AFGHANISTAN'S HIGHWAY TO HELL Softly, softly in the Taliban's den By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KABUL - In five years, US military might, from daisy-cutter bombs to high-tech
weaponry, could not smoke out the Taliban, who retreated to the mountains of
Afghanistan after being forced from power in 2001.
They emerged last year of their own volition after being welcomed back into the
community by various tribal groups, many of which are ready to join in a mass
uprising planned for the spring.
Seasoned British officers assigned in southern Afghanistan to
clean up the mess created by the Americans can sense that big trouble is
simmering, but they are convinced that any aggressive policy will aggravate the
situation.
They realize that they have to accept the Taliban's existence as a reality,
strike peace deals with them and allow them into the political power-sharing
apparatus. This, they argue, can be done through extensive reconstruction,
which is the only way to isolate hardline insurgents. Military might,
therefore, is to be used only for the security of the people, not for
aggressive armed campaigns.
In southwestern Afghanistan, the city of Kandahar and its environs are the
Taliban's main focus. However, their main strategic back yard is Helmand
province, from where they raise human and material resources with money flowing
from poppy cultivation. In the spring, Helmand will be the main engine for the
Taliban's planned capture of Kandahar and the proposed push to Kabul.
Helmand, understandably, has in recent months been the center of the
International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) operations, with heavy US
bombings and frequent engagements between the Taliban and British ground
troops.
All the same, the Taliban claim that of 17 districts in the province, they are
now in control of 13, either partially or completely. The deputy British Task
Force commander of Helmand province, Colonel Ian Huntley, dismisses this claim.
In an interview with Asia Times Online, however, he did agree that the Taliban
had secured some pockets of Helmand.
In response, the ISAF is redefining its approach, ranging from a "definition of
the enemy" to the role of foreign forces in society.
"There is no military solution to the insurgency," said Nic Kay, the British
regional coordinator for southern Afghanistan. Kay is a seasoned official of
the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and heads all operations in Helmand
province. He previously served in Pakistan and Afghanistan, besides serving as
a senior desk officer handling Afghanistan and Pakistan in the FCO.
"It would be a blunder if we assess the situation with a single-track mind. We
need to appreciate the fact that 'Taliban' is a generic name and there are a
whole lot of reasons behind the support for the Taliban in southwestern
Afghanistan," Kay told Asia Times Online in his newly built office at the
British task force camp in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province.
"One of the reasons for Taliban support is loyalty to local commanders, and the
sense at the moment is one of injustice, poor governance, corruption and
general incompetence. Once we tackle these problems, it will be easy for us to
find solutions," Kay said.
"We have conducted research, which does not have any scientific basis but it is
based on our feelings. After talking to the people, we believe there are two
types of Taliban - one reconcilable and the other irreconcilable. The
reconcilable Taliban are about 80%, and they are disgruntled because of bad
governance and corruption. The irreconcilable Taliban are those who are
ideologically motivated and loyal to their command structures. They are hardly
20%. We need to carefully assess both trends separately and deal with the
situation accordingly," Kay said.
In a related move, the governor of Helmand province has been replaced by
Asadullah Wafa, a former royalist and expert on tribal affairs. His task is to
revive tribal structures destroyed by warlords and later by the Taliban.
District shuras (councils) have been established across the province to
make contact with the Taliban. The traditional structures of tribal elders and
mullahs are part of the shuras, which to date have struck peace deals in
Sangeen and Nawzad districts. A peace agreement in Musa Qala was secured some
months ago.
"These peace agreements are actually a blessing for the people of Helmand
province as they have got rid of the fighting. In the meantime, it allows us to
address people's concerns, like law and order and development work," said Kay.
"For instance, three weeks ago the Afghan Auxiliary Police were deployed in
Musa Qala. The police have been stationed for the protection of specific
development projects like the National Solidarity Program, which is being
undertaken by the Bangladeshi NGO [non-governmental organization] BRAC
[Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee]. This includes the construction of new
mosques and schools, and in the meantime, with the help of the shura, we
have make sure that the Taliban do not disrupt these development works," Kay
said.
Kay acknowledged that despite the peace agreements, the Taliban still move
around relatively freely and that the shuras themselves comprise
pro-Taliban people. But Kay is confident that as long as all the protocols of
the agreements are implemented, gradually the writ of the Afghan government
will become stronger and the hardline Taliban will be isolated.
Huntley reiterated: "Our whole counterinsurgency approach rotates around
rebuilding, reconstruction and providing security. We do not aim to chase the
Taliban in the population.
"In December, in Operation Baaz Tsuka, we cleared Taliban pockets around
Highway 1, which is the main artery for the supplies of UK troops between
Kandahar and Camp Bastion, Helmand. In addition, we aim to provide security at
the Kajaki dam project [near the source of the Helmand River]. The dam will
generate 500 megawatts of hydroelectric power. We conducted an operation in the
north of Helmand to provide security to the whole infrastructure of dam and the
transmission routes and cleared the area of insurgents," Huntley said.
The British task force in Helmand is clearly taking careful steps not to
challenge the Taliban directly, but through invoking tribal structures to
isolate them, and through measures such as permanent vehicle control points,
which limit their movements.
These are practical steps, but some feel it might be a case of too little too
late. "Had our plans been implemented two years ago, the situation now would be
diametrically opposite," commented a junior official of the FCO on condition of
anonymity. "We have just started our plans, and the Taliban have already
reinforced their positions and geared up for their massive spring offensive. I
am afraid we missed the boat."
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can
be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
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