Bhutto's death a blow to 'war on terror'
By M K Bhadrakumar
The German weekly Der Spiegel reported in mid-December that at the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the
Netherlands, and at NATO military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, top-secret
strategy games have been held about worst-case scenarios in Afghanistan.
That may turn out to be smart forward thinking. The computer simulations
assumed that if the situation in Pakistan were to spin out of control, the
Taliban would get a free run on the border regions with Afghanistan, and NATO's
supply lines through Pakistan might be jeopardized.
In November, USA Today quoted Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell as saying
that the US military was reviewing contingency
plans in case unrest in Pakistan began to affect the flow of supplies for
American troops fighting in Afghanistan. He underscored that the supply lines
were "very real areas of concern", since three-quarters of the supplies for the
26,000-strong US military deployment in Afghanistan flowed via Pakistan by land
and air. "Clearly, we do not like the situation we find ourselves in right
now," Morrell commented.
Asked how long US commanders would take to switch to alternate supply lines, he
responded he didn't know, but that "if we needed to have it done tomorrow, we
would have it done tomorrow". The crucial question is whether that "tomorrow"
has drawn dramatically closer with the assassination last week of former
premier Benazir Bhutto.
One of the NATO strategy games apparently simulated the withdrawal of the
troops from Afghanistan that had been cut off from supplies. Of course, no one
expects such a contingency to develop - in the immediate term, at least. But
anything now becomes possible. There is cause for deep anxiety when an
acknowledged American area specialist and author like Stephen Cohen of the
Brookings Institute says it is "hard to be optimistic". He fears for Pakistan,
visualizing that "separatism will increase, as will violent, extremist
Islamism" and Pakistan will face a "fundamental crisis" within the next five
years.
In many ways, it is a classic boomerang. With Bhutto's assassination, Pakistan,
which became seriously destabilized by America's "war on terror", may be about
to turn the heat on US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. According to Der
Spiegel, senior NATO leaders fear that "Pakistan could very well descend into
total chaos after the elections scheduled for January". (These have now been
postponed until February.) NATO leaders assess that everything depends
critically on President Pervez Musharraf "managing to retain his hold on
power". If he doesn't, "the already half-heartened efforts by the Pakistani
military leadership, permeated with Islamists, to stem Taliban and al-Qaeda
activities in the Pashtun tribal regions could fail completely".
But Cohen, who is an authority on the Pakistani military, doubts whether the
Pakistani generals any longer have the will to push back the Islamists. He
adds, "What we do know is that there is a large 'alumni' association of former
intelligence operatives, tolerated by the army and the intelligence services -
or perhaps simply beyond their reach."
Troop surge in Afghanistan
The political dilemma of the George W Bush administration will be very acute in
the coming weeks. On the one hand it will have to suspend all disbelief and
earnestly work for Musharraf's continuance in power in the critical weeks
ahead, while on the other hand it is intensely conscious that as long as he
continues in power, Pakistan will remain a dysfunctional state.
At the same time, on a parallel track, Washington has to build up confidence in
NATO capitals that Pakistan can be put on the road to recovery and that the
campaign against the Taliban can gain traction, if only they showed the
readiness to commit more troops for Afghanistan at this critical juncture.
The NATO summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania in April will be a crucial
deadline for the Bush administration. The summit is expected to focus on
Afghanistan. A troop surge in Afghanistan is most likely in the cards. The
Washington Post reported (about the time Der Spiegel broke the news about
NATO's strategy games) that as Iraq calms, Washington's attention is turning to
Afghanistan. The report said that US commanders in Afghanistan are looking for
several additional battalions of troops, helicopters and other resources.
But where will the additional troops come from? They could come out of a
further drawdown of forces from Iraq, but this depends on whether the recent
security gains in Iraq can be sustained with fewer US troops. The Bush
administration has done some severe tongue-lashing of the US's NATO allies, who
remain reluctant to commit additional troops. In early December, addressing the
US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates said, "I am not ready to let NATO off the hook in Afghanistan at
this point." He referred critically to "our allies not being able to step up to
the plate".
