Page 2 of 3 Deep flaws in Afghan peace
drive By M K Bhadrakumar
the talks
with the government. He has spoken of minimal
"preconditions", which would, presumably, relate
to an assurance from the US that the Taliban who
show up from their hideouts for reconciliation
wouldn't be arrested and dispatched to Guantanamo
Bay.
Thus, as the surrealists would say,
the certainty of chance is that an "intra-Afghan
dialogue" is finally getting under way. A sure sign
is
that the United Nations has also gotten into the
act. The UN secretary general's special envoy, Tom
Koenigs, has voiced support for talks with the
Taliban. Koenigs told a German daily, "So far many
have said we do not negotiate with terrorists,
meaning also the Taliban. However, the Taliban
movement is multi-faceted. You cannot lump all of
them together."
Last month, a German
government spokesman, Thomas Steg, hinted at
possible talks with "moderate and reasonable"
Taliban elements. Koenigs has since appealed for a
total cessation of violence across Afghanistan on
September 21 to mark International Day of Peace.
He claimed, "The response has been vast, and it
continues to grow. Help us make peace in
Afghanistan real."
When asked about these
trends on Tuesday at a Kabul press conference, the
visiting Negroponte wasn't dismissive about the
Taliban's offer of talks. Nor did he mention the
fact that the Taliban are a "terrorist" outfit
under US law and Washington wouldn't negotiate
with it.
Instead, he said, "We would want
to know the view of the government of Afghanistan.
Whatever happens, these talks by the Taliban
should be handled in such a way by the government
of Afghanistan that it does not in any way
undermine or prejudice all the important
political, social and economic accomplishments
that have occurred in this country."
On
the face of it, an "intra-Afghan dialogue" has
been an imperative need all along. But the
question today is, can this be made to stick at a
time when the situation in Pakistan itself is fast
spinning out of anybody's control? The crisis in
Pakistan is still unfolding and an increasingly
destabilizing situation is developing. And we seem
to forget that Pakistan has nuclear weapons; for
the first time, it seems within the realms of
possibility that these nuclear weapons could fall
into the hands of the Islamic militants.
The focus today ought to be on an
"intra-Pakistani dialogue". Veteran Russian
"Orientalist", former prime minister Yevgeny
Primakov, recently wrote, "It seems to me that
Washington, which is currently preoccupied with
deploying its military units and missile defense
elements in the newly admitted NATO member
countries, could miss the boat in Pakistan ... Is
it not time for the US to start consultations with
Russia, India and China regarding Pakistan?"
Misgivings in Moscow The
Taliban's political rehabilitation at this
juncture is certain to cause disquiet among
regional powers. Iran's resistance to the Taliban
would seem to be the hardest to overcome.
Everything depends on the United States' hostility
toward Iran. If the US-Iran standoff erupts in a
military confrontation, that is bound to have its
reverberations in Afghanistan.
The new
head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps,
General Muhammad Ali Jaafari, said this week, "The
Revolutionary Guards have identified all the weak
points of the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan and
based on this have consolidated the defensive
capabilities of our country. And if the enemy [US]
wants to take any impudent action, Iran will for
sure give a decisive and teeth-breaking response."
Russia and the Central Asian countries
would be particularly concerned. They have
consistently seen a connection between Islamic
extremism in Central Asia and the Caucasus and the
Taliban. Chechen Internet sites even today glorify
the Taliban. It is an established fact that Uzbek
extremists are engaged in the fighting in
Afghanistan.
Russia and the Central Asian
states would worry that once the radical movement
is allowed entry into mainstream political life,
Afghanistan could get "Talibanized". The ground
reality is that the Taliban today are by far the
best-organized force in Afghanistan. They could
easily eclipse other groups and establish their
dominance.
From Moscow's point of view,
such fears will surely push Russia and Central
Asian countries closer together. They will look
for the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) to provide a defense line against any
threat of creeping "Talibanization" across the Amu
Darya. But they would in essence be getting back
to the situation prevailing in the 1999-2000
period, after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
Russia resents that the US
has been arbitrarily proceeding with imposing an
Afghan settlement without any regional
consultation, even though the US (and NATO)
involvement is under the fig leaf of relevant
United Nations resolutions. The Russian Foreign
Ministry's major survey on foreign policy in March
singled out that an objective basis existed "for
arriving at an agreed option of de-monopolization
of the political settlement in the country, and at
the enlistment of all Afghanistan's neighbors
without exception in it".
The survey
recommended, "Regional organizations, including
the CSTO and the SCO [Shanghai Cooperation
Organization], can play a positive role in
stabilizing the situation around Afghanistan, in
combating the terrorist and narcotic threats, and
in forging real cooperation with that country. It
is useful to forge their interaction with other
international organizations [read NATO],
especially those engaged in the Afghan sector."
To be sure, Taliban dominance of
Afghanistan remains a specter that haunts Moscow.
Russian commentators have warned about the
futility of summarily re-establishing Pashtun
dominance in Afghanistan. In the Russian view, the
nationality question is not unsolvable but it must
be given time, since the non-Pashtun minorities
that have tasted power in recent years will be
reluctant to yield ground to the Taliban.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander
Grushko said in a newspaper interview in July, "It
is not in our interests that the Taliban
re-establish control of the country, the more so
since that would threaten other countries with
instability."
Russia projects its concern
in essence in terms of self-defense. But the
bottom line is that Russia wants to have a role in
Afghanistan. Russia certainly wouldn't want to
take its troops
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