In Afghanistan, blurred lines cost lives
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - Afghanistan's civilian and military actors, both national and
international, have signed a new set of guidelines that call for maintaining a
clear distinction between the role and functions of humanitarian agencies and
the military, an agreement that may well be an unprecedented step in the
history of civil-military relations in conflict situations.
The move comes at a time when many humanitarian and aid agencies are feeling
the pressure of shrinking access to the Afghan population, as larger and larger
areas of the country become off limits. Recent months have seen a spurt in
direct and deliberate attacks on humanitarian aid workers, many of whom feel
their distinct and neutral identity in the conflict has been
compromised by the blurring of roles between the military and the civilian
components of assistance to Afghanistan.
On August 12, four non-governmental organization (NGO) employees, including
three internationals, all of them women, were killed in a brutal ambush in the
province of Logar, south of Kabul. The deaths added to a steadily rising toll
of NGO workers this year, most of them Afghans.
This month the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the umbrella
organization for over 100 NGOs, drew attention to the increased threat to aid
organizations, pointing out that this year alone there had been over 84
incidents, including 21 in June, more than any other month in the past six
years.
"The blurring of lines between the military/political and the humanitarian
community is a real not an imaginary concern," said Ingrid Macdonald, the
regional protection and advocacy advisor for the Norwegian Refugee Council. "We
are all concerned that this is having an impact and many NGOs are now traveling
in unmarked cars trying to look as much like the normal population as possible.
Earlier NGO workers were attacked when they were in the wrong place at the
wrong time. Now we are being targeted."
Macdonald's argument is underlined by ongoing discussion around the Logar
killings, which are being partly attributed to the fact that the International
Resuce Commitee (IRC) employees were travelling in a vehicle with the IRC
logo marked clearly on it.
The civil-military guidelines, which have not attracted much notice until now,
were agreed on at the end of protracted negotiations within a civil military
working group that had representatives of the United Nations Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ACBAR, individual NGOs, embassies of major donor
countries, the government of Afghanistan as well as representatives of the US
led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
While OEF demurred from signing on, stating that it was not routinely involved
in development projects and therefore not required to approve this guideline,
ISAF forces have adopted them with the new NATO commander General David
McKiernan ordering all commanders to implement them.
Clearly thrilled at having brought the military on board, an NGO employee
involved in the drafting of the guidelines, described them as unprecedented,
saying "nowhere else in the world has such a step being taken".
"The guidelines will prevent a blurring of the lines between the role of the
military and humanitarian actors, preventing humanitarian space from being
squeezed further," said Aleem Siddique, the spokesperson of UNAMA. "Recognizing
the distinct role that we have to play will be a vital component of protecting
our impartiality and opening up humanitarian space for us."
The guidelines purport to "establish principles and practices for constructive
civilian-military relations, and for effective coordination, which is critical
for achieving security and stability in Afghanistan" and are "intended to
support the development of a relationship between military and humanitarian
actors in which differences are recognized and respected".
The principles on which the guidelines are based include observance of
international law and human rights, respect for the neutrality and independence
of humanitarian actors, emphasizing the security role of the military,
reporting violations of human rights and stressing the need for respect and
protection of women.
The guidelines state that "maintaining a clear distinction between the role and
function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is a determining
factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organizations
can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely" and that
"sustained humanitarian access to the affected population may be ensured when
it is independent of military and political action".
In defining the role of the military, the guidelines state that "the overall
humanitarian assistance effort in Afghanistan is best served through a division
of responsibilities: government and humanitarian actors have the primary role
of providing humanitarian assistance, and the military is primarily responsible
for providing security, and if necessary, basic infrastructure and urgent
reconstruction assistance limited to gap-filling measures until civilian
organizations are able to takeover."
However, the guidelines also recognize the ongoing role of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams or PRTs, units set up by NATO that combine military and
reconstruction tasks. While emphasizing that the mandate of the PRTs does not
refer to humanitarian activities, they lay out the best practices for the PRT
in the area of reconstruction "given the significant involvement of PRTs in
civilian affairs, and in civil-military liaison", urging the PRTs to follow
Afghan national priorities and try and ensure local ownership of projects.
Macdonald feels that while acceptance of the guidelines is an "important step
in the right direction", the "real test will be how well they are implemented
on the ground, for example the PRTs and military actors ceasing the use of
emergency relief for political and military objectives which undermines the
perceptions of NGOs being neutral".
She expressed the opinion of a large section of the NGO community by saying:
"Many Afghans want security. There is no evidence that PRTs engaging in relief
or development activities is creating security. Why can't the PRTs and military
stick to what they do best, security - and we'll stick to what we do best? PRTs
are even engaging in basic service provision in areas where NGOs and government
are already working - at a minimum, if NGOs and government can operate, then
there is certainly no need for the PRTs to be doing this."
