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3 Deep flaws in Afghan peace
drive By M K Bhadrakumar
This might look like the finest hour in
the foreign-policy record of the George W Bush
administration. Officials from Washington are
camping in the leafy US Embassy compound in
Islamabad, painstakingly putting together a new
power structure for Pakistan.
Yet the
international community doesn't say a word about
"unilateralism" or international law or
interventionism. It is hard to
imagine we are living in a
"multipolar" world.
What is unfolding in
Pakistan could have been enacted in any of
the banana republics in Latin
America in which US Deputy Secretary of State John
Negroponte served as ambassador in the Cold War.
A former prime minister (Nawaz Sharif) is
kidnapped in broad daylight in his country's
capital by the authorities, put on a plane and
handed over to a notoriously authoritarian regime
(Saudi Arabia) that practices sharia law.
Another former prime minister (Benazir
Bhutto) is meanwhile standing in the queue,
marking time abroad, giving an endless stream of
television interviews, waiting for the nod from
Washington to return to Pakistan, willing to serve
for as long as the US mentors desire. A general
(President Pervez Musharraf) in his labyrinth is
getting ready in his uniform to enter a civilian,
loveless marriage in Islamabad, because that's
what Washington wants.
Yet regional powers
show no interest in taking note of the enormous
groundswell of Pakistani public opinion
desperately desiring a "regime change" in their
hapless country. The regional powers are inclined
to accept that democracy should take a back seat
in the current circumstances in the overall
interest of "regional stability". They are
disinclined to react to the highly intrusive role
being played by the United States, with
potentially catastrophic consequences.
The Taliban the net gainers
They are myopic in their vision insofar as
a dangerous turning point has been reached in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The impact of the crisis
in Pakistan will be most keenly felt in
Afghanistan. It may appear at first glance that
Afghanistan stands to gain from the prevailing
pandemonium in Pakistan. Afghanistan looks
deceptively calm. It seems to watch with a
brooding intensity the furious pace of events in
Pakistan. There is already a certain slackening of
the Taliban offensive.
Meanwhile, the
sense of urgency is palpable in Washington somehow
to seek a political settlement of the war in
Afghanistan. Battle fatigue is setting in among
the coalition forces in Afghanistan. It has been
crystal-clear that the operations of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization are going nowhere.
There is growing frustration that peace is nowhere
on the horizon. The 50,000-strong NATO contingent
is failing in its mission to rout the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. Among the coalition forces, there is a
growing difference of opinion over tactics and
deployment.
The new British government has
reportedly told the US administration that in
Afghanistan, the coalition forces are "winning the
battles but losing the war". Among the Afghans,
too, there is a growing sense of despondency about
NATO's war strategy.
Last week, in an
interview with Agence France-Presse, former
foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah said the gap
between the Afghan government and the people is
widening. Growing insecurity, government
inefficiency and incompetence, and the absence of
any development have combined to generate a mood
of popular disillusion. "Today, from what I hear
from the people, it is something like they are
losing hope," Abdullah said.
Thus, all
things taken into account, Washington is gearing
up for the endgame - politically engaging the
Taliban. Quite obviously, the processes set in
motion at the Afghan jirga (council) last
month in the direction of accommodating the
Taliban in political terms are now being speeded
up. It was clear from the outset that the
jirga took place with the full blessings of
the US. (See Afghanistan's ball back in
Pakistan's court, Asia Times Online,
August 18.)
Most important, Washington
seems to have bought Musharraf's argument that the
Taliban's accommodation at present will benefit
his political consolidation, which in turn will
stabilize the situation in Pakistan. Conceivably,
Musharraf estimates that he will have something to
show to the Islamic parties in Pakistan by way of
an "achievement".
As things stand, Maulana
Fazlur Rahman, leader of the Jamiat-i Ulema-i
Islam (Deobandi party that conceived the Taliban
in the early 1990s), is more than willing to
collaborate with Musharraf in the Pakistani
political scene. Musharraf is badly in need of
political allies like him. A split among the
Islamic parties would suit Musharraf, as it might
help isolate supporters of Sharif.
Apart
from the "tactical" considerations (which are of
course an obsessive passion for Musharraf at all
times), the general would argue that bonhomie with
the Islamic parties also carries security
implications. It is hoped that the Taliban's
accommodation will make easier the task to contain
and eliminate the international jihadist groups
operating in Pakistan's tribal areas.
The
US seems to have more or less brought on board the
important Afghan anti-Taliban erstwhile Northern
Alliance groups, too. Musharraf also has been
reaching out to these groups. Former Afghan
president Burhanuddin Rabbani suggested at a
seminar in Peshawar, Pakistan, last week that
negotiations should be held with all Afghan
factions, including the Taliban and the
Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Rabbani
said, "The Taliban should be given representation
in the sub-jirga formed in line with the
declaration of the joint Afghanistan-Pakistan
peace jirga last month."
This has
been a remarkable turnaround for the ethnic-Tajik
Rabbani to make - ironically, on the eve of the
sixth anniversary of the assassination of Ahmad
Shah Masoud, the former leader of the Northern
Alliance, of which Rabbani was a part. But then
Rabbani is notorious for his fickle-mindedness,
especially when he is led to believe that he is
within sight of power and yet another leadership
role. Afghan President Hamid Karzai promptly
seized Rabbani's proposal to offer talks with the
Taliban. Karzai says he also proposes to bring his
estranged former foreign minister Abdullah,
another key figure in the Northern Alliance, back
into government.
Certainty of
chance A Taliban spokesman has since
responded to Karzai's offer. He has been quoted as
saying, "For the sake of national interests ... we
are fully ready for talks with the government.
Whenever the government formally asks for
negotiations, we are ready." He offered that
Taliban would be willing for high-level
representation at
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