Pakistan is experimenting with the Taliban
yet again. The primary focus of the effort is to
delink the Taliban from al-Qaeda and bring them
back into the Pakistani sphere of influence.
Uzbek militants have been the first
"casualty" of this realignment. Potentially,
remaining Arab militants will be next. Tribal
forces in South Waziristan under the leadership of
Maulvi Nazir are at the forefront of this
"movement". Extremist notions of religion remain
their bread and butter, but new political
objectives also guide their
activities on the ground.
This, in short, defines the neo-Taliban
phenomenon.
It is critical to understand
the background, motivations and alliances of
Maulvi Nazir to comprehend fully what is
transpiring in the region. Maulvi Nazir (also
known as Mullah Nazir) is 32 years old, a dual
citizen of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and married
with a son and daughter.
Although he
currently resides in the South Waziristan tribal
area on the border with Afghanistan, he is a
frequent traveler to Afghanistan's Paktika
province and Kandahar, where he owns some
property. As is common in the area, his extended
family lives on both sides of the Durand Line that
separates the two countries.
He belongs to
the Kakakhel tribe, which is a sub-clan of the
Ahmedzai Waziris (who dominate parts of South
Waziristan). [1] Intriguingly, his first
association was with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hezb-e-Islami, a favorite of Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the days
of the anti-Soviet jihad. His battle experience
and guerrilla training are not that of an amateur.
He later joined the Taliban movement in
Afghanistan and remained politically aligned with
Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jamiat Ulama-e Islam.
He moved back to South Waziristan when the
Taliban lost their ground to US-led coalition
forces in November 2001. During this political
vacuum, al-Qaeda funds started pouring into the
Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal belt, and Nazir vied
for this treasure with other competitors,
including Nek Mohammad, brothers Mohammad Sharif
and Noor Islam, and Maulvi Nur Abbas.
It
took the Pakistani military and intelligence
leadership some time to realize what was happening
in the region because, at the same time, the
Indian military was amassing on Pakistan's eastern
border in 2002-03, creating a time-consuming
distraction.
When Pakistan finally started
confronting Taliban and al-Qaeda elements
militarily in 2003, Nazir was already prominent on
the most-wanted list. When he surrendered to the
authorities in 2004 as part of a deal with
militants, he got cleared and was soon released by
the military. Apparently, he kept a low profile
for the past couple of years - possibly at the
behest of his handlers in the ISI.
When he
was reincarnated in late 2006, he was supported by
the Pakistani segment of the Taliban led by Mullah
Dadullah. He also received approval from the
Taliban shura (council) that includes Siraj
Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran
mujahid and an important leader of the Taliban.
Nazir established his credentials as a new
emir of the Taliban by enforcing rigid sharia
(Islamic) law in South Waziristan - apparently
unhindered by government forces. He also directed
his supporters not to confront the Pakistani
military. He was supported in this endeavor by (1)
about a dozen independent pro-Taliban groups of
the area; (2) Punjabi Taliban (mostly members of
banned sectarian and Kashmiri militant groups);
and (3) his tribe members.
After
establishing some degree of control in a matter of
months, he challenged "immigrant" Uzbek militants
operating under Tahir Yuldashev of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, an action which led to a
bloody battle. The Uzbeks lost about 200 people in
the conflict - about a fifth of their total
strength in the area. The Pakistan Army provided
medical cover to Nazir's forces and also helped
him secure the bases vacated by the Uzbeks.
Major-General Gul Muhammad, the commanding
officer of Pakistani troops in the region, was
quick to appreciate this development by saying,
"Wana [scene of much of the fighting] will become
a model for the entire Waziristan region as far as
the campaign against foreign militants is
concerned," while also emphasizing that Nazir had
not joined the fight against Uzbek militants as a
Taliban emir, but as a member of the Kakakhel
tribe.
It is interesting to see a very
similar theme postulated by Nazir when he
addressed a press conference early this month: "I
invited you to see for yourself the changed
environment here after the expulsion of foreign
militants, who had made the area volatile for its
own people. Let the world know that Wana is now
free from foreign militants." The above two
statements explain the relationship between Nazir
and the Pakistan Army. It is not an ideal scenario
for Pakistan, but it has arguably opted for the
lesser evil.
