Page 1 of 2 Embattled frontier Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response
by S P Sinha
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
A good 60 years after independence, India's politicians have failed to satisfy
the aspirations of its ethnically distinct northeastern region. Policymakers in
Delhi agonize over the incessant insurgencies on this embattled frontier, where
99% of the external boundary synchronizes with India's international border.
Counter-productively, alienation and rebellion in this strategic area are
exacerbated by bias and insensitivity of agents of the Indian government.
Divisive strategies of political parties and an entrenched nexus among
politicians, bureaucrats and contractors contribute to the mess.
In Lost Opportunities, S P Sinha, a scholar from the Indian army,
presents a one-stop compilation of the insurrections in all the northeast
"Seven Sister" states. His core argument is that events beyond India's borders,
rather than ethnic impulses, are more potent influences on the area's fate. He
highlights the multiple linkages between insurgencies on both sides of the
India-Myanmar
border, where a "Christian cordon" exists among the Nagas, Mizos, Kachins and
Chins. However, overlooking the pernicious involvement of the Myanmar military
junta in drug trafficking and guerrilla-fanning, the author clings to the
illusion that it is "practical" for Delhi to cooperate with Myanmar.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan and current-day
Bangladesh have hosted nearly all the insurgent groups of India's northeast.
The rise of Islamist terrorism in Assam and Tripura is a direct consequence of
massive illegal immigration from Bangladesh into these states. As of 1996, some
15 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants had infiltrated into India, with
upwards of 4 million settling in Assam and 1 million in Tripura.
Sinha pinpoints the changing demographic profile of the area as the "heart of
the problem". (p 27) Since 1937, the Muslim League ministry of Mohammad
Saadulla encouraged migration of Bengali Muslims into Assam with the aim of
claiming it as a part of the hoped-for Pakistan. After India's independence,
the malaise was allowed to fester due to "misplaced ideas of secularism and
vote bank politics". (p 31) The prophecy of former US secretary of state Henry
Kissinger that "Bangladesh would over the years accentuate India's centrifugal
tendencies and carve out new Muslim states" is an ever-creeping reality.
When the British quit India in 1947, extremist Naga leader A Z Phizo voiced
demands for separation. As secessionists went on the rampage in the 1950s,
pro-India moderates like A K Sakhrie were tortured and murdered by the
militants. Coerced taxation, forcible recruitment of cadres, and arms
procurement from East Pakistan were part of the mix. The hostile conduct of
Michael Scott, a British missionary close to the rebels, undid chances of any
negotiated settlement. The spread of Christianity accentuated the Nagas' sense
of separateness. Across the northeast, missionaries "widened the barrier and
conflict between the hills and the plains". (p 229)
From 1967 to 1974, Naga youths picked for guerrilla training trekked to China,
which even opened a school for northeastern insurgents in East Pakistan. The
1975 Shillong Accord, which promised peace, was rejected by some rebel factions
under Chinese sway. Splits and internecine feuds between the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and the Naga National Council played havoc with the
lives of innocent civilians. A ceasefire has held since 1997, but killings and
extortion by the underground go on. NSCN's revival of the Chinese connection
and the visit of its top guns to Pakistan in 2000 raise doubts about any final
settlement.
Most Mizos did not press for separation from India in 1947. Unlike Nagaland,
the Church in Mizo areas opposed secession and violence from the beginning.
Perceived discrimination by the central government during the 1959 famine
triggered militancy by the Mizo National Front (MNF), which was welcomed in
East Pakistan. Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India deprived MNF of a
reliable ally, but it regrouped with Chinese aid and Burmese havens.
Factionalism in the MNF weaned away splinters to join the Indian "mainstream".
The MNF supremo threw in the towel on being co-opted as Chief Minister of
Mizoram in 1987. Peace lasts in this state owing to the presence of "an
influential political class favoring autonomy within India". (p 101)
In Manipur, the genesis of insurgency lay in discontent that the majority
Meiteis and their language were neglected by Delhi in its bid to woo Naga
militants. Once Pakistan's assistance dried up after 1971, a China-trained
People's Liberation Army (PLA) unit was formed to perform urban terrorist acts.
In the 1990s, the PLA forged links with the armies of Pakistan and Bangladesh.
In this decade, the distinction between above ground and underground politics
blurred. Clashes between Nagas and Kukis, the two minority tribes of Manipur,
were possibly instigated by Indian intelligence agencies and bankrolled by
Manipuri politicians. Violent demonstrations by Meiteis against bifurcating
Manipur to meet the NSCN's demands are now adding to the fracas.
In Tripura, the large influx of refugees from East Pakistan and the unlawful
transfer of tribal lands incited anti-Bengali militancy. Sporadic riots against
Bengalis resuscitated insurgency from time
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
Myanmar
border, where a "Christian cordon" exists among the Nagas, Mizos, Kachins and
Chins. However, overlooking the pernicious involvement of the Myanmar military
junta in drug trafficking and guerrilla-fanning, the author clings to the
illusion that it is "practical" for Delhi to cooperate with Myanmar.
