Taliban deputy leader Mullah Bradar
Muhammad Akhand announced "a new series of
operations" under the code name Operation Ebrat
(Lesson) on March 27. The Taliban's spring
offensive is "aimed at giving the enemy a lesson
through directing powerful strikes at it, which it
can never expect, until it is forced to end the
occupation of Afghanistan and withdraw all the
occupier soldiers ... We will add to the tactics
and experiences of the past years new types of
operations. The operations will also be expanded
to cover all locations of the country, in order
for the enemy to be weighed down everywhere."
There are indications that a main target
of the offensive will be the Afghanistan-Pakistan
frontier, in particular the strategically vital
Khyber Pass. Citing an improvement in the skills
and capacity of
the
Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Afghanistan's
Defense Ministry immediately dismissed the
announcement as "a psychological campaign and not
a reality which could be implemented on the
ground". In reality, the situation along the
border is extremely precarious and threatens the
ability of coalition forces to operate within
Afghanistan.
Joint intelligence centers
on the border The first in a planned
series of six joint intelligence centers along the
Afghanistan/Pakistan border was opened at the
Afghanistan border town of Torkham on March 29.
When the plan is fully implemented there
will be three such centers on each side of the
border at a cost of US$3 million each. There are
high hopes for the centers, which have been
described by the US commander in Afghanistan as
"the cornerstone upon which future cooperative
efforts will grow". According to US Brigadier
General Joe Votel, "The macro view is to disrupt
insurgents from going back and forth, going into
Afghanistan and back into Pakistan, too. This is
not going to instantly stop the infiltration
problem, but it's a good step forward."
The centers are designed to coordinate
intelligence-gathering and sharing between the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and
the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
The project is an outgrowth of
the earlier Joint Intelligence Operations Center
(JIOC) established in Kabul in January 2007. This
center, comprising 12 ISAF, six Afghan and six
Pakistani intelligence officers, was initiated by
the military intelligence sharing working group, a
subcommittee of the tripartite plenary commission
of military commanders that meets on a bimonthly
basis. The JIOC is designed to facilitate
intelligence-sharing, joint operations planning
and an exchange of information on improvised
explosive devices. The working languages are
English, Dari and Pashto, aided by a number of
translators.
The new border centers will
each be manned by 15 to 20 intelligence agents.
One of the main innovations is the ability to view
real-time video feeds from US surveillance
aircraft. The commander of US troops in
Afghanistan, Major General David Rodriguez,
described the centers as "a giant step forward in
cooperation, communication and coordination".
Despite such glowing descriptions, there
remains one hitch - Pakistan's military has yet to
make a full commitment to the project. According
to Major General Athar Abbas, the director general
of Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations, a
military information organization, "At this time
this proposal is being analyzed and evaluated by
the concerned officials. But Pakistan has not yet
come to a decision on this matter.".
General Abbas and other officials have
declined to discuss Pakistan's reservations or
even to commit to a deadline for a decision. It is
possible that the failure to sign on as full
partners in the project may have something to do
with the stated intention of Pakistan's new prime
minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani, to pursue a greater
focus on negotiation than military action in
dealing with the Taliban and other frontier
militants. There may also be reservations on the
part of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) to share intelligence on their clients
within the Taliban.
Actual intelligence
cooperation along the border is hampered by a
number of factors, not least of which is a basic
inability to agree on exactly where the border
lies. In the past, Pakistan has responded to
complaints from Afghanistan of Taliban fighters
infiltrating across the border by threatening to
fence or even mine the frontier, a shocking
proposal to the Pashtun clans that straddle the
artificial divide. Afghanistan's long-standing
policy is simply to refuse recognition of the
colonial-era Durand Line, which it claims was
forced on it by British imperialists in 1893.
Pakistan accepts the Durand Line, but the two
nations are frequently unable to agree on exactly
where the 2,400-kilometer line is drawn.
US intervention in the frontier
region? The United States is pursuing
a number of initiatives to increase security and
diminish the influence of the Taliban in the
frontier regions of Pakistan, including a massive
economic aid program, counter-insurgency training
for the Frontier Corps and enhancement of the
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) monitoring
and surveillance abilities in the area.
The CIA already gathers information on the
region from overflights of its unmanned Predator
surveillance aircraft, which can also deliver
precisely targeted missiles on suspected Taliban
safe houses. Complicating efforts to increase
security in the border region is a belief within
Pakistan that the United States is preparing to
intervene militarily in Pakistan's frontier
region.
