Page 2 of 2 SPEAKING
FREELY India and Japan:
Congruence, at last By Anirudh
Suri
friendship", India should not
allow China's strained relationship with Japan and
even Taiwan enter the India-Japan relationship
equation.
The Chinese have already been
warily watching as different aspects of the
US-India strategic partnership unfolds, and are
equally concerned about talk of a quadrilateral
strategic partnership among the US, Japan,
Australia and India - an
arrangement that clearly spans
China's borders along the Asia-Pacific rim. The
Chinese clearly do not want a strategic alliance,
formal or informal, among the Japanese, the
Indians and the Americans, which they allegedly
made clear to the Indians on the eve of Manmohan's
trip to Japan last December.
Interestingly, New Delhi was not
immediately enthused by the idea of expanding the
US-Australia-Japan trilateral strategic dialogue
to include India, but Beijing's demand that India
not join paradoxically only enhanced its desire to
pursue such an arrangement, possibly reflecting an
increased willingness among Indian elites to
pursue relationships and initiatives based on
their core national interests.
The
quadrilateral dialogue was kicked off on May 25 as
senior officials of Japan, Australia, the US and
India met for the first time on the sidelines of
an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional
Forum meeting in Manila. Though it has a clear
geopolitical significance, the grouping is likely
to be projected not as a formal strategic
alliance, but as a way to induce a constructive
engagement among the major players in Asia.
Implications for the US A
strategic and global partnership between India and
Japan largely bodes well for US interests in Asia
and beyond. US support and encouragement of this
relationship is predicated on the assessment that
the optimal strategy for maintaining order and
stability in Asia, as the region assumes the
mantle of the new center of gravity in the
international order, would be to support the
creation of strong democratic centers of power and
enhance cooperation among them, enabling them to
take the lead in solving regional and global
problems in the process.
Trilateral
cooperation among the US, India and Japan
therefore becomes immensely useful for the United
States for various reasons. First, it would allow
these countries, which share common values such as
democracy and rule of law and interests such as an
open and free Asia, not to be dominated by a
single power, to come together to help formulate a
vision and a strategy for the future of the
continent.
Second, trilateral cooperation
can also serve to demonstrate that US strategy in
Asia is best served by a combination of formal and
informal alliances that come together to serve the
larger US interests in Asia. Third, US-India-Japan
cooperation, with the possible addition of
Australia, could create a core arrangement that
could then evolve into a larger security
architecture in Asia.
It should be noted,
however, that this trilateral relationship must
not be used as a device to contain China; rather,
such a partnership should seek, by way of shaping
the strategic environment in appropriate ways, to
induce China to evolve as a constructive, rather
than revisionist, power in Asia.
The
India-Japan partnership in Asia and the world also
could provide comfort to a United States that is
feeling marginalized by virtue of being denied
membership in the East Asian Summit, among other
Asia-led initiatives. Strategic partnerships with
both countries, in addition to a strong
partnership between them, will allow the US to
maintain an active strategic presence in Asia,
even if it is formally excluded from certain
institutions and initiatives.
That said,
India, or even Japan, will not serve as the proxy
of the US. However, a partnership between the
democratic states in Asia will ensure that it
remains open and free, politically and
economically, that will in turn bring the benefit
of a protected commons that includes safety of sea
lanes, and a secure and reliable access to energy
sources. Moreover, it will allow Asian countries
to work together against the threats of terrorism,
religious extremism, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
India and
Japan today share a clear congruence of interests
due to systemic and structural changes in the
international system in recent years, in addition
to fundamentally sound reasons for a partnership
in the economic, political and military arenas,
amid larger strategic considerations. Firm
determination to give the relationship a concrete
form exists at the highest political level on both
sides and, as a result, both countries have worked
hard over the past few years to establish a solid
foundation for building the relationship into a
truly strategic partnership.
India will
undoubtedly continue to feature prominently in
Japan's global and regional strategy, while Japan
will most likely become a key hinge of India's
"Look East" policy and its efforts to become an
integral part of regional economic, political and
strategic discourse. Asian regional institutions
and even Asia itself, which count India as a key
member state, will look very different from ones
that exclude it.
While certain hurdles
exist, they are unlikely to derail the current
path of the relationship. China will warily watch
the India-Japan relationship, much as it remains
wary of the evolving US-India strategic
partnership, but if India and Japan tread
carefully, Chinese considerations should not
affect their relationship.
At the same
time, India, Japan, the US and Australia should
not seek to enter a formal alliance; rather, a
quadrilateral security dialogue is the best
mechanism to promote cooperation without ruffling
feathers in China. Most important, the India-Japan
relationship can become a key driving force in the
emergence of a new security architecture in Asia
based on the protection of democratic values and
market principles.
Anirudh Suri
is editor of South Asian Perspectives, a monthly
publication of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Based in Washington, DC, he
covers foreign policy, security and economic
issues in the wider Asia-Pacific region. He can be
reached via e-mail at
ASuri@CarnegieEndowment.org.
(Copyright
2007 Anirudh Suri.)
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