Page 2 of 2 COMMENT Neo-cons
have it wrong on Pakistan By
Najum Mushtaq
lose sight of the
fact that instability has grown during Musharraf's
rule. More of Musharraf and his generals will
bring more of the same.
Fallacious
faultlines Another insult to common sense
and to Pakistani citizens' intelligence is
Krauthammer's three-way distribution of the
country's body politic. His biased neo-con
perception sees in Pakistan, on one side, the
Taliban, and on the other, two
"Westernized" groups of the
military and civil society. Appearing on Fox News
in early November, he stated this view: "The
catastrophe is that the two Westernized elements
are now attacking each other as the Islamists sit
and watch and wait to either attack or cause chaos
or take more terrorism action." Neat and simple,
but also dangerously naive.
As mentioned
above, not all religious parties and Muslim sects
are pro-Taliban. And very few of the so-called
core of the military and elite civil society are
Westernized. In fact, calling the military an
agent of Westernization and modernization, as
Krauthammer does, is risible. Has he forgotten the
Ronald Reagan-era Pakistan policy of the United
States?
The military had gone through a
long process of Islamization under the previous
Republican-sponsored military regime of General
Zia ul-Haq. And the military remains an Islamized
institution. Superficial changes and unpopular
policy somersaults by Musharraf have done little
to reduce the impact of that indoctrination.
Religion is the main motivation of the soldiery.
In any case, the military's institutional and
corporate interests remain paramount and trump any
ideological consideration, which is why it had
first orchestrated an Islamic jihad in Afghanistan
in the 1980s and was then able to do a
volte-face under Musharraf. It is the
generals' appetite for power and control over
civil institutions that dictates the military's
alignment with the United States. What the
military ought to be doing in the wake of
Musharraf's abdication from his army post is
returning to the barracks under a semblance of
subservience to civilian control.
Even
among the civil society of journalists, students,
lawyers, politicians and non-governmental
organizations, Islamic-minded people are heavily
represented. It is, after all, a Muslim-majority
country. To label all the protesting lawyers,
journalists and students under the heading of
"Westernized, modern" segments of society is the
ultimate intellectual lethargy. These Pakistanis'
protests against Musharraf are not motivated by
ideals of a Western-like liberalization or by a
desire to see an unbridled wave of modernity. It
is the denial of political freedom, the purging of
the judiciary and the suppression of freedom of
expression that have caused them to retaliate
against Musharraf.
To equate that with a
movement for Westernization and modernization is
to ignore the diversity within Pakistan's civil
society. There are many more ethnic, sectarian,
political and cultural faultlines that run through
Pakistani society. The best way to manage that
diversity is through democratic means. But those
who have President George W Bush's ear are itching
for military action, whether by backing Pakistani
generals or direct US military intervention - or
both.
Mad military methods The
neo-conservative position on Pakistan is redolent
of the Cold War times when Washington had
supported another military dictator, Zia ul-Haq.
As Krauthammer puts it: "The logic [of backing
dictators] was simple: The available and likely
alternative - ie communists - would be worse."
Replace "communists" with "terrorists" and you
have the crux of the neo-con ideology exposed for
what it really is: fear-mongering to conjure up
excuses for exhibition of US military power.
Failing to learn from the invasion of Iraq
and Afghanistan, analysts like Kagan and O'Hanlon
would have Washington embroiled in another
potentially catastrophic military mission in
Pakistan. "One possible plan would be a Special
Forces operation with the limited goal of
preventing Pakistan's nuclear materials and
warheads from getting into the wrong hands.
Somehow, American forces would have to team with
Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly
to move the material to a safer place," suggest
Kagan and O'Hanlon.
They also have another
alternative: "So, if we got a large number of
troops into the country, what would they do? The
most likely directive would be to help Pakistan's
military and security forces hold the country's
center - primarily the region around the capital,
Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab
province to its south ... Pro-American moderates
could well win a fight against extremist
sympathizers on their own. But they might need
help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took
control of parts of the country containing crucial
nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such
regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear
weapons would be a priority for our troops."
So fixated are these analysts on a
military solution to every problem that the normal
procedures of ensuring nuclear weapons do not even
cross their minds. The answer to these fears is
not a military invasion of Pakistan, which will
pitch the entire population and the military
against US forces. What is needed is a better
structured, more transparent, well-codified
command and control system. Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal has been under military control; civilian
political leadership, even when in power, has been
kept out of the nuclear loop. This needs to
change. The command and control structure can be
further improved by introducing more openness into
the process. Whatever civilian government Pakistan
gets after the January 2008 elections, it should
be given a say in managing the country's nuclear
assets.
America and the rest of the
international community ought to intervene in
Pakistan, but not for the wrong reasons, and
certainly not through military means. Musharraf
and the military must be put under pressure to
ensure genuine, credible elections in January.
Military aid and other perks for military
officers such as training, joint exercises and
academic courses should be made contingent on
continuity of a democratic process. The new
generation of post-Musharraf generals will have to
learn to live under civilian leaders, despite the
flaws of the politicians. Instituting democracy
and a culture of civilian supremacy is a long haul
and will take decades of uninterrupted electoral
exercise and peaceful transitions of power. But
the alternative to this, in the name of stability,
antiterrorism, and nuclear safekeeping, would
spell disaster for Pakistan as well as for global
security.
Najum Mushtaq is a
project director at the Pak Institute for Peace
Studies and a contributor to IRC's Right Web.
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