Washington's frustration is two-fold. On the one hand, it has limitations in
augmenting troop strength in Afghanistan. At the same venue where Gates spoke,
Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, frankly admitted
that the US military has limitations in what it can do in Afghanistan due to
overstretch in Iraq. He said, "In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we
do what we must. The war in Afghanistan is, by design and necessity, an
economy-of-force operation. There's no getting around that ... Our main focus,
militarily in the region and in the world right now, is rightly and firmly in
Iraq."
On the other hand, NATO allies stubbornly refuse to pay heed to Washington's
calls for increased troop contributions. European opinion is steadily turning
against the war in Afghanistan. In Germany, the latest opinion polls, in
December, indicated that half the population favored withdrawing troops from
Afghanistan. The same is the case in Canada. In the event of an opposition
victory in this year's parliamentary election, a withdrawal of Canadian troops
will be likely. The Dutch have already decided to pull out. It may trigger a
domino effect. The Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway are already in the
process of withdrawing their troops from northern Afghanistan.
Taliban heading north
Meanwhile, the Taliban have begun moving toward the Amu Darya region in
northern Afghanistan. They seem to be virtually repeating their strategy in the
1996-98 period, making their northern advance in a pincer movement. One arm of
the Taliban is moving toward Kabul from strongholds in Helmand and the
southeastern provinces, while other groups are moving up from Kandahar along
the Iranian border regions and the western provinces of Herat, Badghis and
Faryab. (Faryab has old Pashtun settlements.)
In October, the Taliban tested the waters by overrunning several districts in
the Faryab and Badghis region. The Bala Murghab, Ghormach and Qades districts
of Badghis are virtually under Taliban control. They are recruiting people in
the countryside. They have established intelligence and operational networks in
most district centers in the northwestern provinces. In 1997, the Taliban used
Badghis as the base for their operations in the provinces to the east, such as
Jowzjan and Balkh.
They have also begun harassing the 400-strong German contingent in the northern
province of Kunduz with sporadic firing, booby traps and mines and firing
rockets and rocket-propelled grenades into German camps. A concerted Taliban
attempt to capture Kunduz, a highly strategic area in the north, seems a
possibility. The fall of Kunduz in 1997 to the Taliban was a turning point in
their capture of the Amu Darya region, including the remote Takhar and
Badakhshan regions in the east.
NATO's difficulties mounting
All signs are that the war effort is deteriorating. What is taking place is the
syndrome in which the Soviet occupying troops in the 1980s found themselves
trapped - tactical achievements but a potential strategic failure. Recent NATO
operations in the town of Musa Qala, a dust bowl in the middle of nowhere in
Helmand's stretching desert region, are a poignant indicator. NATO touted it as
a decisive battle - a veritable Waterloo for the Taliban - when it dispersed
the Taliban who had been in occupation of the town for close to a year.
But it is apparent that Afghan government troops will have a tough time holding
on to Musa Qala while the Taliban dominate major districts in Helmand such as
Greshk, Sangin and Garmseer. Besides, the killing and looting that accompanied
the NATO operation left a trail of bitterness that the Taliban will easily
exploit. All reports indicate that NATO troops resorted to indiscriminate use
of artillery and air strikes against civilians.
NATO forces control major cities but the countryside where three quarters of
Afghan people live is beyond their control. The London Sunday Times featured a
devastating article in November lampooning the German troops in the relatively
tranquil northern Afghanistan who refuse to venture out of their camps after
dark. The report, titled "For us ze war is over by tea time, ja", cited that in
one case, German troops engaged in an operation near Kunduz left the
battlefield by afternoon so they could return to the safety of their camp by
sundown, and that German troops "spend much of their time in an enormous base,
complete with beer halls and nightclubs".
