Page 2 of 2 Opium in Afghanistan: A bad
trip By Hayder Mili and Jacob Townsend
increased, maintaining its
importance as a source of terrorist funding
domestically and internationally. One Afghan
diplomat lamented, "It makes no sense why the
donors are blind to what they can see." [7] An
integrated approach to counter-terrorism and
counter-narcotics is required, taking account of
the problem's three major dimensions.
First, proselytizing insurgent groups are
treading a fine theological
line
in financing themselves through drug trafficking.
Some drug barons linked with al-Qaeda, such as
Badruddoza Chowdhury Momen, have argued that "it
is a noble ... responsibility to spoil Western
society with drugs" (Asian Tribune, May 19, 2006).
This line of thought has a long tradition: in
1981, heroin trafficker and mujahideen leader
Nasim Akhunzada published a fatwa stating
that "poppy has to be cultivated to finance holy
war against Soviet troops and their puppets in
Kabul" (Eastern Review, January 1989).
The
difficulty is that most Muslim communities are
intolerant of drug use, and to claim that flooding
the West with narcotics is a form of jihad glosses
over the millions of Muslims addicted to heroin
and the associated infections with the AIDS virus.
Furthermore, despite the apparently clear
religious prohibition on the consumption of
intoxicants, the issue appears divisive in the
insurgency - as in Chechnya, Algeria and Somalia -
because some Taliban are drug users themselves
(Dawn, March 21, 2006).
These
contradictions should be exploited in approaches
to counter-narcotics operations. Ironically, it
was the Taliban who in 2001 produced a successful
opium clampdown, justified by religion. The same
leaders are now protecting poppy growers from
eradication. More than a third of the farmers
surveyed by the UNODC who had never planted
poppies responded that religion guided their
decision. Fear of eradication was a negligible
concern. [8]
Insurgent justifications
depend on potential supporters agreeing that the
ends of jihad justify the inherently sinful means.
Taliban spokesman Mohammad Hanif summarized the
difficult argument for his organization last year
when he opposed the cultivation of opium, but was
"happy with any means of combating Western
societies", including the production of heroin
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 11, 2006).
Opium eradication is a promising
counter-terrorism strategy if it can be executed
without damaging the livelihood of the average
opium farmer. For every leaflet and exhortation
from the insurgents justifying opium, the Afghan
government should be there to highlight the
Taliban's hypocrisy and advertise the damage done
to other Muslims.
Second, development
programs that offset farmers' loss of income also
need to provide some benefit to the pool of
unemployed workers from which the Taliban recruit.
Intervening in the opium economy means rearranging
a number of markets, including those for labor. At
least, the under- or unemployed should not be left
worse off, although, of course, the better outcome
is a self-sustaining development trajectory.
Compensation to farmers is probably
necessary. Options for delivering compensation are
complicated by the tendency of some farmers to
receive loans from traders and insurgents in
anticipation of opium delivery, creating a debt
burden that requires alleviation.
A plan
to pay at the end of the planting season is likely
to be resisted more strongly. However, payment at
the start of the season raises the risks of
cheating and also the costs of monitoring, since
some crops may need to be checked twice. The
United Kingdom's payments for not planting in 2002
and 2003 were unsuccessful, as farmers (and
politicians) pocketed funds and still produced
opium. UN officials report that micro-credit
programs have often been considered as an
alternative to direct subsidies. In essence,
donors would take over the position that
money-lenders currently occupy, with lower
interest rates and a prohibition on using funds
for opium cultivation.
Whatever the
offsetting option chosen, the amount pumped into
rural economies would need to equal that generated
by opium production minus the value of producing
licit crops and adhering to socio-religious rules.
An eradication program supported by compensation
and religious justification would trap the
legitimacy of insurgents in a pincer maneuver.
President Hamid Karzai's 2004 suggestion
for a "jihad on drugs" showed the right intent,
but the argument needs to be heard at the
micro-level through anti-drug proselytizing by
local religious leaders (Agence France-Presse,
March 7, 2004). With the precedent of the
Taliban's 2001 ban on opium cultivation and a
strong effort by the Afghan government - with the
help of foreign funds - to buffer the loss of
income, incitements to rebellion will be weakened.
Finally, the geographical concentration of
the insurgency indicates that counter-narcotics
tactics need to vary with location. For example,
eradication is difficult and possibly
counterproductive in Helmand and Kandahar.
Less than 10% of Helmand's poppy
cultivation was eradicated in 2006, a figure
subject to question in light of frequent reports
that bribes are successful in avoiding
eradication, particularly where government control
is weak. Where security is already poor, teams of
eradicators are likely to increase support for
local insurgents, who by responding violently can
demonstrate that they are protecting communities'
interests.
During counterinsurgency
campaigns, policies of attraction are at least as
important as those of attrition. This holds true
for an integrated counter-narcotics component. In
the north and west, there are relatively good
prospects for reducing and holding down opium
production through a comprehensive approach. Where
Kabul and the coalition can exert a degree of
effective governance, they can gain trust and
promote credible programs. An additional angle
that could be considered is a safe biological
agent to eradicate and suppress poppy cultivation.
As of last November, Afghanistan's
Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund had approved only two
projects across the south. [9] Where territorial
control is hotly disputed or in the hands of the
Taliban, the best counter-narcotics policy is
benign neglect toward cultivators and attempting
to interdict traffickers.
Priority
districts for implementing comprehensive programs
should be those that have a relatively strong
coalition/government presence and adjoin to
insecure or Taliban-controlled opium-producing
areas. Where successful, these demonstrate to
others nearby the intent and benefit of government
efforts. Perhaps the best way to spread this news
is to take participants from one district into
adjacent non-compliant or less secure districts to
share their experience.
Conclusion A three-year
commitment that integrates secured eradication and
economic offsets is a promising alternative to the
medium-term uncertainty of facing off against
insurgents without attacking their local sources
of funding.
The current consensus that a
decades-long project is required to turn farmers
away from opium needs to be challenged by a
strategy that views continuing production as a
paramount security problem. The economic
implications of opium eradication are huge for
Afghanistan, but if the country can be secured,
then the development challenges of the national
economy are no greater (or smaller) than those in
other destitute states around the world. The
difference is that Afghanistan will have removed
the primary additional burden it faces: violent
terrorist/insurgency activities funded by illicit
narcotics.
Hayder Mili is an
independent researcher specializing in terrorism
and security issues in Central Asia and the
Caucasus. Jacob Townsend is a research
analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute and has been a consultant on border
control to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime.
Notes 1.
UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid
Assessment Survey, Kabul: February 2007. 2.
UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, October 2006. For
information on coalition combat deaths, see iCasualties.org. 3.
Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Testimony to the US House
Armed Services Committee, January 2007. 4.
Senlis Afghanistan, Countering the Insurgency
in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making
Enemies, London: MF Publishing, February
2007. 5. Unofficial comments by international
staff working in the region, April 2007. 6.
Unofficial comments by international staff working
in the region, September 2006. 7. Author
interview, March 2007. 8. UNODC, Afghanistan
Opium Survey, October 2006. 9. UNODC,
Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment
Survey.
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