COMMENT Pakistan's extremism
starts at the top By Chietigj
Bajpaee
Pakistan's election results have
challenged the misplaced fear in the international
community that Pakistan could fall under the
control of Islamic extremists. However, this does
not rule out the possibility of Pakistan's descent
into an abyss of instability.
Islamic
extremism in Pakistan is not a grass-roots
phenomenon as it has been in many states in the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. Pakistan's
founding fathers, led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
preceded by the Indian sub-continent's British
colonial rulers and India's Mughal rulers, laid
the foundation for Pakistan to be led by the rule
of law and moderate Islam.
Nonetheless,
successive civilian and military-led governments,
the military and intelligence agencies have
employed Islamic
extremism as a tool of their
policies. As such, extremist Islam has emerged as
a top-down phenomena.
As demonstrated by
the poor performance of Pakistan's Islamic parties
in last week's parliamentary elections, Pakistan
is far from ripe for an Iranian-style Islamic
revolution.
The six-party Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal, which secured over 50 seats in the
last Parliament with a strong showing in
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and
Balochistan, secured less than 10 seats in the
National Assembly in this election and lost its
lead in tribal provinces to sub-national secular
parties such as the Awami National Party and the
Balochistan National Party (Awami).
Coupled with the strong showing of the
secular Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz at the national
level, the election illustrates that secular Islam
is alive and kicking in Pakistan. In fact,
Pakistan's last parliamentary elections in 2002
were the only time in the country's 60-year
history - it has had 10 parliamentary elections -
when Islamist parties had a strong showing. This
was fueled by the government marginalizing the
secular parties, as well as a backlash to the US
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the ousting of
the Taliban from Kabul.
In reality,
Islamist groups have only gained ground in
Pakistan when the government has employed them as
a tool of their policies. During the 1980s,
president Zia ul-Haq, backed by the United States,
used Islamic extremism to fan the mujahideen
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
During the 1990s, Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and successive
governments employed Islamic extremism to
challenge the Indian claim to Kashmir by
undermining India's conventional military
superiority with asymmetrical attacks on soft and
symbolic targets in Kashmir.
The ISI also
attempted to gain "strategic depth" with regard to
India by creating an arc of influence from Central
Asia to Afghanistan. While Pakistan's military
establishment is regarded as professional and
secular (with the exception of Zia, who attempted
to bring Islam into the political and military
sphere), it has not hesitated in using Islamic
extremism to battle its enemies. This was seen in
Pakistan's support for the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan until September 11, 2001, and support
for Islamic extremist groups in Kashmir.
Under President Pervez Musharraf, Islamic
extremists entered Pakistan's mainstream political
sphere as Musharraf empowered extremists in order
to marginalize Pakistan's secular opposition
parties while using the growth of Islamic
extremism to justify his non-democratic rule.
Core dilemmas unaddressed While the victory of Pakistan's secular
opposition parties will relieve some concern over
the "Talibanization" of Pakistan, the threat will
not dissipate as long as Islamic extremism
continues to be employed as a tool by Pakistan's
political parties, the military and the ISI.
In doing so, the government is playing
with fire and has occasionally got burned in the
process, as seen by the numerous assassination
attempts on Musharraf, the assassination of former
premier Benazir Bhutto last December and the death
of over 1,000 Pakistani soldiers in operations
against extremist elements in Pakistan's tribal
regions.
International terrorist and
extremist groups have become increasingly
localized, as seen by the rise of the
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Movement
for the Enforcement of Islamic Law), led by
pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Fazlullah in the Swat
Valley in NWFP and the Tehrek-e-Taliban-Pakistan
(Pakistani Taliban) based in the South Waziristan
tribal area of the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas, led by Baitullah Meshud. Meshud has been
accused by the government of masterminding the
assassination of Bhutto.
To quell the rise
of Islamic extremism, Pakistan must address
fundamental problems plaguing its existence -
namely strengthening institutions, reforming the
education system and stabilizing Pakistan's
periphery.
