Page 2 of 2 Pakistan gains from Taliban
split By Syed
Saleem Shahzad
western provinces
and parts of the southeast, as these areas were
practically beyond the orbit of the Taliban's
influence.
So in the initial phase,
Haqqani concentrated on realigning diverse tribes,
fragmented religious groups and former mujahideen
into well-trained combat units.
In the
meantime, militants who had streamed into the Taliban's
heartland of southwestern
Afghanistan from all corners of the jihadi
crescent gathered under the command of Dadullah to
form a very strong base.
This unexpectedly
big success gave Dadullah a lot of extra room in
which to operate, and he spread his wings. He
enhanced his influenced in North and South
Waziristan and even established contacts with the
Pakistani establishment.
Top commanders
such as Haqqani and Hekmatyar viewed these events
with some concern, although, because of Dadullah's
success, they could say little.
These
commanders felt that Dadullah was going beyond
fighting a war of resistance against foreign
forces to initiating moves that would ultimately
serve Pakistan's political and strategic designs
in the region. Under a deal between Dadullah and
Islamabad, the Taliban, using Pakistani territory
and with Islamabad's support, will be able safely
to move men, weapons and supplies into
southwestern Afghanistan (see Pakistan makes a deal with the
Taliban, Asia Times Online, March 1).
Haqqani and Hekmatyar feared that the
one-legged Dadullah would eventually leave behind
charismatic figures such as themselves in all
political and strategic matters.
Internal wrangling A feature of
Ghazwatul Badr was to have been a simultaneous
wave of thousands of suicide bombers. The idea
came from Haqqani, and he set up facilities for
the orientation of new squads. Dadullah,
meanwhile, has over the past months stepped up his
activities in North and South Waziristan to gather
funds and human resources to fuel his struggle to
hold on to southwestern Afghanistan. And as a
result of Dadullah's efforts, Haqqani's suicide
bombers were co-opted as ordinary fighters for the
southwest, centered in Helmand province.
Baitullah Mehsood, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and
Moulvi Sadiq Noor are the leading Pakistani
Taliban commanders in North and South Waziristan,
and as they are all close to Dadullah, they gave
him their full support.
This cooperation
between Dadullah and the Pakistani Taliban in the
two Waziristans was unacceptable to Haqqani and
his sons Sirajuddin and Nasiruddin, who are also
commanders. They had been settled in North
Waziristan for decades and had dreamed of the
emergence of an elaborate conflict waged under
their command from their bases in North and South
Waziristan through tens of thousands of suicide
bombers.
Haqqani, whose son Nasiruddin is
from one of his Arab wives, is the only Taliban
commander very close to al-Qaeda fighters. Most
Arabs and other foreign militants, especially
after the recent internecine strife in the
Waziristans between al-Qaeda-linked militants and
local Taliban commanders, now live under his
protection.
Haqqani eventually raised his
concerns at the Taliban's top shura
(council). He pointed out that he had been
installed as the main commander of the Taliban's
offensives, yet Dadullah was meddling in the
epicenter of Haqqani's command. The shura
did not properly address Haqqani's objections.
Haqqani was not part of the original
Taliban movement: he surrendered to them without
firing a bullet once they emerged as a powerful
force in the mid-1990s. And despite his stature as
a top commander of the national resistance against
the Soviets, he joined the Taliban as a
second-level leader without complaint. It was only
last year that he was appointed the main commander
and a deputy chief of the Taliban movement.
Mullah Omar's and the shura's
behavior disheartened Haqqani, and opened a rift
with Dadullah as the latter diverted a flow of
trained fighters to Helmand instead of their going
to Paktia, Paktika and Khost, where Sirajuddin is
the commander.
As a result, the intensity
of attacks on NATO and Afghan troops has dropped
considerably compared with last year, when Maulvi
Kalam was the commander of the Taliban in these
three southeastern provinces. Kalam was killed
last September in a NATO air raid.
Haqqani, meanwhile, was appointed
commander of the eastern province of Nangarhar,
where the Taliban have marginal influence. His
assignment is to sow the seeds of rebellion in the
comparatively peaceful province.
During
the resistance against the Soviets, Haqqani was
close to Hekmatyar. Now that these legends are
being sidelined by the Taliban leadership, they
are finding common ground in eastern Afghanistan,
where they have joined forces. In Haqqani's most
recent mission, warlords loyal to Hekmatyar
supported him in a successful operation.
So from their eastern war theater,
Gulbuddin and Haqqani are watching the Taliban's
new strongman, Dadullah, gain victories in the
southwest. He is doing this with the powerful
backing of the Pakistani establishment, which will
allow Pakistan to open a channel of dialogue
between Helmand and Washington, paving the way for
a power-sharing formula between Kabul and the
"moderate" Taliban.
These developments
have in effect separated the eastern and
southwestern areas of Afghanistan, and with it the
Taliban's long Ghazwatul Badr march to Kabul as a
single entity. This might not derail initial plans
for an uprising, but if such an uprising is
successful, it does not bode well for
Afghanistan's longer-term stability.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia
Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be
reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
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