India reels over Obama's silence
By M K Bhadrakumar
Diplomatic predicaments can at times be almost laughable. Indian officials were
scurrying around like headless chickens because 120 anxious hours had passed
and United States president-elect Barack Obama had not yet put a phone call
through to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh - as he has done to at least nine
other heads of state.
The Indians could learn a thing or two from the Kremlin. Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev found himself exactly in Manmohan's predicament when by
November 8 his Kremlin telephone still had not rung. But 43-year-old Medvedev
did a smart thing.
He put a call through to Chicago to the 47-year old president-elect. The
Kremlin thereupon went ahead and publicized the
conversation in an upbeat account. A budding controversy was nipped before it
could blossom.
Kashmir issue reviving
Young people move real fast. The embarrassment is acute in Delhi since
76-year-old Manmohan committed an incredible gaffe in the runup to the US
elections in late September by telling the 65-year-old US President George W
Bush that Indians "loved" him - ignoring how fast the American people's
equation with their lameduck leader was deteriorating.
Delhi finds it appalling that Obama phoned Pakistani leader Asif Zardari on
Saturday and the two leaders reportedly discussed the Kashmir issue. External
Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee promptly reacted, invoking the Simla Accord
of 1972 as the cornerstone of India-Pakistan relations, which rules out
third-party mediation over the disputed territory of Kashmir.
It is a long while since an Indian statesman mentioned the Simla Accord. It is
a "back-off" message and it comes amid reports that in a move to inspire
Islamabad to perform better in the "war on terror", the incoming US
administration may coax India into a settlement of the Kashmir problem and that
Obama proposes to appoint former US president Bill Clinton as special envoy to
undertake a sustained mediatory mission between India and Pakistan.
Indians might have fondly overlooked Clinton's incurable flaws and warmed to
him as president, but his anointment as Kashmir envoy will not go down well.
Public opinion would see it as a failure of the government's foreign policy.
And the ruling Congress party is gearing up for a string of tough provincial
and federal elections.
However, Obama may also be unwittingly exposing some of the fallacies
underlying the Manmohan government's foreign policy - China, the war in
Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation.
Floundering dreams
Indian strategists blithely assume that Washington ascribes crucial importance
to building up India as a counterweight to China. They estimate India stands to
gain from the US's containment strategy towards China. But a containment
strategy towards China may be the last thing on Obama's mind. China is a key
player in any US effort to rebuild the global financial architecture, and
Beijing is behaving like a "stakeholder".
The Indian obsession with "great-power" status looks out of place in the
changed context. George W Bush administration officials constantly drilled into
Indian ears the importance of Delhi taking on responsibilities for the
management of the world order. They visualized India as a junior partner in the
strategy to control the waterway between the Persian Gulf and the chokepoint of
the Malacca Strait through which the bulk of China's oil imports is
transported.
Similarly, the Bush administration prodded Delhi to seriously consider military
involvement in Afghanistan. Against the backdrop of the US-India civilian
nuclear deal, audacious Indian strategists began fancying Delhi and Washington
would move towards a "serious conversation" as regards the "full range of
issues relating to Pakistan's political and strategic future".
Obama's Afghan strategy
Obama threatens to shake up the daydreamers in Delhi. His top priority is to
seek an exit strategy in Afghanistan. He will be wary of following in the
tragic footsteps of president Lyndon Johnson who, like him, inherited a war
(Vietnam), which ultimately consumed his presidency and destroyed his political
life. Obama could as well have delivered LBJ's famous Great Society speech of
May 1964 at the University of Michigan commencement. He is at a comparable
point in the march of American history and politics.
Equally, Obama empathizes with Pakistan's plight. He would assess that the
moral and political responsibility for destabilizing Pakistan primarily lies
with Washington and that as long as the Afghan war continues, Pakistan will
remain in the vortex of volatility, which will affect regional stability. He
may not necessarily opt for Central Command chief General David Petraeus'
strategy of "surge" first followed by negotiations with the Taliban, but his
campaign rhetoric that he is determined to win the Afghan war must be seen in
its entire context.
