BOOK
REVIEW Black turbans
rebound Koran,
Kalashnikov and Laptop by Antonio
Giustozzi
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Shortly after the overthrow of the Taliban
government in the twilight of 2001, the new Afghan
dispensation began facing a vigorous insurgency
that buried hopes of stability and peace. While
the American military was triumphantly announcing
the demise of the Taliban, their trademark black
turbans were back in view by 2003 and spread into
the south and east of Afghanistan over the next
four years.
In a revelatory new book,
Antonio Giustozzi of the London School
content of Economics
analyzes the violence, its perpetrators and their
backers. Though the author does not underestimate
the role of Pakistan in the renewed activity of
the Taliban, he emphasizes that internal
weaknesses of the Afghan state opened the window
for the insurgents to establish themselves deep
inside Afghanistan and pose a serious challenge.
Compared to the old Taliban
movement of 1994-2001, the new insurgents have
less orthodox attitudes towards imported
technologies like video
production. By 2005, some district commanders were
equipped with laptops, despite the scarcity of
electricity. The neo-Taliban have no qualms in
exploiting free-market principles for military
operations. They protect opium traffickers'
convoys in exchange for favors and pay
non-hardcore members by piece work, such as firing
a rocket or carrying out an assassination. By late
2006, their commanders were even relaxing harsh
imposition of their infamous moral codes.
Giustozzi partially attributes the
re-entry of the Taliban to the feebleness of
President Hamid Karzai's administration, which is
geared to accommodating tribal strongmen and
warlords rather than to building a professional
bureaucracy. Corruption, infighting and arrogance
among provincial authorities delegitimize the
government and open space for the Taliban to
re-emerge. For instance, the abuses of Helmand's
governor, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, turned an
uncommitted population into Taliban sympathizers
by 2006. Harsh methods of the government's
intelligence service drive many into the lap of
the insurgency. The general weakness of the
provincial administration alienates tribal elders
who otherwise resent the Taliban's impudence.
Despite persistent efforts of the US and
Afghan governments, Pakistan has arrested just a
handful of Taliban on the whole. Under pressure to
cooperate, Islamabad deports hundreds of suspects
of little value to Afghanistan. Giustozzi cites
evidence that Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) protects Taliban leaders and
bases "by keeping away unwanted presences" and
allowing free passage of insurgents across the
border.
"Cool" ISI advisers may be helping
the Taliban develop aspects of strategy like bomb
attacks. Some dissenting Taliban members accuse
the ISI of forcing attacks on schools and
development projects to undermine the
reconstruction of Afghanistan.
By
consensus, Afghans believe that "the Pakistani
state is behind the Taliban" and resent
Washington's failure to curb this sponsorship.
While the total number of Taliban forces was
around 17,000 men by 2006, it was supplemented by
2,000 "international volunteers" (affiliated to
al-Qaeda) and a whopping 40,000 "Pakistani
Taliban". More than 20% of total insurgent losses
in the new Afghan jihad are "Pakistani martyrs".
Since many Afghan families still send
children to study in Pakistani madrassas
(seminaries), they offer "an inexhaustible flow of
new recruits" for the Taliban. (p 38) Pakistani
policy in the North-West Frontier Province to
patronize only pro-Taliban groups also swells the
insurgents' ranks. Most Afghan mullahs are trained
in Pakistan's Deobandi schools, and this too works
to the advantage of the Taliban as a natural
constituency in rural Afghanistan. Pro-government
clergymen are being silenced through "night
letters" and killings throughout Afghanistan.
Other "collaborationist" targets of the
Taliban include teachers, doctors, judges,
policemen and non-governmental organization
workers. Beheading, mutilation and suicide attacks
are being used by the insurgents as part of a
"strategy of demoralization of the enemy". (p 108)
From early 2007, frisking and execution of
"informers" and "strangers" have become routine
events as the Taliban grow vulnerable to
intelligence penetration of the government and its
foreign allies who employ
"benefits-for-information" schemes.
American reliance on aerial bombardment,
house combing and "clear and sweep operations"
produces large numbers of displaced persons whose
situations are tailor-made for joining the
Taliban. Culturally disrespectful behavior of
North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops
generates nostalgia for the time when the Taliban
were in power. From 2006 onward, there are widely
shared feelings that Afghanistan is "again
drifting towards a generalized jihad against
foreigners". (p 71)
Personal rivalries and
disputes within and between the Quetta shura and
the Peshawar shura of the Taliban exist, but not
at the expense of strong cohesion in the
insurgency. The well-adhered layeha
(Taliban's rulebook) helps maintain discipline and
a unified chain of command in the field. As
"spiritual instructions" predominate military
training in the camps, obedience to commanders is
honored with few exceptions. Unified
Pakistan-based control over revenue sources also
limits factionalism in the organization.
