How Pakistan settled an al-Qaeda
score By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Internal squabbling between the
Taliban and al-Qaeda and exploited by Pakistan
forced many al-Qaeda leaders to move from the
tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan to
Iraq in search of new headquarters from which to
operate.
Senior al-Qaeda member Abdul Hadi
al-Iraqi, 46, was one of these men - and he paid
dearly for the move after being fingered by
Pakistan. On Friday, the Pentagon announced that
Hadi had been arrested late last year and handed
over to the US Central
Intelligence Agency.
Describing Hadi as "one of al-Qaeda's
highest-ranking and experienced senior
operatives", the Pentagon said he had been sent to
the US Defense Department-run prison at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
The Pentagon did not say
exactly where and when Hadi was arrested, but it
is believed to have been in Iraq. Asia Times
Online contacts confirm that he was exposed by
Pakistani intelligence after it received news of
Hadi's movements from Taliban sources close to the
Pakistani establishment. Hadi, as a hardcore
takfiri, [1] was seen as an enemy of
Pakistan.
Although the date of Hadi's
departure from the Waziristan tribal areas is not
known, it was about the time that several powerful
Taliban field commanders, including Jalaluddin
Haqqani, Mullah Dadullah and the Taliban leader
himself, Mullah Omar, affirmed their support for
the Pakistani establishment as a "Muslim state
with a Muslim army". They stressed that instead of
investing energy to destabilize Pakistan, the
focus should be on the jihad in Afghanistan
against foreign troops.
The one-legged
Taliban commander of southwestern Afghanistan,
Mullah Dadullah, had been sent to Waziristan with
a letter from Mullah Omar early last year and he
played a pivotal role in stopping the internecine
strife between the Pakistani Taliban/al-Qaeda and
the Pakistani armed forces. In the months after
this, Mullah Dadullah and the Pakistani
establishment agreed to a deal to support the
Taliban in Afghanistan (see Pakistan makes a deal with the
Taliban, Asia Times Online, March 1).
This re-emergence of a soft corner in the
Taliban's leadership for the Pakistani
establishment was the beginning of the end of
al-Qaeda's effective operations in Pakistan, and
al-Qaeda leaders felt that it was time to move
from Waziristan.
Al-Qaeda adherents were
not prepared to serve as foot soldiers under the
command of the Taliban. They saw themselves as
warriors with a much broader strategy aimed at
bringing down US military might. (For a report on
Al-Qaeda's move from Waziristan, see Ready to take on the
world, ATol, March 2.)
Why
Pakistan was after Hadi Pakistan's
alliance in the US-led "war on terror" turned a
whole generation of Arab fighters into foes. More
than 700 Arab fighters were arrested by the
Pakistani government after September 11, 2001, and
handed over to US custody.
This prompted a
segment of al-Qaeda to take revenge against the
administration of President General Pervez
Musharraf. A special cell was established in
Waziristan, Jundullah (entirely different from the
Iranian Jundullah), to carry out attacks, which it
did on several occasions, against Musharraf. This
placed Jundullah and takfiris like Hadi
clearly in the Pakistani establishment's
crosshairs.
In 2003, al-Qaeda deputy Ayman
al-Zawahiri spoke for the first time against the
Pakistani establishment, calling Musharraf a
"traitor" and urging Pakistanis to stand up
against his rule. (For more on Hadi and his role
in a conspiracy to attack Musharraf, see Pakistan and the al-Qaeda
curse, ATol, October 1, 2003, and Al-Qaeda cell caught in US
squeeze, June 15, 2004.)
Pakistan isolates al-Qaeda By
late 2003, the Pakistani military operation
against al-Qaeda in South Waziristan had left the
group somewhat battered, with its training camps
destroyed, but at the same time this created lot
of anger against the Pakistani forces. This helped
al-Qaeda spread its takfiri and
anti-establishment ideology among local tribes and
led to the formation of the Pakistan Taliban,
which by last year had formed the Islamic State of
North Waziristan and the Islamic state of South
Waziristan.
In this context, Mullah
Dadullah's arrival in South Waziristan as Mullah
Omar's envoy early last year was aimed at building
bridges between the Pakistani establishment and
these renegade Pakistani Taliban who were becoming
imbibed with takfiri ideology and who were
bloodthirsty for the Pakistani armed forces.
Suicide attacks were rampant on troops in the
tribal areas, as well as in Pakistani cities.
Dadullah's role paved the way for the
Pakistani Taliban to sit with the Pakistani
establishment to negotiate a ceasefire, and
Pakistani Taliban commanders such as Haji Omar and
Haji Nazir talked to Islamabad. Soon, a peace deal
was agreed for the two Waziristans, but on the
sole condition that all militants who were at
loggerheads with the Pakistani establishment would
take a back seat, leaving the lead to political
faces (see The knife at Pakistan's
throat, ATol, September 2, 2006).
Pakistan's priorities were crystal-clear:
it did not want anti-establishment elements
thriving under the garb of takfiri
ideology, although it had no problem with the
Taliban regrouping and carrying out actions in
Afghanistan.
Leaders such as Haji Omar,
Baitullah Mehsud, Sadiq Noor - all close to
al-Qaeda - and other prominent commanders were put
in the background and Haji Nazir became the most
powerful Taliban commander in South Waziristan.
Nazir, who was little known only a year ago, was
the one who ordered the recent massacre of
takfiri and anti-Pakistani establishment
Uzbeks in South Waziristan.
These
developments, including the infiltration by the
Pakistani establishment of the rank and file of
the Taliban, rattled al-Qaeda, which realized that
its ideology was no longer acceptable in
Waziristan and Afghanistan, and that the only way
it could stay in Afghanistan was if it agreed to
fight under Taliban commanders.
This was
intolerable for operators such as Hadi, and dozens
of them began the move to Iraq from Waziristan and
Afghanistan. And Islamabad swooped on the chance
when its intelligence learned of Hadi's movements
and passed on the information to the US, thereby
closing a powerful chapter of al-Qaeda's
operations.
Note 1.
Takfiris hold that Muslims who hold
anything less than an extreme view of Islam that
is intolerant of non-Muslims are themselves no
better than kafirs - infidels.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia
Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be
reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
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