The decision to make public a presidential order of July authorizing American
strikes inside Pakistan without seeking the approval of the Pakistani
government ends a long debate within, and on the periphery of, the George W
Bush administration.
Democratic presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, aware of this ongoing
debate during his own long battle with Senator Hillary Clinton, tried to
outflank her by supporting a policy of US strikes into Pakistan. Republican
Senator John McCain and vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin have now echoed
this view and so it has become, by consensus, official US policy.
Its effects on Pakistan could be catastrophic, creating a severe
crisis within the army and in the country at large. The overwhelming majority
of Pakistanis are opposed to the US presence in the region, viewing it as the
most serious threat to peace.
Why, then, has the US decided to destabilize a crucial ally? Within Pakistan,
some analysts argue that this is a carefully coordinated move to weaken the
Pakistani state yet further by creating a crisis that extends way beyond the
badlands on the frontier with Afghanistan.
Its ultimate aim, they claim, would be the extraction of the Pakistani
military's nuclear fangs. If this were the case, it would imply that Washington
was indeed determined to break up the Pakistani state, since the country would
very simply not survive a disaster on that scale.
In my view, however, the expansion of the war relates far more to the Bush
administration's disastrous occupation in Afghanistan. It is hardly a secret
that the regime of President Hamid Karzai is becoming more isolated with each
passing day, as Taliban guerrillas move ever closer to Kabul.
When in doubt, escalate the war - this is an old imperial motto. The strikes
against Pakistan represent - like the decisions of president Richard Nixon and
his national security adviser Henry Kissinger to bomb and then invade Cambodia
(acts that, in the end, empowered Pol Pot and his monsters) - a desperate bid
to salvage a war that was never good, but has now gone badly wrong.
It is true that those resisting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
occupation cross the Pakistan-Afghan border with ease. However, the US has
often engaged in quiet negotiations with them. Several feelers have been put
out to the Taliban in Pakistan, while US intelligence experts regularly check
into the Serena Hotel in Swat to discuss possibilities with Mullah Fazlullah, a
local pro-Taliban leader. The same is true inside Afghanistan.
After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, a whole layer of the Taliban's
middle-level leadership crossed the border into Pakistan to regroup and plan
for what lay ahead. By 2003, their guerrilla factions were starting to harass
the occupying forces in Afghanistan and, during 2004, they began to be joined
by a new generation of local recruits, by no means all jihadis, who were being
radicalized by the occupation itself.
Although, in the world of the Western media, the Taliban have been entirely
conflated with al-Qaeda, most of their supporters are, in fact, driven by quite
local concerns. If NATO and the US were to leave Afghanistan, their political
evolution would most likely parallel that of Pakistan's domesticated Islamists.
The neo-Taliban now control at least 20 Afghan districts in Kandahar, Helmand
and Uruzgan provinces. It is hardly a secret that many officials in these zones
are closet supporters of the guerrilla fighters. Though often characterized as
a rural jacquerie they have won significant support in southern towns and they
even led a Tet-style offensive in Kandahar in 2006.
Elsewhere, mullahs who had initially supported Karzai's allies are now railing
against the foreigners and the government in Kabul. For the first time, calls
for jihad against the occupation are even being heard in the non-Pashtun
northeast border provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan.
The neo-Taliban have said that they will not join any government until "the
foreigners" have left their country, which raises the question of the strategic
aims of the United States. Is it the case, as NATO secretary general Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer suggested to an audience at the Brookings Institution this year,
that the war in Afghanistan has little to do with spreading good governance in
Afghanistan or even destroying the remnants of al-Qaeda? Is it part of a master
plan, as outlined by a strategist in NATO Review in the Winter of 2005, to
expand the focus of NATO from the Euro-Atlantic zone, because "in the 21st
century NATO must become an alliance ... designed to project systemic stability
beyond its borders"?
As that strategist went on to write:
The center of gravity of power on
this planet is moving inexorably eastward. As it does, the nature of power
itself is changing. The Asia-Pacific region brings much that is dynamic and
positive to this world, but as yet the rapid change therein is neither stable
nor embedded in stable institutions. Until this is achieved, it is the
strategic responsibility of Europeans and North Americans, and the institutions
they have built, to lead the way ... [S]ecurity effectiveness in such a world
is impossible without both legitimacy and capability.
Such a
strategy implies a permanent military presence on the borders of both China and
Iran. Given that this is unacceptable to most Pakistanis and Afghans, it will
only create a state of permanent mayhem in the region, resulting in ever more
violence and terror, as well as heightened support for jihadi extremism, which,
in turn, will but further stretch an already over-extended empire.
Globalizers often speak as though US hegemony and the spread of capitalism were
the same thing. This was certainly the case during the Cold War, but the twin
aims of yesteryear now stand in something closer to an inverse relationship.
For, in certain ways, it is the very spread of capitalism that is gradually
eroding US hegemony in the world. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's
triumph in Georgia was a dramatic signal of this fact. The American push into
the Greater Middle East in recent years, designed to demonstrate Washington's
primacy over the Eurasian powers, has descended into remarkable chaos,
necessitating support from the very powers it was meant to put on notice.
Pakistan's new, indirectly elected president, Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of
the assassinated Benazir Bhutto and a Pakistani "godfather" of the first order,
indicated his support for US strategy by inviting Afghanistan's Karzai to
attend his inauguration, the only foreign leader to do so. Twinning himself
with a discredited satrap in Kabul may have impressed some in Washington, but
it only further decreased support for the widower Bhutto in his own country.
The key in Pakistan, as always, is the army. If the already heightened US raids
inside the country continue to escalate, the much-vaunted unity of the military
high command might come under real strain. At a meeting of corps commanders in
Rawalpindi on September 12, Pakistani Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Kiani
received unanimous support for his relatively mild public denunciation of the
recent US strikes inside Pakistan in which he said the country's borders and
sovereignty would be defended "at all cost".
Pakistani security officials claimed on Monday that firing by Pakistani troops
and tribesmen had forced two US military helicopters to turn back to
Afghanistan after they crossed into Pakistani territory. A Pakistani army
spokesman, Major General Athar Abbas, said the military high command had
instructed its field commanders to prevent any similar raids.
Saying, however, that the army will safeguard the country's sovereignty is
different from doing so in practice. This is the heart of the contradiction.
Perhaps the attacks will cease on November 4. Perhaps pigs (with or without
lipstick) will fly. What is really required in the region is an American-NATO
exit strategy from Afghanistan, which should entail a regional solution
involving Pakistan, Iran, India and Russia. These four states could guarantee a
national government and massive social reconstruction in that country. No
matter what, NATO and the Americans have failed abysmally.
Tariq Ali, writer, journalist, filmmaker, contributes regularly to a
range of publications including the Guardian, the Nation and the London Review
of Books. His most recent book, just published, is The Duel: Pakistan
on the Flight Path of American Power (Scribner, 2008).
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