US military: From kinetic to comprehensive
By Carl Baker and Brad Glosserman
A quiet transformation is underway in the United States military that has
significant implications for US foreign policy, and relations with Asia in
particular.
Strategists increasingly recognize that military options must go beyond combat
operations. Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained the new approach in a July
speech: "The overall posture and thinking of the United States armed forces has
shifted - away from solely focusing on direct American military action, and
towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate
the need for military intervention in the future."
He is even ready to put the Pentagon's money where his mouth
is: He advocates shifting resources to other agencies to ensure a more balanced
approach to so-called stability operations.
The painful experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has prompted a serious
rethinking of how the US military must operate. The single most important
lesson is the reminder that it is impossible to kill or capture your way to
security. The new doctrine focuses on pre-conflict actions, emphasizing the
need to create mechanisms and processes to help reconstruct and stabilize
societies in the process of transitioning from, or at risk of lapsing into
violent conflict. Two policy documents articulate this shift: DOD Directive
3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations" and the October 2008 Army field manual (FM
3-07 "Stability Operations").
The DoD directive establishes stability operations as a "core military mission"
that must be given "priority comparable to combat operations". The army field
manual goes further and offers doctrine on how capabilities associated with
reconstruction and stabilization can be leveraged in the context of "peacetime
military engagement" and as part of the "combatant commander's theater security
cooperation plans." This more comprehensive approach to stability operations
"provid[es] the foundation for multinational cooperation" as "military forces
establish conditions that enable the efforts of other instruments of national
and international power."
In some ways, this latest transformation in military thinking is a repudiation
of the "revolution in military affairs" that began in the early 1990s and
culminated in the "shock and awe" campaign in 2003. Lost was the illusion that
technology offered a silver bullet. Even with precision weapons, the use of
deadly force remains a blunt instrument: there is still a need for "boots on
the ground" to pick up the pieces and reestablish social order. But the new
thinking goes further still and recognizes that it is better to invest in
building local institutional capacity to mitigate and reconcile political
differences without resorting to deadly force. In short, the Army field manual
concludes that the best way to eliminate enemies is to prevent them from being
born. That means improving material conditions in regions that are most
vulnerable to the recruitment of adversaries.
"Kinetic" operations are a poor substitute for measures to promote
participation in government, develop programs to spur economic development, and
build local capacity to address grievances. Maintaining a stable society
requires good governance, provision of basic services, institutions to promote
internal reconciliation, economic development, and competent indigenous
military and police forces. Implementation of this strategy is difficult. It
requires real collaboration among relevant agencies. In the language of the
policy guidance on stability operations, it is a "whole of government"
approach. The challenge is integrating the tools offered by these agencies into
a coherent strategy that takes advantage of the vast resources of the military
while avoiding the "militarization" of US foreign policy. Success demands
careful coordination and a conscious effort by all involved to avoid the
interagency squabbles that surfaced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The immediate challenge to implementing a "whole of government approach" to
stability operations is forging an effective organizational framework. This is
difficult for two reasons. First, different agencies and institutions see
"security" differently, and this creates disagreements about which threats are
most important and which solutions are most appropriate. The second is a
byproduct of the military's institutional culture, its penchant for detailed
planning, and its sheer size when compared to other agencies, such as the US
Agency for International Development. The military will typically overwhelm and
subordinate other agencies with which it must work.
A second set of challenges involves resistance within the military itself. One
camp argues these operations detract from the core competency of the military
establishment, which is to deter aggression by other military powers. They
advocate the procurement of new warships, ballistic missile defense, and
sophisticated aircraft to retain full spectrum dominance. Dedicating resources
to operations that do not deal directly with training and preparation for
large-scale war should be limited. For them, stability operations are a fad.
The other camp insists that a real commitment to stability operations requires
more resources. This group will be convinced of the military's seriousness when
the Army has a stability operations division counterpart to an infantry
division and there are disaster relief brigades alongside tank brigades.
The shift in thinking acknowledges the complexity of security in the 21st
century. The whole-of-government approach is an organizational acknowledgement
that security must be approached comprehensively. The shift needs to be
endorsed, accelerated, and implemented by the next US administration.
Thus, as a first step, the US should develop a comprehensive security strategy
that goes beyond countering terrorism and traditional military threats and
postures but also recognizes that the notion of "traditional" and
"nontraditional" security issues is a false dichotomy. This should be done by
the National Security Council to ensure a fully coordinated whole-of-government
approach. This document would detail organizational responsibilities to allay
concerns both internally and externally about the militarization of US foreign
policy. Specifically, there should be a concerted effort to reduce the emphasis
in previous national security strategies on military aspects and a more visible
role for other agencies such as USAID, the State Department, and the Department
of Homeland Security.
This shift is especially important for US engagement with East Asia. Most
regional governments have different priorities from the US regarding security
policy: the shift in DoD thinking brings the US closer to their approach. The
Army field manual's focus on multilateral cooperation also provides a platform
for the confidence-building and capacity-building exercises that those
governments also favor.
A whole-of-government approach also encourages cooperation among more and
different government bureaucracies. By focusing on a broader definition of
security, a wide range of issues - from environmental preservation to disaster
relief - can be addressed multilaterally while avoiding fears that such
cooperation represents a military threat to any single country. An obvious
starting point here is the development of a multilateral security strategy
focused on the eight UN millennium development goals.
The ultimate destination of the quiet transformation underway in the Pentagon
is uncertain. Much depends on the success or failure of the current efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. But, the willingness of the top leadership to acknowledge
the need for a broader perspective on security is significant. A stable and
sustainable security environment requires a collective effort that cannot be
limited to the threat and use of force - especially in circumstances where they
can be avoided. The next US administration must continue this rethinking and
begin the process of implementation.
Carl Baker (cbakerpf@hawaii.rr.com) is director of programs, and Brad
Glosserman (bradg@hawaii.rr.com) is executive director of the
Pacific Forum CSIS.
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