Page 2 of 2 South Asia descends into terror's vortex
By M K Bhadrakumar
Pakistan seizes initiative
Clearly, there are several templates to the terror attacks on Mumbai. No matter
who planned and executed the Mumbai attacks from Pakistani soil and with what
complicated motives, the recent events have immensely helped the generals in
Rawalpindi at this juncture to correct the imbalances they perceived in the
US's South Asian policies during the past three to four years, which they
regarded to be weighed in India's favor, despite Pakistan being the key US ally
in the "war on terror" and its armed forces having taken a heavy beating with
hundreds of casualties.
Also, Islamabad has exposed the fallacy in Indian thinking that it
occupies the pride of place as the US's "natural ally" globally, while Pakistan
was a mere collaborator in an anti-insurgency war on the Afghan tribal tracts.
In turn, the events have also helped Islamabad highlight the complexities of
the US-Pakistan relationship, which is far from a client relationship. This
comes particularly helpful for Islamabad since there is an air of uncertainty
about the policies towards Pakistan under the new administration in Washington.
At a minimum, Obama would have noted that the Pakistani generals are no easy
pushover. The fact of the matter is that the Rice mission to the region in the
wake of the Mumbai attacks brought out the limits to the US's capacity or
willingness or both to "pressure" Pakistan.
Significantly, amid all the fracas over the Mumbai attacks and despite repeated
Indian calls to isolate Pakistan in the world community as the "epicenter" of
terrorism, Washington is quietly putting together a new multi-billion dollar
aid package for Pakistan, and CENTCOM is drawing up a new five-year plan
committing $300 million assistance annually to the Pakistani military.
Kerry, while on a recent visit to Islamabad, made the commitment to speed up
the "mid-life upgradation" of Pakistan's F-16 aircraft capable for delivering
nuclear weapons. He said the US considered a "vibrant, strong, economically
viable" Pakistan to be "vital for peace and stability in South Asia".
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Islamabad has weathered the US
"pressure" over the Mumbai attacks. In Islamabad's estimation, the focus in
Washington is turning to the gala inaugural ceremony of Obama on January 20,
followed by several weeks during which no major US foreign policy initiatives
need to be expected as the new administration settles in. Thus, Islamabad has
shrewdly judged that sooner, rather than later, the international community
will begin counseling Delhi to engage Pakistan in a spirit of dialogue.
India running out of options
With Pakistan's recalcitrance and Mullen's veiled threat of reopening the
Kashmir file, a sense of frustration is gripping Delhi. Pakistan has ignored
India's tough posturing. The faltering Indian security agencies, which have
been in a state of appalling decline in recent years, seem to have failed to
put together any hard evidence of a Pakistani involvement in the Mumbai
attacks.
The Pakistani generals count on Washington to rein in India. And Delhi is fast
running out of options. In the spirit of its "strategic partnership" with the
US, if Delhi counted on Washington to read the riot act to Islamabad, it is
dismayed to see that Washington is more interested in restraining India rather
than do any arm-twisting on Pakistan. Rice increasingly looks like an angel
beating her wings in vain, while the Pakistani generals have ensured that the
imperatives of the Afghan war leave the Pentagon no option but to be
supportive.
At the same time, India is heading for a crucial, tightly fought parliamentary
election within a few months and the government cannot afford to appear to be
weak and rudderless. The majority opinion in the country somehow has convinced
itself that the Pakistani security establishment perpetrated the terrorist
attacks in Mumbai. The government faces potentially damaging criticism in the
competitive domestic politics that its US-centric foreign policy has run into a
cul-de-sac. The powerful pro-US lobby in Delhi's strategic community and the
corporate media already looks confused. The fizz in the US-India strategic
partnership is fast vanishing. The much-touted US-India nuclear deal, hailed as
a historic achievement of the government, already looks jaded and something of
an embarrassment.
Obama's war priorities
Thus, the challenge facing Obama is having to reconcile the almost
irreconcilable contradictions in the US's South Asia policy. Surely, his number
one priority will be to stave off defeat in the war in Afghanistan. Obama's
Afghan strategy is to double the level of US forces in Afghanistan from 32,000
troops at present and to try to arrest and incrementally reverse the Taliban's
steady gains in the recent period. Clearly, the US intends to engage the
Taliban politically and is no longer averse to accommodating the Taliban in the
power structure at some point in the next year or two, but this has to be from
a position of strength. No doubt, 2009 is a decisive year of the war.
At the same time, Afghanistan is heading for presidential elections in 2009.
Hamid Karzai has stated his intention to seek another five-year mandate. In
2004, the US was in a commanding position and could dictate the course of
Afghan politics. But that is not quite the situation today. Even Karzai is
showing the gumption to openly mock at the US's Afghan strategy. Asked by the
Chicago Tribune last week about Obama's description of Karzai as weak and
spending too much time in a bunker, the Afghan president snapped back, "Bunker?