Empowering Pakistan's
institutions and addressing its neglected
education system are pivotal to combating Islamic
extremism, although Musharraf's pledges in these
areas have been unfulfilled.
First, he has
undermined the institutions he hoped to strengthen
by manipulating the political and legal process to
prolong his rule since taking power in a coup in
1999. Second, his military government devoted too
few resources to promoting secular education while
simultaneously strengthening the military
industrial complex and empowering Islamist parties
to keep secular opposition parties weak.
The return of a secular civilian
government may change this, but given the lack of
progress in achieving these goals during a decade
of civilian rule by Bhutto and Sharif, significant
change is not expected. The fact that Bhutto's
inexperienced 19-year-old son, Bilawal, and
husband, Asif Ali-Zardari, who faces allegations
of corruption, have been appointed as the heads of
the PPP ahead of more experienced party members
illustrates the continued dominance of feudal
patronage over policy platforms in Pakistani
politics.
Pakistan's internal stability
also remains closely intertwined with its
international relations. Although tensions between
India and Pakistan have been shelved for the time
being, a major terrorist attack on Indian soil or
an escalation in terrorist infiltration across the
Line of Control that separates the Pakistani and
Indian-administered areas of Kashmir, could
increase hostility.
The dialogue that was
initiated between both states in 2004 is presently
in abeyance as the Indian government has
apparently decided to take a wait-and-see attitude
to the process of political transition in
Pakistan. Confidence-building measures must be
complemented by a concrete solution to the issue
of Kashmir, which remains a thorn in bilateral
relations. In the end, rapprochement in
India-Pakistan relations will be necessary to
justify the Pakistani military's withdrawal from
the political sphere.
On Pakistan's
western front, addressing the "Pashtun problem" is
pivotal to stabilizing relations with Afghanistan.
Pashtun nationalism and the disputed status of the
Durand Line between the two countries are core
issues within Afghan-Pakistan relations.
They were addressed in a "Joint
Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga" (tribal
assembly) in Kabul last year, which will be
followed by a series of jirgagai or smaller
jirgas. However, these initiatives are
likely to make slow progress, given the continued
level of mistrust between Musharraf and Afghan
President Hamid Karzai, the lack of recognition
for Pakistani sovereignty over tribal affiliations
in the area and the Pakistani side pushing for
Afghanistan and the United States to reach
rapprochement with "reformed" Taliban.
Following in the footsteps
of a foe The recent discussion of
Pakistan's "fragmentation" goes back to debates by
political pundits during the first decades of
neighboring India's independence (1947) that it
would also undergo balkanization.
However,
a state far more ethnically, religiously and
geographically diverse than Pakistan has survived
for 60 years and the fear-mongers have been
silenced as India has emerged as a darling of
foreign investors.
The essential issue
that needs to be addressed in Pakistan is one of
identity. How does Pakistan see itself? The
Nehruvian and Gandhian view of India as a secular
democratic state allowed it to reconcile its vast
diversity, despite sporadic and ongoing pressures
on India to take Pakistan's path based on a narrow
religious identity.
Pakistan's Islamic
identity has not been sufficient to quell strains
between its major ethnic groups and accusations
that the national government's policies are
dictated by the interests of Punjab province.
India's federalist structure of
government, which devolved power to the states,
also facilitated in undermining separatist
tendencies. A similar empowerment of Pakistan's
ethnic and religious minorities would weaken
separatist tendencies in Balochistan, NWFP and the
tribal areas and help to quell sectarian and
ethnic violence on the streets of Pakistan's major
cities.
Chietigj Bajpaee
is a research analyst for Asia in the Country
Intelligence Group at Global Insight. He has been
a research associate for the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,
DC, a research assistant for the London-based
International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS) and risk analyst for a New York-based risk
management company. The views here are his own. He
can be reached at cbajpaee@hotmail.com.
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