Almost stealthily, another deadline in
United States foreign policy arrives when the
so-called Five plus One - the US, Britain, France,
Russia and China plus Germany- deliberate on the
Iran nuclear problem in Berlin on Tuesday. For the
first time perhaps, Washington approached such a
meeting in low key. Certainly, no saber-rattling
this time.
Last Tuesday, with hardly a
week to go to the Berlin meet, US State Department
spokesman Sean McCormack said, "I'll let the host
of such a potential meeting speak about it before
I do." A day later, he updated, saying Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice would attend the meet,
and "the whole strategy here is to
use
various kinds of diplomatic pressure, at a
gradually increasing rate, to try to get a
different set of decisions out of the Iranian
leadership".
McCormack wouldn't say
Washington expected the Berlin meet to endorse a
third United Nations Security Council resolution
on sanctions. Several factors underlie the
cautious US approach. First, there is continuing
reluctance on the part of its European allies to
confront Iran. On the one hand, the US and its
European allies share fundamental concerns over
nuclear non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and
Western dominance of the Middle East. But, on the
other hand, very obviously, each has its vested
interests.
New players in Persian Gulf
This was starkly evident from the visit by
French President Nicolas Sarkozy to the Persian
Gulf region last week. Washington would have
thought Sarkozy was bringing French Middle East
policy closer to US strategies. But over Lebanon,
lately, divergences have appeared - and now over
Iran. Sarkozy prefers soft diplomacy toward Iran.
Again, all he would say when France concluded an
agreement with the United Arab Emirates on January
15 securing its first-ever military base in the
Persian Gulf - the only country other than the US
with bases in the region - was that it is "a
signal to all that France participates in the
stability of this region".
The French
newspaper Le Monde commented that the base, which
will be operational in 2009, elevates France to a
new political height, even if it cannot replace
the US as the leading power in the region. Paris'
motives are yet to be gauged - whether the base is
for threatening Iran or for rivaling the US or for
offering French protection to Persian Gulf states.
Persian Gulf states are estimated to have
an annual surplus out of trade in oil of US$800
billion. They are expected to spend about $500
billion in infrastructure projects in the coming
five years. Big-time spenders attract big-time
sellers. China's trade with Persian Gulf states
(including Iran), for instance, already touched
$150 billion by end-2006. It goes beyond just
trade in oil. The floodgates have opened. Chinese
companies are positioning themselves in a big way
as suppliers of goods, including high-end products
like automobiles, and services.
More than
100 Chinese companies are present in Iran building
ports and airports. China is interested in
everything involving investment of the Persian
Gulf's surplus capital - petrochemical
infrastructure, refineries and oil storage,
venture-capital funds, and private equity.
Anti-Muslim sentiment in the US since September
2001 has turned private Persian Gulf investors to
focus on China.
Thus, US President George
W Bush's recent tour of the region brought out
clearly that there is a sea-change in the
mentality of the so-called "pro-West" Arab
regimes. Bush realized that the Arab states need
to be persuaded about reinforcing US-Arab ties and
enhancing the US's strategic position in the
region. The issue goes much deeper than the
obvious one of Bush being a lame duck without
major political accomplishments in the region
during his entire presidency.
Gulf Arab
states have simply refused to be drawn into a
US-led alliance against Iran. They reiterate their
firm preference for quiet diplomacy and are
manifestly reluctant to confront a neighbor of
growing regional influence. They are instead
proceeding with their own accommodation with
Tehran. The latest such move is by Kuwait, whose
foreign minister is currently on a visit to Tehran
with the intent of initiating discussions with his
Iranian counterpart to resolve a 50-year maritime
boundary dispute between the countries that has
blocked the development of the massive Dorra gas
field in the Persian Gulf (which is also shared by
Saudi Arabia).
