afghanistan, the Soviets never controlled this
area.
Obviously, the Taliban could not
withstand the NATO bombardment of the area, so
they simply melted into the forests of Nooristan
province, the mountains of Kunar province and the
plains of Bajaur.
They are now waiting, as
they were last year, for the green light from
southwestern Afghanistan, at which point they will
emerge from their hiding places to join the
planned mass rebellion. This could be any time
after March, once the weather warms up.
NATO is all too aware that time is short,
and also that after five years, many of which saw
US forces raining bombs on Afghanistan, hard
military aggression is not an option - it simply
increases support for the Taliban.
NATO
accepts that "Taliban" is a "generic name" for the
insurgency, which includes most segments of Afghan
society in the southwest of the country. Rather
than bombs, a political solution is needed.
For instance, the British in Helmand call
their mission a "security task" under which they
aim to provide security to the people, rather than
chase the "enemy" from its hideouts. All the same,
they do clear pockets of Taliban along routes
around Kandahar.
NATO has also redefined
the Taliban into two categories - "reconciliatory"
and "irreconciliatory". According to its
information, southwestern Afghanistan comprises
80% reconciliatory Taliban with whom it has
already started negotiations.
A new
governor in Helmand province, an expert in tribal
affairs, will attempt to invoke tribal traditions
for rapprochement with the Taliban. At the same
time, money and resources are being pumped in for
infrastructure and reconstruction projects to help
win hearts and minds.
This battle might
already have been lost. The Taliban want all
foreign forces out of the country, and they will
fight to the last to achieve this once battle
resumes over the next few months.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia
Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be
reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
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