Jirga sidesteps Pashtun radicalization
By Haroun Mir
KABUL - After months of negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a joint jirga
(council) finally took place in Kabul. But the four-day gathering, which ended
this weekend, was more like a peace conference than a traditional jirga,
where belligerent parties should have faced one another and accepted the
outcome of the meeting.
Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and President Hamid Karzai of
Afghanistan made eloquent speeches in support of peace and a policy of
friendship between the two Muslim
nations. But they failed to highlight the main threat to the stability of the
countries - the intensive radicalization of Pashtun tribes at the hands of
al-Qaeda.
On Sunday, the 700-strong jirga approved a joint declaration to form a
mini-jirga for dialogue with groups of militants, including the Taliban.
The declaration also said that the sides would avoid hostile statements against
each other and that they would exchange anti-terrorism intelligence.
The declaration recognized terrorism as a common threat, emphasized the need
for a "war on terror", and pledged: "The government and people of Afghanistan
and Pakistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centers for terrorists in
their respective countries."
But the assembly was picked by the Afghan and Pakistani governments and lacked
representatives from the Pashtuns who fight Afghan and coalition forces, and
support the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
The jirga was to have taken place in the Afghan city of Jalalabad last
December as a Pashtun inter-tribal meeting to discuss the trans-border
incursion of insurgents from Pakistan into Afghanistan and the presence of
al-Qaeda and foreign fighters in the Pashtun tribal territories.
But it changed to become a conference between official delegations of the two
countries. The Pakistani delegation was mainly composed of Pashtuns, with no
major national figures from Punjab or Sindh among them. The majority of the
speakers from both sides defended the official position of their respective
governments in the ongoing blame game between the countries.
In any case, a traditional jirga is not the right mechanism to overcome
historic rivalries between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the majority of
Pakistanis, such as Punjabis and Sindhis, the jirga has no historic or
legal significance.
The absence of major Punjabis, the dominant ethnic group, proves that Pakistan
tried to limit it to a traditional council among Pashtun tribes.
The large number of the participants, and ambiguity about specific goals,
lowered expectations for the jirga. A few speakers from both sides
mentioned the main issues, such as widespread radicalization of Pashtun youth
and the lack of economic development in the tribal zones.
But the majority of participants limited their speeches to emotional mutual
praise, such as the great sacrifice the Afghan people made during the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, in the global fight against communism or
the assistance that the Pakistani people have provided Afghan refugees in
Pakistan.
In fact, this jirga should have focused on specific issues rather than
on broad and general discussions.
There is a difference in perception between Afghanistan and Pakistan in terms
of resolving issues between the countries. While Afghanistan looks at them in a
more traditional and tribal way, such as the jirga, the majority of
Pakistanis don't live under such a tribal structure.
In addition, Pakistan's military and civilian leadership does not want to leave
its national strategic interests in the hands of a traditional assembly. It
considers the jirga as simply a matter of inter-Pashtun dialogue.
The Afghan authorities should have focused mainly on finding solutions to the
Pashtun problem in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, because Pashtuns remain the
main supporters and backers of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Historically, Afghanistan is much better positioned to interfere in Pashtun
tribal affairs than Pakistan, because in the past 200 years the majority of its
rulers have been Pashtuns who have also claimed authority over the Pashtun
tribes in Pakistan.
Afghanistan and Pakistan face a far greater dilemma than their historic
territorial disputes. Because of almost three decades of intensive
radicalization of Pashtuns in Pakistani madrassas (seminaries), they are
losing their tradition tribal structures. Traditional leaders have been
replaced by the likes of Mullah Omar and Mullah Dadullah; the latter hardline
commander was killed in fighting in Afghanistan this year. Many traditional
Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan were killed during the war against the Soviets
or were assassinated by the communist regime in the early 1990s. A few left for
the West.
Pakistani authorities, in their struggle against India, have over the years
promoted extremist Islamic movements in the tribal zones to the detriment of
traditional Pashtun parties. Indeed, most traditional Pashtun leaders have been
sidelined by religious leaders. For instance, despite an agreement for all
traditional Pashtun leaders from the tribal zones to take part in the jirga,
just the boycott by one of Pakistan's major religious leaders - Maulana Fazlur
Rahman - was enough to discourage a number of leaders from participating.
The weakening of Pashtun tribal structures has had a long-term impact on both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In a traditional jirga, any decision made by
the chieftains, elders and spiritual leaders is binding on all tribe members,
which is not the case anymore, as the leaders have lost their authority to
religious leaders.
Second, issues in the context of the confrontation between the West and Islamic
extremism bypass Pashtuns' tribal interests. Pashtun youth, such as Taliban
fighters, consider themselves part of a global Islamic movement that does not
limit itself to any territorial boundary or tribal code of conduct.
Afghanistan faces two distinct problems with its neighbor Pakistan. One is
territorial issues, and the other is the radicalization of Pashtun tribes both
in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. In both cases, Afghan authorities should reach
a comprehensive solution with Pakistan for it to regain control of its Pashtun
territories.
The cessation of hostilities over disputed territories between Afghanistan and
Pakistan requires strong and brave leadership in both countries, rather than
endless bilateral peace conferences. Historically, bold political decisions
between rival nations have been made by strong charismatic leaders and not by
assemblies of people. For instance, rapprochement between Germany and France
after World War II was only possible with leaders such as General Charles de
Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.
Afghanistan and Pakistan should first work to regain control of their Pashtun
territories from the Taliban and al-Qaeda before engaging in deep negotiations
over disputed borders.
Both countries have a huge stake in the future of the Pashtun tribes. Hundreds
of thousands of indoctrinated young Taliban fighters in the hands of al-Qaeda
are a threat to the stability of the region. They are a tough and formidable
force to be used in a guerrilla war against any country in the region.
The Taliban are like a war machine. In the event of internal conflict in
Pakistan, religious parties could use them to fight against secular parties.
The only guardian of Pakistan's stability is its powerful military. In the
event of internal unrest and the military splits along ethnic lines or
ideology, the Taliban would become the only dominant force in Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda could conceivably create its own kingdom in Pakistan, as it did in
Afghanistan from 1995-2001.
Recent events in Pakistan should convince its military leadership that the
threat to the existence of the country does not come from India or Afghanistan,
but from extremist religious parties and al-Qaeda inside Pakistan.
The focus of North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led troops to fight
international terrorism as well as financial resources that are dedicated in
this war are unique opportunities for Afghanistan and Pakistan to overcome the
threat of Islamic extremism, starting by taking back the control of Pashtun
territories from al-Qaeda. In Afghanistan, without the presence of foreign
forces, it would be just a matter of days before the Taliban and al-Qaeda took
control of the whole country.
The United States, as a major ally of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, should
force the two countries to adopt a common long-term strategy against al-Qaeda
and Taliban ideology. The peace jirga is a good initiative to start
dialogue and build confidence between the two nations, but it is not the right
mechanism to make crucial political decisions to prevent the creation of a
"Talibanistan".
Haroun Mir was an aide to the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, Afghanistan's
former defense minister. He works as a consultant and policy analyst in Kabul.
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