Afghan counterinsurgency by the
book By Fawzia Sheikh
KABUL - The Afghanistan Counterinsurgency
Academy is a work in progress - the clamor of
construction, the bulldozing of garbage and the
sparse staff are all clear signs.
Built on
a former Canadian military base near the
bullet-ridden palace of Afghanistan's former royal
family, the COIN Academy, as it is known, is on
the verge of acquiring a dining facility, a
lecture hall and other services.
"The
academy is still in survival mode," US Army Major Luke
Meyers, the academy's
operations chief, told Inter Press Service (IPS).
"We're trying to build this as fast as we can but
it's taking time. We're six years behind really,
to be honest. We're glad we've made this step at
least."
Following pressure from top
American military officials, the COIN Academy
opened in April nearly six years after the
invasion of Afghanistan while a counterpart school
in Iraq was established in 2005. Afghanistan's
facility recently shifted to its new location on
the outskirts of Kabul.
The nature of the
fight in Afghanistan is described as a
counterinsurgency, the kind of conflict American
soldiers have not faced since the war in Vietnam.
This brand of warfare is defined as the combined
"military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions taken by a
government to defeat insurgency", according to a
manual on the subject issued by the US military
last year.
Political power is the central
issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies;
each side wants civilians to accept its governance
or authority as legitimate, the manual states. The
document goes on to say that counterinsurgency is
a complex form of warfare that seeks the
population's support by offering protection and
services like water and medical care, among other
things.
The school aims to teach
counterinsurgency practices to newly arrived
Western trainers sent to embed with the Afghan
security forces, as well as to coalition forces
and to senior members of the Afghan military,
police and intelligence services.
But is
it a useful effort at this stage in the war?
Policy makers interviewed in Washington seem to
think so.
"I guess it would fall under the
heading of better later than never," said US
Congressman Adam Smith, a Washington state
Democrat and member and chairman of a
congressional subcommittee on terrorism,
unconventional threats and capabilities.
Smith rejects the notion that the
academy's creation suggests that the Bush
administration is paying more attention to the war
in Afghanistan. "We're not increasing troop levels
there. We are still behind the game in terms of
providing the money, operating infrastructure,
support. So however much they want to pay
attention to Afghanistan ... 80% of our military
assets are still committed to Iraq," he told IPS.
Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at the
Center for American Progress, a Washington-based
think-tank, said the COIN Academy must succeed.
Dismissing the idea Iraq is the central front in
the war against terrorism, he said, "This is where
the attacks came from. This is where al-Qaeda
central has reconstituted itself. I've rarely ever
seen such a botched opportunity. Now, hopefully,
it's not too late."
He said operating the
school, however, should be part of a multi-faceted
counterinsurgency approach that calls for the
addition of 20,000 extra troops redirected from
Iraq, a re-evaluated counter-narcotics strategy,
better-funded and managed reconstruction goals and
increased US pressure on Pakistan to be a more
reliable partner in fighting insurgents.
In one indication Washington recognizes
the significance of the international fight in
Afghanistan, President George W Bush intends to
redirect some funding earmarked for Afghan army
training to police training. The police force has
long been a second priority as the army's role in
securing the country's borders and fighting
insurgents took front and center.
Despite
some positive signs, back at the COIN Academy,
Meyers, the operations chief, laments his team's
requisite "sales job of fighting for money and
resourcing" while the US government is so focused
on fueling the Iraq war machine.
The
academy received US$1 million this year but is
lobbying for an annual budget of $7-9 million to
spend on paying instructors and for building
infrastructure. "It's taking a while for the word
to get out," Meyers said about the school. He
added that he and his colleagues are still trying
to gain the support of key players in the US
government.
The COIN Academy shares
lessons garnered on the battlefield with its Iraq
counterpart and with military learning centers in
the US. In another year, Meyers told IPS, his team
hopes Afghan officers will join the staff.
The cornerstone of the academy is a
five-day leaders' course that so far has taught
400 students. The curriculum includes information
about the conflict's key participants (including
countries and coalitions), advice on operating in
Afghanistan, details about ethnic and tribal
concerns in various regions and the history of
attacks, violence and threats across the country,
he said.
He said students are given a
handbook in English, Dari and Pashtu to help carry
out missions, and which can be taken onto the
battlefield instead of a laptop computer.
During each course, academy staff bring in
between 80 to 100 students and divide them into
groups focusing on each of the country's five
regions, explained Meyers. He said embedded
Western trainers arrive in the country and spend
time with Afghan army and police from the area to
which they will be assigned.
"There's a
benefit [to] them of living, eating and studying
together," a practice not followed at the Iraq
COIN Academy, he continued. "Most of the learning
actually takes place outside of the classroom,
whether its language, cultural, just general
questions about Afghanistan."
Meyers
related a story illustrating the advantages of
Westerners and Afghans working together. In one of
the earlier courses, he said, instructors
presented the group with a particular scenario
about one of the country's regions.
An
American officer confidently replied: "Here's the
answer. Problem solved. Class is over. But an
Afghan officer disputed the response, telling his
American counterpart he had not considered certain
issues like the fact the mountains are in the
east, the language is Dari, not Pashtu, and the
region has electricity for only three hours a day.
"Everyone doesn't know everything. It's
not just US-led. It takes time to understand what
everyone can bring to the table," concluded
Meyers, adding that most senior Afghan officers
have operated in a counterinsurgency environment
longer than any US soldier.
Fawzia
Sheikh was recently embedded with US troops in
Afghanistan. Interviews for this story were
carried out in Afghanistan and the US.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