Contrary to NATO propaganda, the Taliban seem to face no difficulty in
recruiting new volunteers from a vast pool of disaffected Afghans. This is
quite understandable, since, as an Asia Foundation survey in December assessed,
some 80% of Afghans are disillusioned with the Kabul government.
Clearly, from the Bush administration's perspective, there couldn't be a worse
time for the unraveling in Pakistan. But what is it that the US can do to
ensure that Pakistan stabilizes? The simple answer is, precious little at the
moment. Even with the elections delayed, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid that
supports Musharraf cannot hope to return to power - unless, of course, the
elections are blatantly rigged, which, in the present circumstances, cannot be
ruled out.
In all probability, in a relatively free and fair election, an alliance of
Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League and the late Bhutto's PPP (Pakistan
People's Party) may well capture power. But that may set the stage for a
confrontation between the democratic opposition and Musharraf. Can Washington
prevail on Sharif and Asif Zardari (Bhutto's husband) to let bygones be bygones
and work under Musharraf?
But even assuming that a PML-PPP coalition government refrains from confronting
Musharraf, its willingness to go along with the "war on terror" on Washington's
terms is highly doubtful. Any elected government will be sensitive to the
deep-rooted opposition to the war in Pakistan public opinion.
US special forces in Pakistan
Pentagon sources have been quoted by influential columnist and former Army
intelligence analyst and consultant William Arkin as claiming that Washington
is expecting, in terms of an agreement reached in November with Islamabad, to
"vastly expand" the US military presence in Pakistan's frontier area. Arkin
wrote in the Washington Post that the "first US personnel could be on the
ground in Pakistan by early in the new year".
The new head of the US Special Operations Command, Admiral Eric T Olson,
visited Islamabad in August, November and December, meeting with Musharraf, the
chairman of the Pakistan Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Tariq Majid,
and the commander of the military and paramilitary troops in northwest
Pakistan, Lieutenant General Muhammad Masood Alam. Arkin says that what appears
to have been under discussion is a "shift for the US military and for
US-Pakistan relations" whereby Musharraf will lift restrictions on US
involvement in cross-border military operations by special forces as well as
paramilitary operations within Pakistani territory.
The Washington Post has separately reported that planning for the proposed US
military deployment in Pakistan is already underway at the headquarters of the
US Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. The report characterized the
proposed counterinsurgency campaign as a "vivid example of the American
military's asserting a bigger role in a part of Pakistan that the Central
Intelligence Agency has overseen almost exclusively since September 11".
The project is no doubt critically important for the success of Afghan
operations. NATO has been insisting for some time that Washington cannot any
longer "afford to leave the Pakistani military to clean up its side of the
border".
However, Bhutto's assassination may have upturned the project for the
deployment of US special forces in Pakistan. In the present volatile situation
there is bound to be an overwhelming popular uproar if Musharraf is seen as
acquiescing with US military operations - under whatever pretext - on Pakistani
soil. With Bhutto's death, there has been a paradigm shift in the power
calculus. Bhutto might have, arguably, gone along with the new US plan, but not
Sharif.
No doubt, Sharif's strength lies in creating allies among conservatives and
Islamists. Indeed, he is the only national figure left in Pakistani politics
today who can possibly walk the tightrope between Pashtun tribalism and
Islamism in the Pakistani northwest. But that's about it. Sharif will militate
against any perceived dilution of Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial
integrity by the US military.
Conceivably, Washington brought immense pressure to bear on Musharraf to agree
to Washington's carefully crafted schematic plan to station US special forces
on Pakistani soil. Any "vastly increased" presence of these forces in the
northwest regions will be anathema to the Pakistani military. Apart from the
aspect of professional pride and patriotism, the Pakistani military will be
uneasy about a US presence in the northwest close to where almost the entire
nuclear arsenal of Pakistan is kept.
The new year has come, but it is unlikely special forces are heading for
Pakistan's northwest any time soon. Bhutto's assassination has taken the
pressure off Musharraf and the Pakistani military for complying with the US
plan, no matter the imperative needs emanating out of NATO's war in
Afghanistan.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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