Taliban losing the will to
talk By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Back-channel negotiations
between the British Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) and the Taliban proved so successful
in Helmand province in Afghanistan that North
Atlantic Treaty Organization-led forces took
advantage of the lull in Taliban activities to
step up their offensive.
The result,
ironically, was a breakdown in the peace
initiative and intensified fighting that continues
today.
The FCO, the British government
department responsible for
overseas relations and foreign
affairs, began negotiations with the Taliban in
Helmand last year and continued through to early
this year. The medium was tribal elders and
religious clerics, and especially former Taliban
commanders who were also tribal leaders.
The talks, which were a part of an
official FCO policy to engage and "reconcile" with
the Taliban, resulted in peace agreements in many
parts of Helmand and Kandahar provinces between
the Taliban and the Afghan administration. By this
March, a lot of sting had been taken out of the
Taliban's much-vaunted spring offensive.
NATO forces, however, used the lull among
the Taliban's rank and file to step up operations
from March onward. This caught the Taliban by
surprise, and they retreated from many of the
districts they had occupied.
They
resurfaced over the next few months in large
numbers in the southwest on the border areas with
Iran, in turn taking NATO by surprise.
The
FCO is still looking for a broader political deal
with the Taliban leadership, but things have
changed. The Taliban, having taken up the
offensive again, want to keep the momentum going,
and few leaders now want to talk of any political
power-sharing formula.
A key figure in the
interaction between the FCO and the Taliban was
Rais Baghrani, a tribal chief in Baghran district,
Helmand province. Rais left the Taliban movement
several years ago. He engaged top Taliban
commanders, including Mullah Dadullah, who was
killed fighting coalition forces last month.
The initial motivation of the FCO was to
establish a more secure environment for British
troops posted in Helmand province and, second, to
obtain guarantees and safeguards for
reconstruction projects from Taliban attack.
Ultimately, the FCO's aim was to establish the
rule of law in the province.
The initial
motivation for the Taliban was to get some
breathing space and ultimately to take over full
governance of the province. The focal point of
this was to legitimize the Taliban so they could
take power, even if it meant sharing it to some
extent at first.
So the peace process
began to roll. The Taliban were talking and FCO
officials were allowed to visit districts in
Helmand province. British officials noted that the
Taliban were very relaxed; some commanders and men
went to Pakistan on vacation and others returned
to normal life.
All the same, there were
sporadic attacks and NATO believed that the
Taliban would never give up on trying to rule
Afghanistan. So intensive operations were resumed
in March. The Taliban lost many of their top
commanders, including Dadullah.
But they
have fought back, including in the Kajaki
district, where NATO forces are thick on the
ground to protect workers involved in the
refurbishment of the hydroelectric Kajaki dam on
the Helmand River. The dam, which was built in
1953, currently generates as little as 12
megawatts of electricity. It is hoped to increase
this to 51MW. According to recent reports, the
Taliban have retaken the area.
In this
climate, the FCO's desire to re-establish
back-channel contact with the Taliban is bound to
fail, especially as the Taliban are passing
through another transition in which various groups
under their field commanders are devising tactics
according to their own ideologies.
The
Taliban have also received a fillip with the
revival of activities in the Pakistani tribal
areas of South Waziristan and North Waziristan on
the Afghan border. The Taliban command center
there has gathered thousands of fresh jihadis.
They are mostly of non-Afghan ethnic stock and the
flag bearers of an emerging caliphate that is
envisaged to spread from Afghanistan to Iraq and
beyond.
As long as the number of these
jihadis remains relatively small, the Taliban can
remain flexible and pragmatic, but should global
jihadis become a dominant force, the Taliban will
become totally rigid and geared for idealist
absolutism.
With Iran and Pakistan looking
to further their interests, the Afghan quagmire is
deepened. At this stage, neither the Taliban nor
the coalition forces appear strong enough for a
decisive victory.
Thus the Taliban's
present push in the southwest will be watched
closely. Whether either side will be prepared - or
willing - to return to the days of back-channel
talks remains an open question.
Syed
Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan
Bureau Chief. He can be reached at
saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
(Copyright
2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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