COMMENT Delhi carries a small stick
By Chietigj Bajpaee
Israel bombs the Osirak nuclear research facility in Iraq in 1981 after it
alleges that Iraq is using the facility to develop a nuclear weapons program.
China seizes and dismantles a United States EP-3 aircraft after it allegedly
ventures into Chinese airspace in 2001. The US invades Afghanistan after the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
And then there is India. An attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001;
hijacking of Indian Airlines 814 to Afghanistan in 1999, which was released
only after the exchange of three terrorists, including one who was later
responsible for the execution of US journalist Daniel Pearl; terrorist attacks
in Jaipur in May 2008, Hyderabad in August 2007, Mumbai in July 2006, Varanasi
in March 2006, Bangalore in December 2005, Delhi in
October 2005 and Ayodhya in July 2005; a recent surge in infiltration across
the Line of Control in Kashmir; and this week's attack on the Indian Embassy in
the Afghan capital Kabul. India's reaction: point fingers at political
opponents and turn the other cheek.
India's burgeoning economic growth, growing foreign exchange reserves, and
expanding middle class are necessary but insufficient conditions for India's
emergence as a great power. This will require certain fundamental shifts in
strategic thinking both internally and on the world stage.
Internally, overcoming India's growth in spite of the government rather than
because of it through tackling corruption and inefficient bureaucracy and
regulations will be necessary to attract the US$500 billion in infrastructure
investment that is necessary to sustain India's development. Overcoming
outdated social, religious and cultural practices, which relegate women, tribal
communities, religious minorities and lower castes as second-class citizens, is
also necessary to fully utilize the country's productive capacity.
Externally, India needs to develop a more assertive and aggressive foreign
policy. Part of this requires India to develop a long-term strategic doctrine,
upgrade its military and adopt more proactive and well-coordinated diplomacy.
However, more fundamentally, it requires a change in mentality.
China was an influential world power long before it became an economic power.
Its status as a modern-day great power was not cemented with Deng Xiaoping's
economic reforms in the late 1970s but rather in 1950 when China faced off
against the military might of the United States in the Korean War. This set the
stage for China's importance in the Cold War framework of triangular diplomacy
between the United States and Soviet Union.
Significantly smaller states such as Singapore have developed a more strategic
foreign policy than India, by defining their place in Asia and the world and
orchestrating major shifts in response to changes in the international system.
Even India's traditional nemesis, Pakistan, has developed a more proactive
foreign policy, as the country was able to lead a major reorientation of its
foreign policy following September 11. Even before this, Pakistan was able to
constantly reinvent itself as a US ally as a member of SEATO (Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) during the Cold
War; as a leader in the Islamic world with its support for the Afghan
mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and development of an
"Islamic nuclear bomb" in 1998; as an "all-weather" ally of China; and by
developing relations with Central Asia in order to gain "strategic depth" in
its rivalry with India.
India could play a more proactive role in regional and international security.
If not for the greater good, then for its own selfish motives to stabilize its
periphery and gain access to natural resources and markets on its doorstep.
While China has "shelved" tensions with all countries along its borders, India
has active conflicts along almost all of its borders.
No country in history has risen to great power status with instability on all
of its borders and active insurgencies in over half of its states (Naxalite,
northeast, Kashmir). Despite its growing energy needs, which are necessary to
sustain its growth and development needs, India has been unable to gain access
to natural gas supplies on its doorsteps in Bangladesh and Myanmar to its east
and Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia to its west, due to a mix of
tense bilateral relations, instabilities in these states and competition from
China.
India is in an ideal position to address instabilities in these states, given
the benign view of India in some of these states and India's "soft power"
influence through its longstanding historical, cultural and political links and
credentials as a democracy. For instance, India could play the role that China
plays in the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program with respect to
Iran's nuclear program, given its well-established relationship with Iran and
rapprochement with the United States.
Similarly, India has the potential to adopt a "middle path" in dealing with
Myanmar's military junta between diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed by
the West and the aid "without conditions" from China. Finally, India should be
a party to talks between Afghanistan and its neighbors, given that Afghanistan
borders Pakistan's northern areas, which are claimed by India as part of the
disputed region of Kashmir.
Indian policymakers need to remind themselves of US president Theodore
Roosevelt's saying to "speak softly and carry a big stick". Instead, they
appear to have been doing the opposite: bragging of India's status as one of
the world's oldest civilizations, leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, the
world's largest democracy, and now rising economic power under the motto of
"India rising", while showing little substance. For too long there has been
discussion on the gap between the India's potential, capabilities and
accomplishments. Only when India stands up on the world stage will it receive
the respect that it deserves.
Chietigj Bajpaee is a research analyst for Asia in the Country
Intelligence Group at Global Insight. He has been a research associate for the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, a research
assistant for the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies
and risk analyst for a New York-based risk management company. The views here
are his own. He can be reached at cbajpaee@hotmail.com.
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