Page 2 of 2 Sri Lanka hunt turns to
Tigers in north By Ajai Sahni
sometimes younger) are required to
undergo two hours of military training every day.
While much of this mobilization is coercive, the
LTTE would clearly be able to muster a very
substantial force for any full-blown conflict with
the SLA.
Weapons used by the LTTE in
recent battles, as well as numerous seizures by
the government, suggest a considerable and varied
arsenal, including artillery, a limited supply of
surface-to-air missiles. mortars, machine-guns,
mines, large quantities of
explosives (more than 5,375
kilograms were seized by the government between
December 2005 and this month), and huge reserves
of small arms.
The resupply of LTTE arms
is continuous. The "Sea Tigers" are charged with
the task transporting weapons, according to Sri
Lanka Navy (SLN) sources, from Cambodia and
Indonesia. The Sea Tigers have an estimated 450
senior cadres and another 250-300 lower-level
cadres.
The current fleet consists of 60
improvised high-speed fighting craft (each with
four 225-horsepower outboard motors brought in
from Australia), capable of attaining speeds of
38-40 knots, and at least another 15 "logistics
boats" for transport. Despite a number of
devastating "wolf-pack attacks" with up to 20
speedboats - including three to four suicide boats
packed with explosives - attacking SLN vessels in
the past, the SLN has been successful at
interrupting Sea Tiger movements along the east
coast.
Weapon consignments are now
transferred to civilian vessels - including
commandeered Indian boats - outside Sri Lankan
waters, to the south of the country, and are then
transported along the west to the north. They
reportedly enter Sri Lankan waters from the Indian
side at Rameshwaram, under the cover of an
estimated 300-400 Indian fishing boats that cross
over into Sri Lankan waters every day.
Interdiction in this case has been difficult, and
has also resulted in some friction between Sri
Lanka and India, as the fishing boats have been
targeted.
Militarily, Sea Tiger
capabilities are insignificant. They are capable
of inflicting a huge disruption of civil and
military (including food) supplies to
government-held Jaffna, which relies entirely on
sea and air transportation from Trincomalee,
Muhamallai and India for its needs. However, as
one senior SLN officer expressed it, "Boat to
boat, they have nothing compared [with] what we
have. If push comes to shove, the navy will take
over. In an all-out situation, we will win."
The "all-out situation" is what the LTTE
is now desperate to prevent. This is the first
time in nearly two decades that the initiative
appears to have slipped entirely out of its hands,
and where it has been forced into an entirely
defensive position. The LTTE has, consequently,
launched a strident campaign emphasizing alleged
human-rights violations by government forces, as
well as a campaign for the creation of political
conditions for the resumption of negotiations -
including the ouster of the present hardline
regime, and the restoration of a government led by
Ranil Wickremasinghe, whose commitment to the
peace process and a negotiated settlement is well
known.
In Colombo, opinion is
progressively hardening in favor of continued
military operations, even among advocates of a
negotiated solution. These voices feel that
pressure must be exerted on the LTTE if it is to
be brought to the negotiating table in a measure
of greater good faith. President Rajapakse, on the
other hand, believes that military pressure,
combined with the evolution of ideas that could
help arrive at an equitable political solution,
are the necessary prongs of present strategy.
The Accelerated Eastern Development
Program is one step in this direction, and its
successes are expected to have an impact in the
north as well by using military force to separate
the LTTE from the general Tamil population. This
perspective is, however, diluted by rising
concerns about the capacity of the economy to bear
the costs of the war over an extended period. With
the unequal military balance between the
conflicting forces, and the LTTE's limited
capacities for positional warfare, the Tigers can
be expected to escalate terrorist attacks across
the country as pressure mounts in the north.
Clearly, no tidy "surgical" solution -
negotiated or military - is possible in Sri Lanka
within the present framework. A process of
stabilization in the east, and of attrition in the
north, has been initiated by Colombo. But to meet
all of its objectives, a broader military
offensive in the north will become inevitable.
Ajai Sahni is editor of the
South Asia Intelligence Review and executive
director of the Institute for Conflict
Management.
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