Britain caught out in Afghan ploy
By Sharif Ghalib
TORONTO - President Hamid Karzai has blamed what he called an "extremely
ethnic" report in the London Times for his decision to turn down the
appointment of Lord Paddy Ashdown as the United Nations super envoy for
Afghanistan.
As history recounts, Afghanistan and Great Britain have been in three major
conflicts, known as the Anglo-Afghan wars. Occurring within the span of 70
years, the wars represented the geopolitical situation of the 19th century,
giving rise to the Great Game, the competition for territory and influence
between the colonial British and the Russian czar empires.
However, centuries later, on the heels of September 11, 2001, history appeared
to be repeating itself as the British returned to
Afghanistan, this time not as occupiers but as a major ally contributing to the
international efforts for the implementation of a United Nations mandate to
establish peace, and "to help Afghanistan build a more stable and secure
future".
By the same token, the United Kingdom came forward as a key donor nation,
pledging substantial development and reconstruction funds to help Afghanistan
recover from the scourge of war and mayhem. In early 2006, Britain hosted a
historic UN-sponsored international conference on Afghanistan in London, which
specified benchmarks for a strengthened partnership between Afghanistan and the
international community, set out in the conference's final document known as
The Afghanistan Compact.
In 2006, pursuant to an expansion of peacekeeping operations by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a contingent of British troops took over
security tasks in the Taliban-dominated southern province of Helmand,
superseding US forces.
Deployed as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to
provide a secure environment for the rebuilding efforts in the region, the
British troops had high hopes of pacifying Helmand without "firing a shot", in
the words of then British defense minister John Reid. But with the violence
steadily building through the unchallenged cross-border replenishment of the
Taliban's manpower and a thriving drug trade, the British forces soon realized
they were confronted with a formidable foe.
A year into the fighting and trying to cope with the mounting fatalities among
their soldiers, some British commanders called for "playing the British not
American card" in Helmand, heralding a shift of policy that eventually led to a
change in their rules of engagement with the enemy.
The overhauled modus operandi proved to be none other than the one based
on a resuscitated 19th-century colonial school. As a result, the district of
Musa Qala, north of Helmand province, was captured by the Taliban. They scored
their gain with the support of the local government, intriguingly without a
shot being fired. The British had already withdrawn to leave control with the
council of elders. The Taliban then brokered an agreement with the local tribal
elders to keep the peace; a peculiar exercise that outraged the government of
Karzai.
In the meantime, to complement validation of the handling of Musa Qala, British
media insensitively resorted to lashing out at Karzai and glorifying ethnic and
demographic tendencies while referring to the overall situation. The trend grew
to the point that even the ethnic configuration of the Karzai government came
under scrutiny, raising alarm across the political spectrum in Kabul and
beyond.
Hence, Musa Qala, destined to fall back into the hands of government forces the
next year, turned out to become the first known recourse by the British in a
series of ensuing attempts, all in tune to the 19th century-era Great Game
mantra of ethnic wrangling, dealmaking and disbursement of cash to tribal
chiefs in return for short-lived loyalties.
Subsequently, in December 2007, a British and an Irish diplomat were expelled
by the Afghan government, accused of holding secret talks with the Taliban in
Helmand province. Details of the accusations released by the Afghan government
shockingly even spoke of plans by the British to set up a military training
camp in southern Afghanistan aimed at providing training for as many as 2,000
Taliban fighters.
The allegations caused an uproar in the Kabul government, whereupon it was
reflected in a parliamentary report in which some government officials rather
cynically expressed doubt if the British really wanted to bring security to
Helmand.
The report in effect put in perspective the furiousness and awe on the part of
both the government and the average citizens across the country alike with
regard to the new British strategy seeking to extend an olive branch to the
enemy and preaching for reaching out to the Taliban.
Although, in principle, consistent with Kabul government's official line of
dialogue with the Taliban, those willing to respond without preconditions, the
conduct aroused added commotion over the unilateral, secretive and
tribe-centric nature of it, which had practically sidestepped the elected
government of Afghanistan.
The bizarre revelation, over time, set the more rhythmic tone for Britain's
advocacy of conciliation, which culminated in proclamations by British
government ranking officials that the Taliban should be brought into the
political arena in Kabul.
Months later, as the residual perceived obsolete doctrine of the British of
striking deals with chieftains and fiefdoms continued to haunt Afghans, the
unforeseeably contentious anecdote of Lord Ashdown's nomination as the
succeeding UN envoy in Afghanistan sprung up, which was blocked and, much to
surprise of a great many, turned down by Karzai.
In point of fact, it is vitally important that Karzai has finally spoken his
mind and spelled out the rationale behind his stance on Ashdown's appointment.
His asserted attitude over the issue, by and large, echoes the greater national
sentiment across Afghanistan.
Let's remember that, having been through decades of turmoil and upheaval,
successive overt and creeping invasions, proxy wars and a historic indigenous
resistance against extremism and terrorism with colossal sacrifices, the people
of Afghanistan have come a long way.
Seven years ago, the nation enthusiastically embraced the world's collective
efforts for bringing democracy to the country. With generous solidarity from
the international community, among others Britain, the country has been able to
triumphantly follow through an ambitious peace accord signed among the
concerned ethno-political forces in Bonn, Germany.
Today, a new constitution, the most enlightened of its kind that Afghans can
call to mind, and recognizing inter alia the multiethnic and heterogeneous
demographic character of the country, continues to guide the nation through its
social and political life with equal citizens of a modern indivisible
pluralistic unitary state.
Accordingly, to guard against these hard-won historic achievements, and in the
interest of durable peace and of long-term stability, allied governments need
to ensure promotion of genuine national unity among all Afghans. They further
need to ensure an inclusive approach toward all Afghans and to engage all
moderate peaceful ethno-political forces who are part of the government and
committed to the success of the peace process.
Moreover, considering the socio-political realities of today's Afghanistan
bound to becoming a modern and democratic state, and in line with the new
geostrategic imperatives of the region, the world community must avoid creating
ethnic divisions and/or tilt among Afghans.
As for the Taliban, allied nations may need to support the government of
Afghanistan in its bid - already approved by the nation's parliament - for
engaging all those rank and file combatants who choose to break with their past
and come into the government fold, in good faith and without any preconditions,
pledging allegiance to Afghanistan's constitution in its entirety, and with the
sole aspiration to re-integrate into society and pursue a peaceful life.
Without a doubt, the people of Afghanistan highly appreciate the magnanimous
contributions made by the United Kingdom to the efforts of the international
community to establish peace and stability and to ensure reconstruction in
their country. Likewise, they greatly admire the invaluable sacrifices of
British soldiers in Afghanistan.
Indispensably, however, London needs to apply more pragmatism to its strategic
approach toward modern Afghanistan, as today both nations remain an equal time
away from the 19th-century geopolitical ambience.
Sharif Ghalib served at the United Nations for 10 years, and was the
first Afghan diplomat to negotiate the establishment of full bilateral
diplomatic and consular relations between Afghanistan and Canada at
resident-embassy level. He opened the Embassy of Afghanistan in Ottawa in late
2002 and served as the country's charge d'affaires and minister counselor until
2005.
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