Washington accepts Pakistan has special interests in Afghanistan and the US
needs to accommodate them. These include security guarantees against perceived
Indian threats as well as regard for the Durand Line that separates Afghanistan
and Pakistan. It shouldn't come as a surprise to Delhi if the US seeks a
rollback of the scale of the Indian presence in Afghanistan.
Even-handed policy
Two, Obama will actively seek to improve India-Pakistan relations so that they
become predictable. His inclination to bring in Clinton as special envoy must
be seen from this perspective. He needs someone with persuasive skill to
influence Delhi, while he focuses on Pakistan and the war. But Obama cannot be
naive enough to conclude that his route to Afghan settlement lies through the
treacherous minefields of the 60-year-old Kashmir dispute.
Nor is Clinton unaware that India will never accept any redrawing of its
boundaries. And Indians are famous for hunkering down, as he learned in the
late 1990s when they went nuclear. Clinton would know his task essentially
would be to probe the Indian offer to make the borders separating the two parts
of Kashmir "irrelevant" within the overall framework of a durable peace process
with Pakistan. Therefore, the high probability is that despite his fondness for
travel, good food and diplomacy, he may still be reluctant to take up the
challenging assignment in South Asia.
Compared to the Cold War era when India withstood the hostile US stance on the
Kashmir issue, it is in a far happier position today on the world arena. So,
why are Indians going ballistic? The problem lies elsewhere. The Manmohan
government frittered away a rare four-year spell of relative calm to provide
responsive government in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). A colossal failure of
leadership in Delhi and massive political ineptitude locally in J&K
incrementally sapped India's strong position.
The consequent alienation of Kashmiri people runs deep. The challenge facing
Delhi is to hold free and fair elections to the provincial assembly in J&K
due in December, and to facilitate the formation of a government which the
international community will regard as democratically elected. Delhi's fear is
that any talk of US mediation may embolden Kashmiri secessionists.
On balance, Obama can be expected to pursue an even-handed policy towards the
two South Asian rivals India and Pakistan. But herein lies the rub. The
expectation in Delhi is that the US ought to build up India as the pre-eminent
power in the region. This is the real source of the angst among the Indian
elite and strategists, even though the Obama administration will continue with
the US policy to seek a strong relationship with India in the sphere of
military and intelligence cooperation.
Nuclear deal may unravel
Meanwhile, a potentially debilitating discord is appearing on the horizon.
Obama supported the nuclear deal with India, which was recently ratified by the
US Congress. But now it transpires, following "leaks" from Washington, that as
early as September 23, Obama had written to Manmohan that his administration
would regard the deal with India as a "central element" of the US's nuclear
weapons policy.
He put on record that his administration would press for the US's ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) "at the earliest practical day".
Furthermore, he said his administration would "launch a major diplomatic
initiative" to ensure that CTBT came into force. Obama added he would also
pursue negotiations on a "verifiable, multilateral treaty" to end production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Both with regard to the CTBT as well as an immediate moratorium on the
production of fissile material, he wrote, "I very much hope and expect India
will cooperate closely with the United States in these multilateral efforts".
Curiously, the Manmohan government kept the letter under wraps until it became
public knowledge last week. It was apprehensive that the letter challenges the
official contention that the deal accords recognition to India as a nuclear
weapons state.
The letter touches a raw nerve. There is apprehension that Obama's thinking
will be integrated into new US disarmament proposals that draw India into the
global nuclear order through the CTBT and the fissile material production ban
and impose on India a more stringent accounting of its nuclear material.
Delhi's priority is to use the deal to provide the context to access to
sensitive US military technology within the overall framework of the "strategic
partnership". Surely, there is a grey area here. Did the Bush administration
negotiate the deal with transparency? Hard to say. Are Indians so dumb as to be
led up the garden path and hustled into a deal full of ambiguities? Not really.
Only Bush and Manmohan would know.
It appears India and the US have a growing need to retain Manmohan and Bush in
their current jobs as lifetime heads of governments so that the strategic
partnership can go from strength to strength.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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