It is necessary to explore
Nazir's motivation behind his campaign against the
Uzbeks and foreign militants. Besides Arab
militants in the area, there are some Uighurs
(from Xinjiang, China) and Chechens as well. In
the words of Nazir, the charges against Uzbek
militants relate to their involvement in "killing
and robbing tribesmen besides imposing their
self-styled sharia upon them".
Uzbeks
reportedly became enmeshed in local rivalries and
were blamed for increasing not only crime, but
also brutal assassinations of pro-government
elders (who were often dubbed by Arabs and Uzbeks
as US spies).
In addition, economic
interests also play a part in this power matrix.
Uzbeks started coming to the area during the late
1980s and early 1990s; however, the major influx
began after key developments in 2001. Uzbek
families managed to acquire large properties, some
of which were bought and some of which were
offered as gifts by the local people who entered
into relations with them.
The Uzbeks
worked hard and gradually developed some lands
into model farms. This became the bone of
contention between the settlers and the locals.
Some locals partnered with the Uzbeks in business
and also acted as their protectors. Others
naturally developed a grudge. On the other hand,
Nazir has always looked for economic
opportunities, and soon after his first victory
over Uzbek militants he publicly urged the
Pakistani government to initiate development work
in the area and specifically asked mobile-phone
companies to start services there.
It will
by no means be smooth sailing for Nazir, who leads
a group of no more than 3,000 fighters - mostly
Waziris. Family and friends of the assassinated
leader Nek Mohammad, a legendary figure, are still
supportive of Uzbek fighters and al-Qaeda
elements.
Mehsud tribesmen (the largest
tribe in terms of numbers in the area) under
Baitullah Mehsud are also resisting Nazir. Haji
Omar, a senior pro-al-Qaeda Taliban commander in
South Waziristan and an arch-opponent of Nazir,
while being interviewed by a British Broadcasting
Corp (BBC) correspondent about Nazir's anti-Uzbek
drive, gave a stern warning to the Pakistani
military: "Do not become a party to the conflict,
otherwise we will sign out from the peace
agreement we reached with the government" in
November 2004.
It is in this context that
Nazir's recent pro-Osama bin Laden statement
should be interpreted. [2] Contrary to Western
media assessments, it is likely that this
assertion is a mere public relations effort to win
support of many in the region who are sympathetic
to bin Laden. The statement should not be
construed as blind support for all things
al-Qaeda. For similar reasons, Nazir had to
declare Uzbek leader Tahir Yuldashev an agent of
US, Russian and Israeli intelligence before
attacking his forces. Such slogans work wonders in
the region.
To succeed, Nazir still faces
serious challenges. Uzbeks, as indicated above,
have supporters among the Mehsud tribesmen in
South Waziristan, and some Uzbeks have now shifted
to North Waziristan, which is largely out of range
for Nazir.
Second, the Punjabi Taliban
component of Nazir's forces may restart their
sectarian killing business as a night job as soon
as they succeed in their current task. Moreover,
there are no guarantees about how Nazir will start
behaving once in complete control of the area.
If recent history is any indicator, Nazir
may be a passing phenomenon, but this overall
strategy may open up an avenue for Pakistan to
reclaim some of its lost territory.
Notes 1. For details
about the dynamics of the Wazir tribe and its
sub-clans, see Ilyas Khan, "Pakistan's Tribes: Who
is Killing Who?", BBC, April 5. 2. Nazir said
that although he has never met bin Laden, "If he
comes here and wants to live according to tribal
traditions, then we can provide protection to him
because we support oppressed people."
Hassan Abbas served as the
sub-divisional police chief in North West Frontier
Province from 1996-98, and was the deputy director
of investigations in Pakistan's National
Accountability Bureau from 1999-2000. Currently,
he is a fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy
School of Government and is the author of
Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army
and America's War on Terror.
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