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2 A change of US plan for
Pakistan By M K Bhadrakumar
Three top-ranking US officials spoke in
unison over the weekend, hinting at direct US
military strikes inside Pakistan - White House
spokesman Tony Snow, White House Homeland Security
Adviser Fran Townsend, and National Intelligence
Director Mike McConnell.
The US media have
since carried reports quoting unnamed sources that
the White House is already weighing "options"
involving "deniable covert action" by US special
forces inside
Pakistan; US air strikes
against "known terrorist compounds" in Pakistan's
tribal areas; or a large-scale ground offensive
across the border from Afghanistan.
Yet
twice within the week before these White House
officials spoke, assistant secretary of state
Richard Boucher gave an altogether different
assessment of the nature of the strife in
Pakistan's tribal areas, and Washington's approach
to it. On July 12, Boucher testified before
Congress and on July 17 he gave a detailed press
briefing in Washington.
Contradictory
assessments In his congressional
testimony, Boucher viewed the situation in
Pakistan with a high degree of equanimity. He
repeatedly underlined the US administration's
confidence in Pakistani President General Pervez
Musharraf's handling of the complicated
politico-security situation in Pakistan's tribal
areas. Boucher spoke optimistically about
Musharraf's "comprehensive strategy to combat
terrorists and extremists".
Boucher cited
how the Pakistani government's strategy was
already boosting the "capacity and will of local
tribes to resist and expel violent extremists in
their midst, achieving successes". He concluded
his testimony on July 12 by saying, "Pakistani
security operations in the tribal areas are
disrupting terrorist activities in an area where
terrorists previously felt secure."
In his
briefing on July 17, Boucher was even more
forthright in endorsing Musharraf's resolve and
capacity to act against terrorism. "The first
thing I would say is the Pakistani government is
dealing decisively with the problems ... the
government of Pakistan is prepared to move, to act
against dangerous militancy that has come to
infect various areas in parts of Pakistani
society." He viewed the so-called Waziristan
agreement not as an aberration but as in essence a
well-intentioned move on Musharraf's part that
somehow didn't work. This peace agreement, now in
tatters, saw the Pakistani military withdraw from
the tribal areas in return for the people there
stopping cross-border activity into Afghanistan.
Interestingly, Boucher attributed the
recent spurt in extremist violence in Pakistan as
a natural reaction to Musharraf's six-month-old
crackdown on militancy rather than as a phenomenon
of resurgence by terrorists. He didn't display any
concern as such about an al-Qaeda presence in
Pakistan's tribal agencies.
Boucher
categorically ruled out the need for any direct US
military involvement. He said, "That'll be for the
Pakistani government to decide how to go about it
militarily ... and we'll obviously work with
them." Boucher also asked rhetorically, "Is he
[Musharraf] capable of doing this without the
United States? The answer is yes, but it's not a
question that's really going to arise, because
he's going to have our support."
The most
interesting part of Boucher's presentation was
that, unlike the White House officials named
above, he believes the forces of militancy and
extremism operating in Pakistan's tribal agencies
are increasingly on the run in the face of
relentless pressure from Pakistani security
forces. And he drew satisfaction that Pakistani
Taliban are reeling under pressure too.
In
short, what we find is that within 48 hours, the
pendulum in Washington swung to the other extreme,
culminating in the stunning statement by Snow on
Thursday, "We never rule out any options,
including striking actionable targets" within
Pakistan.
But then Snow also shifted his
stance rather abruptly. On July 17, he had said,
"If you talk - when you talk about going in there
[Pakistan's tribal areas], you don't blithely go
into another nation and conduct operations ... we
are working with a sovereign nation which is an
ally with us, in this particular case. And when it
comes to Pakistan, the United States has, in fact,
been continuously working with President
Musharraf, and we're going to do what we can to
try to strengthen his hand in whatever he needs."
The next day, Snow followed up by giving
details of how the United States proposed to
"strengthen" Musharraf's hands - by committing
US$750 million over a five-year period for the
economic development of Pakistan's tribal areas
and by providing $300 million a year in foreign
military financing to support Pakistan's Frontier
Corps.
Snow repeated that the US couldn't
get directly involved militarily in curbing
militancy in Pakistan's tribal areas. He said,
"Pakistan is a sovereign government, and Pervez
Musharraf is a man who, as president of Pakistan,
has an obligation and a challenge to do what he
thinks is going to be most effective in securing
peace within his own land ..."
Evidently,
the White House spokesman came under instructions
to raise the ante overnight by hinting at direct
US military involvement in Pakistan's tribal
areas. What changed on the ground to warrant such
a dramatic shift in White House thinking? The only
new factor was that Musharraf's standing within
Pakistan became highly precarious after the
Supreme Court judgment in Islamabad last Friday to
reinstate Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad
Chaudhry.
Bhutto's travails All
of a sudden it began to look that Washington's
best-laid plans to work out a "democratic
transition" involving Musharraf and exiled former
prime minister Benazir Bhutto had gone awry.
Boucher had said as recently as July 17, "I think
it was noteworthy that Benazir Bhutto expressed
her support for the action of the Red Mosque ...
So there is sort of a logical, moderate center to
Pakistani politics that we hope we can help - can
emerge through a democratic election." Boucher was
referring to the Pakistani military's recent
storming of the radical Lal Masjid.
The
Supreme Court verdict dramatically altered the
political equations within Pakistan. For one
thing, Bhutto has begun developing cold feet about
Musharraf's staying power. At the very least, she
is marking time, waiting and watching the rapidly
developing flow of events. She has since told the
London Sunday Times that Musharraf "has lost his
moral authority. His popularity rates are down,
and it would be very unpopular if we saved him. We
would lose votes by being associated with him."
As an experienced politician, Bhutto seems
to have done her homework. Despite her anxiety to
preserve the US
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