Page 2 of 2 A change of US plan for
Pakistan By M K Bhadrakumar
administration's newfound goodwill
toward her (after keeping her at arm's length in
recent years), Bhutto's instincts of political
survival are getting the better of her. She sizes
up that in the downstream, an assertive judiciary
may now well proceed in the coming weeks to
frustrate Musharraf's plans to get elected for a
second time by the same Parliament and to serve
both as president and chief of army staff.
So Bhutto must be pondering: What is the
use of a political deal
even
if Washington were to underwrite one? She must be
nervous that the virulently anti-Musharraf front
comprising opposition parties led by former prime
minister Nawaz Sharif in alliance with the
religious parties and most minor parties may
already be stealing a march over her in Pakistani
public opinion. She cut a sorry figure by not
insisting that Musharraf should step down after
the Supreme Court judgement, as many other
opposition stalwarts promptly demanded last
Friday.
Bhutto knows that the mood of the
powerful Deobandi clergy is changing, too. The
powerful Wafaqul Madaris - a federation of
religious schools - may be showing signs of
shedding their aversion to the hurly-burly of
politics. Certainly, it now becomes very difficult
for Bhutto to mobilize electoral support in Punjab
and North-West Frontier Province. It is a matter
of time before Sharif will become the leader of a
reinstated Pakistan Muslim League (PML) once the
time-servers of the PML who gathered around
Musharraf begin to scatter.
Sharif is
straining to return to Pakistan. Unlike Bhutto, he
has no cases pending against him in the Pakistani
courts. Therefore, in a fair election, Bhutto
would still face an uphill struggle to become
prime minister again. The alliance of Punjabi
right-wing politicians and the militant clergy
would definitely be more than a match, even if she
conquered Sindh in alliance with Muttahida Qaumi
Movement. Worse still, the alliance may enjoy the
tacit support of sizable sections of the security
establishment, including rank-and-file soldiers.
The problem is evidently not a
straightforward one of the military's intrusive
role in Pakistan's national life. It is not as if
liberal democracy would ensue once the military
withdrew into the barracks, and which would save
the country from extremism. As a Pakistani scholar
put it, "Islamic parties have learned that they
can use the modern notions of elections and
democracy as instruments for advancing their
Islamic ideological agenda. They are not committed
to democracy and constitutionalism as a doctrine
for governance and societal organization. Their
commitment to democracy is purely instrumental."
Besides, the problem is also that the US
support for Musharraf (and Bhutto) is feeding into
Pakistan's boiling cauldron of political
antagonisms. Clearly, any deal with Musharraf in
the present scenario, under perceived US tutelage,
will prove to be extremely damaging politically
for Bhutto. Also, it seems highly improbable that
Musharraf, who is hopelessly isolated politically,
is in any position now to announce elections next
week - as he must - so that they could be held
just in time before his term ends in October.
Politics of fear Thus
Washington suddenly finds itself caught between a
rock and a hard place. It is no longer a matter of
a "moderate center" accruing in Pakistani politics
and providing "a basis for the whole society to
fight terrorism", to quote Boucher. The immediate
concern is, short of an outright army coup,
Washington has to figure out how Musharraf's
continuance in office can be ensured.
In
the present supercharged political climate in
Pakistan, the probability is high that a civilian
government that takes over power in Islamabad will
be highly sensitive about the public attitude with
regard to the United States' blatant interference
in Pakistan and its perceived hostility toward
Muslims worldwide. In short, any abdication by
Musharraf or the Pakistan Army from the political
scene becomes simply inconceivable for Washington
at this juncture.
The stakes are very high
for US regional policies. Under a representative
government formed on the basis of civilian
supremacy, US intelligence agencies wouldn't be
able to have a free run within Pakistan as they
can under Musharraf's acquiescent regime. It is
also a virtual certainty that the Pakistani courts
would begin to look into the horrific cases of the
"disappearance" of hundreds of Pakistanis in
security operations involving US intelligence
agencies during the course of the "war on terror".
Most critically, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) operations in Afghanistan may
be seriously jeopardized. Boucher virtually told
US Congress members on July 12 not to fiddle with
Musharraf's regime. He warned: "Much less
frequently mentioned is Pakistani cooperation in
facilitating the logistical support of the United
States and NATO forces deployed in neighboring
Afghanistan. Most of our support for coalition
forces in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan."
Given the interplay of these complex
factors, Washington may have to resort to the one
available "exit strategy" - imposition of
emergency rule in Pakistan. It is not Washington's
problem that the survival of Pakistan is in the
medium term critically dependent on the
restoration of democracy and rule of law. For the
present US administration, the priority will be to
salvage the war in Afghanistan. It doesn't want to
leave a legacy of losing two wars in a row. If the
end justifies the means, Washington will not
hesitate to engineer a pretext for the imposition
of emergency rule in Pakistan.
This is not
the first time the White House has invoked Osama
bin Laden's name at a critical juncture in its
political calendar. President George W Bush
resorted to the politics of fear with stunning
success during his re-election campaign in 2004.
Bush knows that the common American is trapped by
a fear of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. In the present
context, al-Qaeda becomes a "dual-use" fantasy.
A series of spectacular air strikes in
Pakistan's tribal areas, with their brooding
mountains, apparently hunting down the
near-mythical bin Laden, will surely brush up
Bush's image as a man of action in safeguarding
"homeland security". On the other hand, it is
bound to trigger such mayhem within Pakistan that
it becomes eminently logical for the army
leadership there to impose emergency rule and
postpone elections. And the international
community would have no choice but to accept such
an outcome.
At this point, Bush can be
certain of "bipartisan" support in any action he
takes in regard of "homeland security". On a
weekend that belonged to Harry Potter, Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid, a Democrat, said, "We
have the intelligence report, which says al-Qaeda
during this administration is stronger than ever.
I don't think we should take anything off the
table. Wherever we find these evil people, we
should go get them."
M K
Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years,
with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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