Unlike the old Taliban movement, the
neo-Taliban have a more sophisticated propaganda
machine that foxes opponents by manipulating the
press. Motivational magazines, music tapes, VCDs,
and DVDs exhorting jihad that are manufactured by
sympathetic Pakistani businesspersons are
available plentifully in Afghan towns and
villages. The Taliban's priority is "mobilization
of Muslim opinion worldwide as a source of
funding, moral support and volunteers". (p 138)
To forge a countrywide revolt, the Taliban
have been parleying with their former enemies of
the Jamiat-i-Islami since 2005. Northern militias
that feel marginalized by the Kabul government and
enthused by anti-foreigner sentiments are working
with the Taliban. The Karzai government itself has
been negotiating with Taliban leaders since 2003
through United Nations auspices. For the latter,
departure of foreign troops is a precondition for
any agreement, while the former is "prepared to
negotiate even with [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar
as long as he freed himself from foreign slavery,
ie Pakistan". (p 136) These mutually unacceptable
prerequisites epitomize Afghanistan's predicament
as a victim of chronic external interventions.
Giustozzi assesses the impact of NATO's
counter-insurgency intervention as blurred
overall, and counter-productive in Helmand and
Kandahar. Rifts among the American, German,
British and Dutch contingents have been inimical
to formulating a joint strategy.
The
government's militia conglomerate, Afghan Military
Forces (AMF) suffers from serious indiscipline and
primitive structure that rules out significant
resistance to the Taliban. Karzai encourages
private armies and village militias to fill the
vacuum, but their notoriety for misbehaving with
civilians wins few allies. The meagerly paid
Afghan National Police (ANP) indulges in illegal
activities and is, ironically, "a contributing
factor to the insurgency". (p 175) Several police
officers are alleged to be collaborating with the
Taliban against foreign troops.
The Afghan
National Army (ANA) has been heavily dependent on
embedded foreign mentors and is incapable of
autonomous action. Over-representation of Tajiks
in the officer ranks causes public relations
disasters with authorities in the Pashtun south.
Irregularities and absence of communication with
local people are eroding the ANA's reputation.
Although NATO forces make development aid
a component of the counter-insurgency, villagers
and town dwellers are "more concerned about the
lack of security and death of relatives at the
hands of foreign troops". (p 198) "Winning hearts
and minds" of the Afghan public is difficult in a
scenario where "many civilians are being killed
and branded as Taliban". (p 202) Fearful of
collateral damage, local residents in Kandahar and
Helmand are asking for the withdrawal of foreign
troops from their environs.
Belated moves
by Karzai to implement "good governance" in the
provinces are failing to appease local communities
fearful of the reviled American hand behind these
measures. Giustozzi considers the Taliban
insurgency to be "nearing its metastasis" (p 216),
a stage where slow improvement of governance is
obsolete as a counter-insurgency ploy.
Kabul is also trying to reconcile
insurgents at the grassroots level through the
Peace Strengthening Commission, but this runs into
mistrust about the genuineness of the amnesty
offers. Also, the ISI is said to be actively
trying to prevent Taliban militants from defecting
to the other side. Local truces with individual
insurgent commanders have been struck, but the
Taliban are neither disbanding nor disarming.
Giustozzi concludes that the
Pakistan-abetted insurgency is "probably
inevitable", but the neo-Taliban could have been
blocked from building a huge constituency had the
Karzai government ensured a "de-patrimonialized
subnational administration". (p 231) The future
augurs indefinite war, especially as the
neo-Taliban continue to get fully incorporated
into "a global jihadist perspective". (p 236) It
appears that the eventual fate of Afghanistan will
be decided less by the battles on the ground and
more by the international oscillations of radical
Islam.
Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop.
The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan by
by Antonio Giustozzi. Columbia University Press,
New York, 2008. ISBN: 978-0-231-70009-2. Price:
US$ 24.95, 259 pages.
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technologies like video
production. By 2005, some district commanders were
equipped with laptops, despite the scarcity of
electricity. The neo-Taliban have no qualms in
exploiting free-market principles for military
operations. They protect opium traffickers'
convoys in exchange for favors and pay
non-hardcore members by piece work, such as firing
a rocket or carrying out an assassination. By late
2006, their commanders were even relaxing harsh
imposition of their infamous moral codes.
