Page 2 of
2 Benazir's second
homecoming By M K Bhadrakumar
Bhutto's brand of secularism, and
are devout Muslims, she can galvanize Pakistan's
silent majority and thereby help isolate the
forces of extremism, which despite their loud
clamor and muscle are still a marginal phenomenon
in Pakistan's polity.
But this would make
her enemy number one for the terrorist squads,
diffuse and aplenty in today's Pakistan.
Similarly, the JUI can provide a useful bridge to
the Taliban camp. Though the JUI
forms a part of the Deobandi
Muslim movement and may pose as ideologically
rigid, Rahman himself is in practice a man of many
parts. He got along comfortably with Bhutto during
her second prime ministership in 1993-96, even
heading the Pakistan Senate's Foreign Relations
Committee. His inclusion in the new regime will
throw the Islamic platform in Pakistani party
politics into great disarray and almost certainly
reduce them to noisy rubble with no real capacity
to bite. Rahman is no stranger to the US security
establishment, either - having been a significant
protagonist in the Taliban saga.
The ANP
is expected to have a go at channeling Pashtun
nationalism away from the Islamist path. It enjoys
the confidence of Afghanistan President Hamid
Karzai, and can play a limited but useful role in
the current process of negotiations with the
Taliban. Unfortunately, the ANP is a pale shadow
of its past strength (and caliber) in the era
prior to the Afghan jihad of the 1980s when
Islamism got superimposed on the traditional modes
of Pashtun life built around tribal chieftains or
maliks. But in the present day circumstances, ANP
still provides a much-needed representation for
the Pashtun segments that remain defiant of the
Islamic leadership dictating the rhythm of their
political and social life, though its real clout
and gusto remains indeterminate.
The house
that the Bush administration has built in
Islamabad, therefore, is not bereft of logic
altogether. It looks imposing. It has interesting
possibilities. But the main uncertainty lies in
its durability. Pakistani politicians are
extremely quarrelsome. Coalition politics is a
very sophisticated form of governance that
requires tact and accommodation. The requisite
spirit of give-and-take may be lacking. Also, the
corporate interests of the army are bound to cross
paths with the vaulting ambitions of politicians,
especially if the politicians unduly insist on
civilian supremacy, as they will at some point.
The pervasive anti-Americanism in
Pakistani public opinion may seem a problem. But
then, the US has not been traditionally upset over
its popularity ratings in similar circumstances
when the end justified the means. In the entire
Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Washington
impassively enforced US dominance decade after
decade. A key ally like South Korea seethed with
anti-Americanism in the 1970s and into the 1980s
until democracy gained foothold and began
tempering the public mood.
Meanwhile,
there are three main directions in which the US
can help Pakistan. First, by remaining focused on
the central point that it is a long haul to bring
Pakistan back from its present slide into an
increasingly ungovernable country. That requires
commitment in intrinsic terms, both in resources
and in political capital. Nor can it be a
piecemeal approach. It must also take place in a
conducive regional environment. But the US has no
proven record in nation building. Washington's
attention span is usually limited.
Second,
the "war on terror" in Afghanistan needs to be
redefined. The Afghan insurgency is not a marginal
phenomenon that can be eliminated by force. It is
well rooted within Afghanistan and in parts of
Pakistan. (Arguably, it is relatively stronger
within Pakistan). The Taliban should not be
confused with al-Qaeda. A negotiated solution to
the insurgency is possible.
But, on the
other hand, the US (and Britain) should not be
cynical by loading the Afghan settlement with a
geopolitical agenda. Any attempt to finesse the
irredentist Islamist elements in the region as an
instrument of geopolitics aimed at perpetuating
the Western military presence in the region or for
encircling Iran or for advancing the US's
so-called "Great Central Asia" strategy will be
resented and eventually opposed by other regional
powers. At the moment, though, the Anglo-American
intentions are far from clear - to say the least.
The first step in transparency should have been by
widening the gyre of regional involvement in a
genuine intra-Afghan dialogue. But the tendency to
monopolize an Afghan settlement is what is on
continued display. The present selective
involvement of the United Nations is not a
substitute.
Third, Pakistan must be
provided with a guarantee of peace and
tranquillity in its Pashtun borderlands. Only by
legitimising the Durand Line as a proper, duly
accepted international border can this be
achieved. Again, Pakistani hegemony over
Afghanistan is inconceivable, but Islamabad should
nonetheless be given the confidence that
Pakistan's legitimate influence in Afghanistan
will not come under challenge.
Finally,
any enduring peace in Afghanistan will remain
predicated on that country's neutrality in the
geopolitics of the region. The bottom line is the
vacation of the Western military presence. But,
unfortunately, Afghanistan has come to be the
playpen where the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's gumption to assume a global
security role is being put to the test. Reducing
the NATO forces' casualty figures for assuaging
European public opinion should not turn out to be
the core objective of engaging the Taliban in
negotiations.
Continued, open-ended
military presence in Afghanistan increases Western
dependence on Pakistan, which, in essence,
increases the role of the Pakistani military.
Incrementally, the army has developed a vested
interest in the Western military presence in the
region. But that only contributes to the
assertiveness of the army in Pakistan's political
arena, and, paradoxically, it serves to undermine
the foundations of the very same comely
architecture that the Bush administration has
erected in Islamabad in the recent days and weeks.
The bomb blasts in Karachi on Thursday
night do have an ominous ring about them.
Admittedly, nerves are on edge in Pakistan. It is
a sign of the times that in an early impromptu
comment, Asif Ali Zardari, husband of Bhutto,
blamed the Pakistani intelligence agencies for the
bomb blasts. Bhutto herself demanded the sacking
of the intelligence chief. The government promptly
assured that there is no move to postpone the
elections due in Pakistan in January, but
suggested all the same that Bhutto eschew public
contacts for the sake of her own security.
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