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2 US elevates Pakistan
to regional kingpin By M K Bhadrakumar
The hearings of the US congressional
committees on intelligence in Washington in the
past two successive weeks make it clear that the
administration of President George W Bush has no
intention of pressuring Pakistan over the
resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Moreover, there may be no need for the Bush
administration to pressure President General
Pervez Musharraf. The Pakistani leader seems to be
positioning to play a profoundly meaningful role
in US regional policy as a whole that will go far
beyond the
limited
turf of Afghanistan. In return, he can be
confident of solid US backing for his
controversial re-election bid as Pakistan's
president in September. (Musharraf seized power in
a bloodless coup in 1999.)
The Bush
administration's predicament was fully revealed in
the contradictory references contained in the
written statement handed in by the then director
of national intelligence, John Negroponte, during
his testimony before the US Senate subcommittee on
intelligence on January 11. On the one hand,
Negroponte claimed that al-Qaeda's core elements
are still "resilient" and are plotting against US
national-security interests from their leaders'
"secure hideout" in Pakistan and, furthermore,
that the Taliban and al-Qaeda maintained "critical
sanctuaries" in Pakistan.
On the other
hand, Negroponte described Pakistan as the United
States' "frontline partner in the war on terror",
even though Pakistan remained a "major source of
Islamic terrorism".
Again, Negroponte
estimated that the challenges facing President
Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul are
"significantly exacerbated by terrorism but not
exclusively attributable to it". Negroponte also
put in proper perspective the Taliban challenge by
saying it didn't pose any direct threat as such to
the Kabul government, though it could be deterring
reconstruction and "undermining popular support"
for Karzai himself.
Negroponte treated
with kid gloves the entire delicate issue of
Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in Pakistan's
tribal agencies, which is the heart of the matter.
Notably, he spoke with understanding about
Pakistan's genuine difficulty in cracking down on
the militants' "safe haven" in the tribal
agencies, given the potential for tribal
rebellions and a "backlash" by sympathetic Islamic
political parties in Pakistan, which are staunchly
opposed to the US military presence in
Afghanistan.
But the astonishing part of
Negroponte's statement was his observations
regarding the nexus between the "war on terror"
and Musharraf's own political future. Negroponte
implicitly acknowledged that Musharraf is
politically vulnerable and his ability to crack
down on the Taliban will, therefore, be
significantly reduced in the months ahead because
of the compulsions of the elections in Pakistan.
But elsewhere in his testimony, Negroponte
contradicted himself by virtually expressing
confidence that Musharraf's continuance in power
is beyond doubt, despite the huge criticism within
Pakistan about his remaining president as well as
chief of army staff. Negroponte said, "There are
no political leaders inside the country able to
challenge his continued leadership. Musharraf's
secular opponents are in disarray, and the main
Islamic parties continue to suffer from internal
divisions and an inability to expand their support
base."
What explains such verbal jugglery?
Indeed, statements at other senior levels in the
Bush administration in recent days have also paid
handsome compliments to Musharraf's cooperative
attitude in countering the Taliban challenge,
including at the level of the military leadership.
The commander of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan, General
David Richards, went out of his way on at least
two occasions in recent weeks to express total
satisfaction over Pakistan's role. He even
attributed to Pakistan credit for the reduced
level of Taliban activity since autumn.
In
an interview with an Afghan news agency last week,
Richards said the Pakistani army was fully
cooperating and was doing its best to stop
cross-border activities by the Taliban. He said
categorically, "It is no longer the policy of the
Pakistan government to see the Taliban in
Afghanistan." No matter Islamabad's past policies
in Afghanistan, Richards stressed, Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is now fully
cooperating. He then revealed that it was thanks
to an ISI tipoff that it had been possible to kill
prominent Taliban commander Mullah Akhtar Osmani
in Helmand province last month.
"The
conditions are ripe for a complete victory,"
Richards claimed. So what has happened to the
crisis that Karzai has been complaining about in
respect of Pakistan's alleged role in
masterminding the Taliban resurgence in
Afghanistan? Was it all a concoction by the
international media? (Richards actually put the
blame on the media for unduly exaggerating the
Taliban challenge.)
Someone also seems to
have advised Karzai to see the writing on the
wall. He too has calmed down. In his presidential
address to the Afghan Parliament in Kabul on
Sunday, Karzai refrained from criticizing
Pakistan. He vaguely attributed in a passing
reference all the "Talibanphobia" to "certain
Pakistani circles". Only a few weeks ago an
agitated Karzai indulged in a "public display of
resentment" toward visiting Pakistani Prime
Minister Shaukat Aziz through "hot words,
gestures, body language and finger-pointing", to
quote a former Pakistani ambassador in Kabul.
Evidently, Karzai has been advised by the
United States to restrain himself. There is a
deliberate US attempt to play down the gravity of
the Afghan crisis - and Pakistan's role in it. Yet
The Economist magazine wrote, "Insurgents allied
to the Taliban are believed to be planning a big
offensive. NATO has hopes its soldiers in
Afghanistan could forestall this during the
winter, through military pressure on the Taliban
and huge amounts of civilian aid. That strategy is
in tatters."
And indeed, the White House
is to ask Congress next month for US$8 billion in
new funds for Afghanistan, which is more than half
the $14.2 billion Washington has spent on the
country since the US-led invasion in 2001. And
about 3,200 US troops who were due to end their
tour of duty are to remain for a further 120 days.
A sense of alarm over the Taliban's
resurgence is apparent in regional capitals,
especially Moscow, Tehran and New Delhi. Top
leaders of the erstwhile Northern Alliance (which
spearheaded the anti-Taliban resistance) visited
Tehran in recent weeks and held consultations with
Iranian officials. Iranian and Indian foreign
ministers visited Kabul. The Russian foreign
minister was scheduled to pay a visit to Kabul on
Wednesday en route to
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