An NGO employee involved with the negotiation said the guidelines were not
meant to "make a doctrinaire point or emphasize a principle" but to make a
difference by recognizing the reality on the ground, ie the involvement of PRTs
in reconstruction. By emphasizing the primary mandate of the military, it was
hoped that the guidelines would move the PRTs towards a process of transition
that would lay emphasis on building civilian mechanisms and processes. "This
document is not perfect and it is not meant to state what the military can or
cannot do. Everyone has had to make compromises."
While the work on the guidelines was initiated in 2007, discomfort over the
blurring of civilian and military functions goes much further back. In the
complex situation left behind following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001,
multiple agendas and multiples actors led to an emphasis on an integrated
approach, emphasizing the apparent joint goals and responsibilities of the
international community as a whole.
With most of the international community presenting an upbeat picture of the
apparent success in quick implementation of the Bonn roadmap, it was argued
that development and security were spreading to most areas of the country and
the remaining pockets could be fast tracked using a civil-military combination
that would bring development to areas that remained insecure. In 2003, there
was the setting up of the first PRT that would carry out reconstruction under
the safeguard of a military encampment, arguably in areas where the NGOs still
couldn't work.
In the triumphant rhetoric that held sway then, dissonant voices were few and
quickly dismissed as originating from "tree-huggers" or pessimists. However, as
NATO expanded, it not only used the PRT model for its expansion throughout the
country, but the change from a preponderance on the "war against terror" to
securing the country, revealed an insurgency growing in strength. Despite this
there was no rethinking of the PRT model, but rather increasing reliance on the
PRTs for delivering aid to more and more areas.
The military began viewing it as a means of winning local support using
reconstruction and aid delivery as an ameliorative for their military
operations. Individual donors nations, keen on seeing their troops fare well,
chose to spend most of their money on provinces where there troops were
stationed, a substantive portion of it through the PRTs. "Emergency and
development aid is being used as a military and political incentive," said
Macdonald. "This confuses peoples' perceptions of who we are, what we do and
why we are doing it. We deliver aid based on the needs of the population and to
those who are most vulnerable - not based on politics or military aims."
Instead, the past two years have seen the military therefore taking on more and
more reconstruction work even as the escalating insurgency has resulted in
harsher military operations, a combination that an increasing number of aid
agencies feel challenges their own neutrality and threatens their security.
Weeks before the attack on the IRC workers, a group of NGOs including the IRC
met the visiting UN emergency relief coordinator John Holmes to express concern
over the blurring of lines, calling on the UN to speak out on the "need for
clear separation between the military and the civilian actors, necessary to
enable aid agencies to assist people in need".
The "international military actors' increased involvement in relief and
reconstruction is further complicating the operational environment for NGOs,
particularly in terms of security", the aid agencies argued, adding that this
forced a closer relationship between civil and military actors. Being perceived
as an agent for any armed party "is a clear threat to our security", the Mercy
Corps head, Nigel Pont said at the time.
The NGOs also called for an independent UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an office that does not exist in Afghanistan under
the integrated mission approach which has, instead, a small humanitarian unit.
The UN, following an internal tussle, decided against a separate OCHA, but
agreed to strengthen the humanitarian affairs unit.
"Humanitarian space in Afghanistan has been compromised by the military and
private sector companies trying to do the same work as long-term humanitarian
workers. Some of them have very little, if any, humanitarian experience, yet
they think they can just turn up and do what we do, just as well," said
Macdonald.
"The military should not be in the business of providing water and sanitation,
distribution of food and non food items, nutrition programs, health clinics and
programs, building schools and education programs. The principle is called
'last resort' - when the military steps in when no one else can do it to
provide life saving assistance - not for some political or military purpose.
But in large parts of Afghanistan, the military is stepping in where other
actors are already doing it."
During his visit Holmes emphasized the importance of maintaining distinct roles
for the military and the humanitarian community, saying "I think it is very
important that PRTs do not involve themselves in humanitarian assistance unless
there is absolutely no other alternative for security reasons. I also think it
is very important that the PRTs do not describe what they are generally doing
as humanitarian."
Since then, according to the publicity press releases issued by ISAF press
office, NATO soldiers have delivered computers to a children's hospital,
conducted a carpentry course, inaugurated four new wells constructed as part of
an agriculture project, conducted a plumbing course, guarded pistachio forests,
installed a water purification process, taught farmers how to dry their fruit
produce, provided material for schools and aid for a refugee camp, among other
works that include reconstruction, development and delivery of humanitarian
aid. Arguably much of this was not an emergency and not based on the principle
of "last resort".
As the guidelines are circulated and implemented more widely, the next few
months will make it clear whether there is an actual impetus behind this
agreement, or whether, like the hundreds of documents produced by the
international community on Afghanistan, this is one of the many that will
gather dust in academic archives.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in
Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered
the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
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