Efficacy of sanctions
No doubt, these factors cast a shadow on
the US's ability to force the pace on the Iran
nuclear issue at Berlin on Tuesday. Yet another
factor is that no matter the authenticity of the
Iranian stance that it has the right to enrich
uranium, Tehran's apparent cooperative attitude
towards the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) seriously delimits the scope for Washington
to ratchet up tensions at this point. On the
diplomatic level, Tehran has so far managed to
stay ahead of Washington. Iran's position has not
changed in substantive terms, but its proactive
diplomacy has effectively countered US attempts to
contain Iran. The US is left with no alternative
but to await the IAEA report on Iran in March.
Meanwhile, a new angle has appeared.
Reuters news agency broke the story that according
to a report by the US Congress's Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the economic impact
of US sanctions against Iran is unclear and Iran
has signed about $20 billion in energy contracts
with foreign companies since 2003. The GAO report,
which is due to be released this week in
Washington, urges the US National Security Council
to do a "baseline assessment" of sanctions against
Iran and to inform Congress. "Without an overall
assessment of the sanctions' impact and subsequent
reviews on a periodic basis, Congress and the
administration will continue to lack important
information for developing effective strategies to
influence Iran's behavior," said the report.
The CAG, which is the investigative arm of
Congress, underscored that state-owned Iranian
banks could circumvent strict US sanctions by
simply turning to other financial institutions or
by funding their activities in currencies other
than the US dollar. "Iran's global trade ties and
leading role in energy production make it
difficult for the US to isolate Iran," the report
warned. It pointed out that increased oil demand,
high oil prices and Iran's huge reserves helped
Tehran get more than $50 billion in oil revenues
in 2006.
The CAG report comes at a
sensitive time. It is bound to lead to demands for
the Bush administration to devise a system for
measuring the effectiveness of sanctions against
Iran and may lead to Congressional hearings on the
US's policy options toward Iran. In turn, it adds
to the pressures building up on the Bush
administration to solve the "Iran problem".
Tehran is adamant about not stopping its
uranium-enrichment program. The development of the
full-cycle enrichment system potentially enables
Iran to possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, even
if Iran fulfills its commitments to the IAEA, as
far as Washington (or Israel) is concerned, the
problem does not go away.
Russia digs
in The clock is ticking on another front
also. As of last week, Russia had supplied more
than half the nuclear fuel needed for Iran's
Bushehr plant. Some American experts estimate that
in an year's time after the commissioning of
Bushehr, Iran could come to possess highly
enriched plutonium sufficient for as many as 20
nuclear charges. A Russian commentator recently
admitted, "In practical terms, nuclear fuel
supplies [for Bushehr] will bring Iran closer to
nuclear weapons unless it gives up its bid for the
uranium-enrichment cycle."
Not
surprisingly, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni
visited Moscow last week just ahead of the Berlin
meet. Livni told her counterpart that it was
inconceivable for Russia to be shipping nuclear
fuel to Iran while the latter continued to enrich
uranium. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
responded that Moscow is supplying the fuel to
Iran under strict IAEA safeguards. He underscored
Moscow's belief that the IAEA should play the
primary role in the standoff and that punitive UN
sanctions were a bad idea. He added that Russia
sought a "political-diplomatic settlement" of the
dispute.
Moscow has taken a stance that is
highly principled and cannot be faulted. Lavrov
says Russia never had any information on the
presence of a military component in the Iranian
nuclear program.
Again, Moscow maintains
it may think there is no economic need for Iran to
continue uranium-enrichment activities and will
even try to convince Tehran that freezing the
program will benefit Iran itself. But ultimately,
it is up to Tehran to heed Moscow's advice. Thus,
Moscow insists it has the right to supply the fuel
to Iran.
The issue is that Moscow should
be exercising its right at all. What emerges is
that the Iran problem has become part of the much
larger problem of Russian-American relations.
Moscow will never acknowledge it - or Washington -
but incrementally, imperceptibly, the Iran problem
is becoming part of the Kremlin's "asymmetric
response" to the hardline US policy of containment
of Russia. Unlike in the Soviet period, Moscow is
not waging an ideological struggle. Nor is it
seeking confrontation with Washington over Iran.
