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3 Afghanistan's ball back in
Pakistan's court By M K
Bhadrakumar
of the region cannot be
overlooked. Washington has calculated that armed
with the jirga's decisions, Karzai has a
solid case to stall any attempt by the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) at its summit in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, this weekend to force its way
into the arena of conflict-resolution in
Afghanistan. Russia and China spearhead the
grouping.
Besides, an intra-Afghan peace
process of the kind mooted at the
jirga will remain
exclusively under the control of the US, Britain
and Pakistan. Iran and Russia remain excluded,
despite their robust efforts in recent months to
barge in. According to Browne, Iran in particular
may have begun "backing every horse in the race"
in Afghanistan.
The US would prefer to
address China's concerns in Afghanistan
separately, despite China's involvement in the
SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. In fact, soon after
the SCO summit in Bishkek, which Karzai will
attend, Afghan Foreign Minister Dadfar Spanta
proceeds to China on a four-day visit.
The
prospect of a ceasefire can be expected to give
NATO forces much-needed breathing space. This
would enable NATO (under Washington's tutelage) to
rethink its strategy toward Central Asia. Most of
the supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan come
via Pakistani territory. Therefore, the
jirga's peace process, which will
incrementally free Pakistan from the distractions
over the frontier problems in its western region,
will lead to more wholehearted cooperation from
Islamabad for the consolidation of a long-term
NATO presence in the region.
Given the
fluidity of security in the Persian Gulf region,
especially over Iran, the US and Britain have
calculated that a Pakistan at ease with the
integrity of its state will make a reliable ally
for NATO in the medium and long terms.
Challenges ahead But both
Musharraf and Karzai have been weakened
politically in the recent period. The main
challenge for the emergent peace process arises on
the Pakistani side rather than the Afghan one. The
jirga carried moral authority, but is that
sufficient for translating changes on the ground?
First, to make the peace process work, the US and
Britain will have to depend on the military
leadership in Pakistan - Musharraf in particular.
This has implications for the overheated Pakistani
domestic politics. The jirga has raised
dust within Pakistan.
The fact is,
Musharraf has emerged from the jirga 10
feet tall. That isn't a pleasant sight for many in
Pakistan at the moment. Musharraf, in turn, will
have taken careful note of the extended standing
ovation he received at the jirga. He was
indeed the cynosure of all eyes last Sunday. He
finds himself catapulted into the lead role as
peacemaker in Afghanistan. To quote the New York
Times, "His presence at the final ceremony of the
jirga lent weight to the proceedings." No
one is disputing his prerogative to call the
shots. The name-calling by Kabul that used to be a
daily occurrence has given way to a gush of
camaraderie.
On his return from Kabul, he
told the media in Islamabad, "The joint
declaration and the formation of the 50-member
committee [are] a step in the right direction, but
it is not an end in itself, rather a beginning of
[a] peace process." He gently flagged that his
role is only beginning. That was a reminder to
Washington that his position as Pakistan's leader
is going to be highly critical in steering the
peace process through.
Musharraf expressed
confidence that the 50-member committee will
engage the Taliban and push the peace process
forward. But he held out a thinly veiled warning
for the benefit of Pakistan's Islamic parties,
which have lately become somewhat recalcitrant in
their opposition to him. He hinted that it is he
who will hand-pick the people to be included as
protagonists in the peace process. He said his
nominees should have "credibility and standing" -
a tall order for Pakistan's Islamic leaders.
Not surprisingly, the two prominent
Islamic leaders in Pakistan who claim to have
strong political bases in North-West Frontier
Province and Balochistan and who are strong
supporters of the Taliban - Maulana Fazlur Rahman
of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and Qazi Hussain Ahmad
of Jamaat-i-Islami - were kept out of the
jirga in Kabul. (A second jirga is
expected to be convened in Pakistan.) Both have
shown their frustration by resorting to anti-US
rhetoric. Musharraf now has the upper hand in
selectively "engaging" them, if he chooses to,
which he can use to advantage in the broader
lineup of political forces as Pakistan moves
toward presidential and parliamentary elections.
But even detractors in Pakistan grudgingly
admit the salience of the jirga. The former
interior minister in Benazir Bhutto's government
in the early 1990s, Naseerullah Baber, who is a
retired general and often touted as the "Father of
the Taliban", predictably criticized the
jirga but was forced to admit, "The US has
recognized the identity and political clout of the
Taliban by inviting them to the jirga,
which amounted to a confession of defeat on their
part, for they had never accepted the Taliban as a
party to the Afghan conflict."
Equally,
liberal, secular-minded sections of the Pashtun
community in Pakistan, especially the Awami
National Party, have enthusiastically welcomed the
outcome of the jirga. From this perspective
alone, the jirga holds the potential to
squeeze the jihadist culture out of Pakistan.
Putting faith in Musharraf may still work.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for
more than 29 years, with postings including
ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey
(1998-2001).
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