In a March 30 interview, CIA
director Michael Hayden declared that the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region would be the
most probable source for new terrorist attacks on
the United States: "If there is another terrorist
attack, it will originate there." The CIA chief
warned that the situation along the border
"presents a clear and present danger to
Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in
general and to the United States in particular".
Hayden also suggested that Osama bin Laden and his
deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri were present in the
Pakistan tribal frontier, where they were training
"operatives who look Western".
A spokesman
for Pakistan's Foreign Ministry responded angrily
to the CIA director's comments, stating that if
the United States has information about the
whereabouts of the al-Qaeda leadership, it should
share it with Pakistan so it can take action.
"Such a statement does not help trace alleged
hideouts ... Terrorists have threatened Pakistan
and targeted our people. We are, therefore,
combating terrorism in our own interest."
Syed Munawar Hasan, leader of the
Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan's largest Islamic
political party, suggested that Hayden's
statements were "white lies", similar to
Washington's allegations of weapons of mass
destruction in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Munawar
urged the new government to stand fast in the face
of what he described as US threats to invade
Pakistan, despite the establishment of a
democratic government. The provincial assembly of
the North-West Frontier Province issued a
unanimous condemnation of Hayden's remarks.
The
Torkham Gate The location of the first
joint intelligence center at Torkham reflects the
strategic importance of this border town at the
Afghanistan end of the fabled Khyber Pass.
It is the main gateway for supplies to US
and ISAF forces within Afghanistan and is believed
to be one of the main targets for the forthcoming
Taliban spring offensive. Linking Afghanistan's
Nangarhar province and Pakistan's Khyber Agency,
Torkham is traditionally the busiest commercial
border post between the two countries.
A
new round of attacks on Torkham may have already
begun - as many as 40 oil tankers destined for
coalition forces in Afghanistan were destroyed in
a series of explosions in a Torkham parking lot on
March 20. There were 70 to 100 tankers awaiting
clearance to cross into Afghanistan at the time.
Only a day before the attack on the
tankers, an effort by a US Army colonel to
expedite border clearances for military transports
at Torkham failed when the chief Pakistani customs
official refused to meet with her. Vehicles
typically wait in parking lots at Torkham for up
to 20 days awaiting clearance to proceed.
Part of the problem is due to delays in
permits faxed to Torkham from the US base in
Bagram near Kabul - until these are received the
vehicles are forbidden to cross into Afghanistan.
There are also accusations that some tanker
operators may be selling their fuel along the road
in Pakistan before deliberately torching their
vehicles at Torkham to claim the insurance on the
missing load.
Torkham has also become a
nearly unregulated transit point for legal and
illegal migrants since the demolition of the
border gate by the National Highway Authority of
Pakistan two years ago. A series of meetings
between Afghan and Pakistani officials - attended
as well by NATO officials - has been unable to
agree on the design and other details of a
replacement gate. Smuggling and illegal crossings
have spun out of control while tensions between
the respective border authorities nearly erupted
into open fighting in September 2006.
Conclusion Pakistan's
reluctance to make a full commitment to
intelligence-sharing raises a number of difficult
questions: Is the ISI still cooperating with or
even aiding the Afghan Taliban? Do the military
and the intelligence services operate outside of
political control? Is it possible to collaborate
with the Taliban and not the Taliban's allies,
al-Qaeda? Why do the better-armed and
better-trained regular forces frequently
relinquish their security role in the frontier
regions to the poorly-equipped Pashtun Frontier
Corps?
After a meeting on security and
terrorism issues with chief of army staff Ashfaq
Pervez Kiani on April 3, a spokesman for Gillani
stated that the prime minister was formulating a
comprehensive terrorism strategy "based on
political engagement, economic development and
backed by a credible military element". Many
within the new government believe that President
Pervez Musharraf's aggressive military approach to
the frontier crisis over the past several years is
responsible for the recent rash of suicide
bombings and other attacks that have taken scores
of lives across the country.
In the
meantime, there is a dangerous lack of
coordination on border issues in which all parties
bear responsibility. There is every indication
that the Taliban have identified Torkham as a
crucial weak point in the supply and logistics
system that maintains the international military
presence in Afghanistan. The failure to share
intelligence combined with bureaucratic delays and
infighting along the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier
threatens the entire coalition mission in
Afghanistan.
Dr Andrew
McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle
International Security in Toronto, Canada.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