It is acting perfectly within the framework of
international law. It is, in fact, acting in
concert with the IAEA. Prima facie, it even
cooperates with the international effort to
prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
China prevaricates In
comparison with Russia, China offers a study in
ambivalence. At times distinctly, at times
vaguely, China is tilting a little toward the US,
while, of course, keeping everyone guessing -
Washington included. In essence, Beijing has
weighed that its strategic ties with the US are
far too important to be brought under the scanner
on account of Iran. Apart from economic pragmatism
being a major guiding principle of its foreign
policy, Beijing has to carefully weigh where the
relative advantage lies in the Persian Gulf. The
choices are not clear-cut, as in Moscow's case.
Beijing demonstrated last week its
capacity for cutting things very fine by
simultaneously hosting on January 16-18 visits by
two foreign dignitaries who need no introduction
as dogged adversaries - Iranian secretary general
of the National Security Council, Saeed Jalili
(who is also Tehran's chief negotiator on the
nuclear issue) and by US Deputy Secretary of State
John Negroponte. As it turned out, Jalili's visit
was about influencing China's stance at the
forthcoming Berlin meet, which was also what
Negroponte had in mind.
Beijing,
poker-faced, told Jalili through Chinese Foreign
Minister Yang Jiechi, "The Iranian nuclear issue
is now at a crucial moment. China hopes all
concerned parties, including Iran, make joint
efforts to resume negotiations as soon as
possible.". Clearly, this articulation fell
disappointingly short of what Jalili hoped to
hear, but that was as far as Yang was prepared to
go. Jalili's brief was to pitch for China's
support for the UN Security Council sending the
Iran file back to the IAEA. But a Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman instead called on Iran to
continue its cooperation with the international
community and to "observe the UN Security Council
resolutions".
Beijing's reticence is
understandable. At this point, it is loathe to
introduce any discordant note into China-US
relations. Negroponte's visit was in connection
with the fifth round of US-China strategic
dialogue. For the first time, military
representatives of the two countries participated
in the meeting. But that wasn't all. What pleased
Beijing immensely was that what Negroponte did
after his arrival in Beijing on Wednesday was to
hold a press conference in the US Embassy in
Beijing, where he proceeded to categorically
denounce Taiwan's planned referendum on UN
membership as "provocative" and "a mistake".
Negroponte explained that the US
understood Taiwan was a core issue for China, and
Washington takes China's concerns seriously.
Therefore, he continued, "It's not something we
will want to talk about as a 'trade-off' with
other issues." Indeed, the battle-scarred veteran
diplomat knew perfectly well the worth of the
gesture that Washington is making at a juncture
when the Taiwan problem is fraught with
uncertainties. He hinted precisely that Washington
expected a quid pro quo from Beijing on
issues of core concern to it. The government
newspaper China Daily acknowledged that Washington
was signaling that "it is willing to use its
influence to contain secessionist moves" in
Taiwan.
According to a Chinese Foreign
Ministry statement, Negroponte later restated the
US position on Taiwan to his counterpart, Chinese
Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, while stressing
that the US "welcomes China's development and will
devote itself to developing a constructive and
long-term relationship of comprehensive
cooperation with China".
The bland tone of
the Chinese officials' talks with Jalili showed
Negroponte delivered his message with perfect
timing. Indeed, the US Embassy's media note on
Negroponte's talks singled out that his "extensive
discussions" held in a "frank and open" atmosphere
touched on five "specific discussion topics" -
which included Taiwan and Iran, apart from
human-rights issues, Myanmar and North Korea.
To be sure, Negroponte left something for
Beijing to think hard about. He made clear that
the Iran issue is hibernating and a showdown may
still ensue during the Bush administration's
remaining term. He reminded his hosts Iran is a
core issue for US geostrategy in the Middle East;
Bush hasn't changed his hardline policy toward
Iran, and Washington will work out new plans, as
the US and Israel cannot accept the current
situation. He will expect Beijing to act in its
best interests.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including
India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
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