We are in a trench, and our allies are with us in the trench. We were on a high
hill with a glorious success in 2002 ... We must now look back and find out as
to why we are in a trench, or if you'd like to describe it, as a bunker."
Four years ago, it was unthinkable that Karzai would have used such biting
sarcasm against the US ambassador in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, let alone Bush.
Karzai asked, "Why are we in a bunker?" He then went on to tear the US war
strategy to pieces for its mindless and excessive use of force, and concluded,
"And if this behavior continues, we will be in a deeper trench than we are in
today. And the war against terrorism will end in a disgraceful defeat."
Clearly, in these troubled times ahead, Obama cannot afford to get tough with
the Pakistani generals. He will need all his charm to coax them to cooperate
for the successful conduct of the war, and they can be a difficult lot indeed
as the recent destruction of the NATO's supply convoys amply testify. Besides,
Pakistan holds the trump card in any political reconciliation involving the
Taliban. Arguably, Pakistan has a crucial say in the election of the next
Afghan president as well. After all, the onerous duty falls on Islamabad to
orchestrate the participation of over 4 million Afghan refugees who are living
in Pakistan in the election process, and these ethnic Pashtuns could be a
decisive vote bank in determining who the next Afghan president will be.
Of course, much will also depend on Obama's adherence to the "Great Central
Asia strategy", which aims at rolling back Russia, Iran and China's regional
influence. If he is genuinely keen to work out a durable Afghan settlement, he
will need to take help and cooperation from Russia, Iran and India in putting
together a credible inter-Afghan reconciliation. In fact, such an approach -
broad-basing the search for an Afghan settlement - will help reduce Obama's
dependence on Pakistan. Delhi will welcome such an approach by the Obama
administration. But would the cold warriors in Washington allow Obama to opt
for a change of course? Unlikely. Indeed, against the backdrop of the Afghan
war, there has been a creeping takeover of the US foreign and security policy
in South Asia by the generals in the Pentagon who are probably today quite in a
position to devour Obama's call for change.
Reality check for India
All this adds up to a harsh reality for Delhi: it might as well abandon any
hopes that Obama will turn the screws on the Pakistani generals. On the
contrary, the Pakistani generals may have concluded that it is their turn to
expect that the US puts pressure on Delhi to behave with restraint. (Of course,
there is no guarantee that such terrorist attacks as on Mumbai do not repeat.)
The Pakistani generals may not think it sufficient enough if the US restores an
even-handed approach to relations with the two South Asian rivals. Conceivably,
they may insist on US mediation in India-Pakistan disputes, especially on the
Kashmir issue. They will insist that unless Pakistan is free of its threat
perceptions on its eastern border, the armed forces will remain far too
"distracted" to concentrate on the war in Afghanistan.
That is why, the denouement of the current crisis over the Mumbai terrorist
attacks will be of critical importance for India. Delhi is beginning to feel
disenchanted by the US role in the crisis. Using unusually tough language,
Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee hinted that India's patience with
Pakistan was wearing thin. Speaking in Delhi on Tuesday, Mukherjee made plain
his displeasure with the US mediation in the current crisis. He said, "While we
continue to persuade the international community and Pakistan, we are also
clear that ultimately it is we who have to deal with this problem. We will take
all measures necessary as we deem fit to deal with the situation."
Mukherjee added, "We are not saying this just because we are affected but
because we believe that it will be good for the entire civilized world and also
for the Pakistani people and society. This terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan
is the greatest danger to the peace and security of the entire civilized
world."
But all indications are that Pakistan is not impressed by the Indian rhetoric.
It seems to think Indian politicians are grandstanding in an election year.
But, just in case Delhi may spring a surprise, Pakistani army chief General
Ashfaq Kiani has warned that the armed forces would give an equal response
"within few minutes" if India carried out any surgical military strikes. "The
armed forces are fully prepared to meet any eventuality, and the men are ready
to sacrifice for their country," he reportedly said.
As Delhi and Islamabad dig in, Obama will have a hard time balancing the US's
regional policy. However, one positive outcome will be that the US-India
relationship will emerge out of this phase as a more mature process, having
shed the false expectations and the rhetorical hype of recent years. A new
government will also be assuming office in Delhi by next May and it is bound to
take a fresh look at the "strategic partnership" with the US.
It is highly unlikely that any new leadership in Delhi will emulate current
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's ardor for India's strategic partnership with
the US. India will also have drawn its lessons from the current crisis. The
return to an independent foreign policy may become necessary - almost
unavoidable. The year 2009 may well prove to be a formative year of
readjustment in India's post-Cold War foreign policy.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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