KABUL - Taliban spokesman Qari Yusof Ahmadi has confirmed to the press that the
Taliban are ready to negotiate directly with the Afghan government. In contrast
to Ahmadi's previous statements, he said that the Taliban have never rejected
negotiations with the government. Earlier, he had insisted that talks would
begin only on the condition that foreign troops leave Afghanistan.
The Taliban agreed to negotiations a day after President Hamid Karzai extended
an invitation for talks on September 9. Although the positive response from the
Taliban is welcome, it is important
to consider what will be on the agenda for discussion and whether the
negotiations will have the impact everyone is expecting.
Will the negotiations address the larger questions confronting Afghanistan or
will these be reduced to a few local deals in the south? Will these talks
conclude an establishment of real peace in Afghanistan or merely buy time for
the belligerents?
These are some of the questions Afghans are asking. They are hopeful, but they
also know that the situation is very complex, which will require vision,
patience and real leadership from both sides.
Equally important to remember are the interests of the international community,
in particular the United States, which invaded this country with a very
specific goal in mind: to exact revenge on those who perpetrated the September
11, 2001, attacks in the US (al-Qaeda) and those who harbored them (the
Taliban).
Interestingly, despite the invitation to talks, both sides are actively engaged
in combat. Neither warring side has made any suggestion regarding putting a
ceasefire in place as a precondition for negotiations, which is odd.
Although the initial toppling of the Taliban regime and driving out al-Qaeda at
the end of 2001 was welcomed by Afghan people, subsequent military operations
against the Taliban and other insurgents, with the resultant losses suffered by
the civilian population caught in the crossfire, have angered people and Afghan
authorities.
It has undermined the credibility of the government and its international
allies in pursuing their "war on terror" in Afghanistan.
From what is known, the government is keenly evaluating the Taliban's positive
response to Karzai's offer of negotiations. The government has also welcomed
the Taliban's decision to drop their previous precondition for foreign troops
to leave Afghanistan before talking.
Talking to the Taliban and reaching any deal with them will undoubtedly change
the face of Afghan politics and may further strain relations with Northern
Alliance followers, who, helped by US money, special forces and air power,
drove the Taliban from power.
The issue of negotiations with the Taliban is hotly debated in media and
political circles. Some members of the Mushrano Jirga (upper house of
Parliament) in Kabul have already accepted the principle of negotiating with
the Taliban and have said that improvement of security in Afghanistan is
directly linked to the Taliban's participation in national politics.
A further point to carefully consider relates to who from the Taliban ranks
will take part in the negotiations. Will the majority of Taliban leadership
come to the negotiation table or only a few disaffected commanders who are
unhappy about the Taliban's links to al-Qaeda?
The so-called "moderate" or "new" Taliban, represented by their former foreign
minister Maulawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil or their former ambassador to Pakistan,
Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, have already warned the government and the
international community that they must negotiate with the Taliban or risk
further violence and ascendance of hardcore Taliban who might refuse to
negotiate at all.
But whom do they really represent among the Taliban ranks? Do they really have
any influence with the Taliban leadership that is waging the ongoing war? Can
they bring them to the negotiation table? Should Kabul be taking them
seriously? By including such people as Mutawakil and Zaif, can their
participation in national politics weaken the hardcore Taliban? Or should Kabul
be talking to the hardcore Taliban instead? Or both?
It is likely that the hardcore Taliban leadership with strong links to al-Qaeda
will resist talking to the government and its international allies. What would
be interesting to know is the numerical strength of these hardcore elements,
how close their links are to al-Qaeda and the influence they have over the
Taliban's war policy.
Only when this information is available can a strategy to influence their
choices succeed. If it is found that the local commanders waging the war are
largely acting independently and their agenda is not linked to al-Qaeda, the
chances for holding negotiations and succeeding in them are much greater.
It is quite likely that the US administration has realized the limit of its
strategy in Afghanistan and is trying to consolidate its gains ahead of the
2008 US presidential elections by orchestrating a deal between the Afghan
government and the Taliban that can be heralded as a "success".
Such a scenario makes good sense. For example, US strategic interests will be
guaranteed by ensuring the continuity of a friendly Afghan government and its
"war on terror", with a slight modification of shifting its war focus from the
Taliban back to al-Qaeda.
(Published under an agreement with The Killid Group.)
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