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2 India unmoved by flying
Tigers By Sudha Ramachandran
that the radar at Katunayake had
been switched off for maintenance work, but this
has not quelled the clamor for Chinese radar among
some sections in Sri Lanka.
While
expressing concern over the LTTE's air capability,
India has reiterated the need for a political
solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka. "The main
issue is to get a solution to the conflict.
Picking an individual incident of violence does
not help us to address the
root
cause of problem. The root cause of the problem is
the conflict, which is escalating," Indian Foreign
Secretary Shivshankar Menon said in Colombo last
week. "We are very concerned at the escalation of
violence recently, and [the] LTTE air strike is
one example in this escalation of violence," he
said.
India's support for finding a
political solution has disappointed those in both
countries who would like to see Delhi help Colombo
take out the LTTE's air infrastructure.
Although the LTTE is banned in India,
Delhi is reluctant to provide Sri Lanka with
lethal military equipment. It is not that India is
not aware of the nature of the LTTE. The Indian
armed forces fought the Tigers in Sri Lanka in
1987-90 and a former Indian prime minister, Rajiv
Gandhi, was assassinated by a Tiger suicide
bomber. Yet there has been reluctance on the part
of successive Indian governments to sign a
defense-cooperation agreement with Colombo that
would formalize a larger military role for India
in the Lankan conflict.
India's reluctance
to supply Sri Lanka with lethal military equipment
is in part the outcome of Delhi's increasing
frustration with the Rajapakse government's
pursuit of a military option rather than a
political solution to the conflict. India is also
annoyed with his government's military cooperation
with Pakistan. Delhi is unwilling to supply
Colombo with hardware that it will use against the
Tamils. Indian analysts are of the opinion that
dismantling the LTTE's air capability without the
Lankan government moving on finding a political
solution is counterproductive.
But more
important, it is the exigencies of coalition
politics that drive the reluctance of successive
Indian governments to cooperate with Colombo in
offensive operations against the LTTE. The
previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
government and the present United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) government have been dependent on
the support of Tamil parties such as the Dravida
Munetra Kazhagam (DMK). Fearing that provision of
lethal defense equipment to Colombo in its war
against the LTTE would inflame passions in Tamil
Nadu, prompting the DMK to pull out of the ruling
coalition, Delhi has allowed Tamil parties to
direct its Sri Lanka policy.
Noted
strategic affairs expert C Raja Mohan has argued
that while "all governments in New Delhi have had
to take into account Tamil political sensitivities
in dealing with the civil war in Sri Lanka, few
governments have sunk to the depths of such a
preemptive appeasement of Tamil coalition
partners" as has the UPA government. "Whether it
is in letting its allies proceed with the
controversial Sethusamudram [channel security]
project or in failing to take timely steps to
counter the LTTE, the UPA government has chosen to
abandon its national responsibilities rather than
invite any political trouble in the coalition."
The NDA too had Tamil parties in its
coalition. "But in conducting its policy towards
Sri Lanka, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government was
willing to explore sophisticated options. When the
Sri Lankan crisis re-erupted in 2000, Vajpayee
moved quickly with arms supplies to Sri Lanka, but
also pressed Colombo to embark on a negotiation
with the Tamil Tigers. This even-handed policy
helped strengthen the basis for a peace process,"
Mohan maintained.
The UPA government's "do
nothing" policy, its "policy paralysis" toward Sri
Lanka, has let the LTTE "evolve into a monster".
It has resulted in India "losing ground" with the
Lankan government as well as the LTTE, Mohan
claimed.
The IAF has reportedly suggested
to the Indian government that it consider
favorably Lankan requests for supply of
air-defense radars, shoulder-fired missiles and
surface-to-air missile systems. According to
reports, the government will restrict itself to
supplying only air-defense systems to Colombo, not
offensive weaponry.
The Tigers' military
muscle is being allowed to grow thanks to
Rajapakse allowing hawks to determine his policy
toward the ethnic conflict and Delhi allowing its
Lanka policy to be directed from Chennai.
Sudha Ramachandran is an
independent journalist/researcher based in
Bangalore. (Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about
sales, syndication and republishing.)
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