Many paths in Colombo's victory push By Ameen Izzadeen
COLOMBO - Sri Lanka is on the verge of victory against a separatist movement
that has terrorized the country for nearly three decades. The Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are almost a spent force and the government of Mahinda
Rajapaksa is determined to finish the rebels off once and for all.
The international community is also pressurizing the government to declare a
ceasefire it says will save tens of thousands of civilians trapped by the
conflict in a 10-square kilometer enclave on the nation's northeast coast. But
even if the war ends in a ceasefire, the government can rightly say that it has
crushed the LTTE.
Victory has many fathers. This may be a cliche, but in Sri Lanka's case, it is
a valid one. The victory the Rajapaksa administration
will likely claim would not have been possible if other factors had not fallen
into place.
These include a Congress party-led government taking power in New Delhi, former
US president George W Bush's "war on terror"; a split in the rebel group during
the early years of the ceasefire period; the death of a key rebel advisor and a
resilient Sri Lankan economy after the 2004 tsunami.
Other key factors have been miscalculations the LTTE made in assessing its own
power and underestimating the firepower of the government security forces;
public support for the government's war and the diplomatic work done by past
governments in changing international opinion in favor of Sri Lanka.
The path to victory began with the ceasefire agreement of February 2002, five
months after September 11, 2001. This ceasefire contributed in no small measure
in bringing about a split in the movement. In March 2004, the LTTE's Eastern
Province commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, alias Karuna, and his
followers defected from the group to the government.
The second blow to the LTTE came in May 2004, when the Congress party came back
to power in India, with Sonia Gandhi, the widow of former prime minister Rajiv
Gandhi who was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber, at the helm.
From day one, the new Congress government, which is no friend of the LTTE, has
extended full support to the Sri Lankan government's war efforts, despite the
presence of the powerful Tamil parties Dravida Munnetra Kazhakam and
Marumalarchi Dravida Kazhakam in the coalition.
After the split in the movement and an anti-LTTE government took over in New
Delhi, the US's global "war on terror" dealt it a more serious blow. The "war
on terror", combined with intense diplomacy by the Sri Lankan government, saw
country after country declare the LTTE a terrorist outfit and start crackdowns
on its fund-raising activities.
The LTTE tried to portray itself as a liberation movement and not a terrorist
organization like al-Qaeda, but without success. Even Western countries where
the group had enjoyed a measure of sympathy did not want to be seen by
Washington as supporting terrorism. In Bush's "war on terror", the adage "one's
terrorist is another's freedom fighter" had no place. The LTTE's reputation as
a liberation movement dimmed while its image as a terrorist group grew.
Despite this, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's determination to set up a
separate Eelam state for Tamils grew stronger. In 2005, he was ready to
re-launch the war, in spite of the ceasefire agreement he signed with former
prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in February 2002.
But the new Rajapaksa administration, faced with the daunting task of
re-building the nation after the 2004 tsunami, was in no mood for a fight. The
LTTE continued to provoke the government, killing soldiers observing the
ceasefire and almost succeeding in assassinating Sri Lankan army commander
Sarath Fonseka and defense secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, President Rajapaksa's
brother. The president listened to the international community's advice and
restrained himself.
The government only lost patience when the LTTE refused to open the sluice
gates of an irrigation canal which ran through an area under rebel control. On
July 26, 2006, the government, emboldened by public support, launched an
operation to liberate the waterway. The operation dealt a crushing blow to the
LTTE. From thereon, the government's security forces defeated the LTTE in
successive battles.
It was about this time that Prabhakaran lost his chief adviser, Anton
Balasingham, to cancer. The LTTE began to falter with Prabhakaran
underestimating the government's resolve and miscalculating the security
forces' fire power.
In the past, the LTTE, advised by Balasingham, had a reputation for always
being a step ahead of the government. It was said that the script of the Sri
Lankan war was written by the LTTE. But with the death of Balasingham, the
group's ability to synchronize its movements with international or local events
diminished.
For example, it was pinning much hope on the changes of government in
Washington and New Delhi. But when the Democrats, whose campaign for the White
House received the support of the Tamil diaspora, came to office, it was a bit
too late. The LTTE had already lost much of its territory and was on the run.
Similarly, the LTTE was anticipating early elections in India, and a Bharatiya
Janatha Party government in New Delhi that would come to its aid.
This has not happened, but India is still reluctantly pressurizing the Sri
Lankan government to announce a ceasefire due to the Congress Party's need for
electoral victory in the state of Tamil Nadu, which remains a bastion of
support for the Sri Lankan Tamil cause.
The LTTE also miscalculated the economic ability of Sri Lanka to sustain the
war effort. While the war was going on, Sri Lanka's economy, which received a
major boost with the 2002 ceasefire agreement, continued to grow at a healthy
pace. In earlier phases of the war the LTTE had succeeded in crippling Sri
Lanka's economy. But this time, the economy was strong enough to face the
effects of the war. It was only after last year's meteoric rise in oil prices
and the current meltdown began to hit world economies that the Sri Lankan
economy felt the crunch.
Looking at the conflict in retrospect, it can be said that the decline of the
LTTE began with the 2002 ceasefire, quite contrary to claims that the truce
strengthened the rebels. Prior to the ceasefire, the LTTE was a formidable
force. In 2000, it laid siege to Jaffna, Sri Lanka's northern capital, and at
the time some 35,000 troops faced certain death at the hands of the advancing
rebels. The Sri Lankan government was helpless and it was only
behind-the-scenes persuasion by India that forced the Tigers to withdraw.
It appears that after the ceasefire agreement, the Tigers squandered all their
trump cards.
Ameen Izzadeen is a Colombo-based journalist.
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