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2 Playing South Asia's World War III
game By Chan Akya
Much
of what happens in South Asia appears
bewilderingly confusing to outsiders, as
centuries-old fissures erupt into the increasingly
dangerous modern environment. The most elementary
mistake to make here is to become emotionally
involved in media stereotypes. Instead, focusing
on the ultimate objectives of each interest group
- in other words, employing an approach dictated
by game theory - provides a logical framework
within which to examine
current events.
Nash in
Pakistan As I wrote in a previous article
[1], Pakistan's existence as an artificial
construct imposed by the British on the people of
South Asia was laid bare by the events that led to
Bangladesh's independence in 1971. Since then, the
confusion about the country's raison d'
etre has only intensified.
No longer
serving its intended mission as a homeland for the
region's Muslim population, Pakistan has instead
evolved into a perennially unstable country that
lurches from one crisis to the next. In practice,
Pakistan exists because it is unthinkable for
anyone in Western capitals to have the country
break down further.
It has certainly
rejected democracy, but has much cause to be upset
with Western allies such as the United States who
have proved fair-weather friends more than once.
Pakistan hasn't done itself too many favors in the
past few years by lurching between support for the
US and the "traditional" antagonism demanded by
its population to the bete noire of the
Arab Street, the US.
I have made no secret
of the regard in which Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
deserves to be held by both developmental
economists and the world's
geopolitically-sensitive population, for the
honest and capable attempt made at turning around
the economy [2]. Increasingly though, with his
mentor sinking into an ever-greater hole, the
prime minister's position appears tenuous. His
importance though is only likely to increase
because of these events.
This is the
person, not President General Pervez Musharraf,
who can move Pakistan from its fractious past to a
better future. By focusing on industrial
development, infrastructure growth and freeing up
the wheels of finance, Aziz has helped to spark
the first real phase of sustained economic growth
in the country for the past few decades. To be
sure, the external environment of strong growth in
various parts of Asia has also helped, but the
fact that Pakistan isn't lagging behind is
certainly good news.
The biggest threat to
his work comes not so much from Islamic
fundamentalists, but rather the "democratic"
alternative, namely former premiers Benazir
Bhutto, or indeed Nawaz Sharif. The former is now
re-enacting the events of the late 1980s when the
US swept General Zia ul-Haq under the carpet and
ushered in a new era for democracy in Pakistan,
albeit quite short-lived.
Even as many
media outlets portray these two leaders as beacons
of democracy, their record while in power proved
dismal, with economic growth sliding to a
standstill even as inflation increased. It was
their record of corruption while in power and
frequent squabbling that led the Pakistani people
to distrust democracy, and it is quite ironic to
see events coming full circle.
Employing
game theory to understand Pakistan proves
productive. The country is the sovereign
equivalent of the Nash Equilibrium - a dilemma in
which all the players accept sub-optimal outcomes
because they simply cannot trust each other. Thus,
while the US accepts cohabitation with a ruthless
dictator because it distrusts the alternatives,
the Pakistani people accept the lack of democracy
because the record of economic growth under the
military was better. This equilibrium prevailed
from September 11, 2001, to its sixth anniversary,
roughly.
For some reason, folks in
Washington seem to have decided to throw out the
rulebook and try to create a new game, in which
they may have assumed that the wily general would
accept a reduced role. The "savior" would be
Bhutto again, this time to provide popular
legitimacy to America's biggest friend in the
region.
The idea was probably to blunt the
increasing popularity of Islamic fundamentalists
among the Pakistani public by bringing in a leader
with her own fanatical fan following. Thus it was
almost guaranteed that the former would try to get
rid of the latter - as seen in the suicide bomb
blasts that greeted Bhutto's welcome parade when
returning to the country after years of exile.
Separately, the general had his own game,
which demanded clinging at all times to the
buttons that launch Pakistan's nuclear weapons, to
ensure his survival. Handing over those controls
to a civilian prime minister was likely to make
the general a toothless president, a ceremonial
role that he was clearly going to be unhappy with.
That leaves everyone with the dilemma of
whom to support - the general again, which could
possibly increase popular support for Islamic
fundamentalists, or the forces of democracy, that
would
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