Taliban stuck between anvil and hammer
By Brian M Downing
In February, the government of Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) came to
an agreement whereby the government accepted the latter’s imposition of Islamic
law in parts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in exchange for a
ceasefire. Few thought the agreement would last long and indeed it soon fell
apart - because of government support for US Predator drone strikes, according
to TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud. This raises new questions about the future of
Pakistan and US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in
Afghanistan.
On announcing the end of the agreement, Mehsud sent his bands south, toward the
political and military centers of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In so doing, he let
passion override strategy and badly damaged the TTP cause. Their thrust into
the Punjab heartland
accomplished what has only rarely and ephemerally happened in Pakistan:
agreement between civilian and military leadership. The rancorous politicians
and generals saw the sortie as a challenge to the existence of Pakistan, and
struck back.
Guerrilla forces like the TTP are effective in insurgencies and inter-tribal
warfare, but success can give rise to senses of destiny and invincibility. In
going on the offensive toward Islamabad, the TTP had to forego the advantages
of insurgents and, to some extent, fight in a conventional manner. They had to
concentrate forces, hold positions and organize supply systems - often in areas
where they did not have local support or intimate knowledge of terrain. Such
quixotic attacks play into the hands of all but the most inept conventional
armies and lead to failure, as the Afghani Taliban learned in its 2007
offensive, as did the Vietcong in the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam.
Mehsud’s attack also turned large portions of the Pakistani public against
them. Many Pakistanis were amenable to tribal autonomy and even Islamic law in
parts of the NWFP. After all, the government presence there had never been
strong, not even during British rule, and the affairs of Pashtun tribes up in
the mountains were of little interest. But the TTP’s drive into Punjab
threatened many Pakistanis who, regardless of comfort with secularization, had
little affinity with harsh interpreters of Islam. Attendant images of the TTP’s
idea of justice brought widespread concern that Pakistan might be in danger.
The frontier has long been marked by warfare, but it was almost always tribal
warfare - a form of conflict circumscribed by custom to limit death and
destruction. Led by a young visionary, not tribal elders, the TTP bring an
almost limitless idea of warfare that has occasionally jarred the frontier,
wreaking havoc on villages and tribal systems alike and portending convulsive
but unknowable change.
TTP support is localized - South Waziristan, the Swat Valley, and a few other
pockets. But their sortie brought war to disinterested areas and not all the
blame for destruction fell on the government In recent days, tribal councils
have been pressing for the TTP’s withdrawal from their regions.
Neither popular support for war on fellow Pakistanis nor an agreement between
government and army can be relied on to last. Anti-United States sentiment is
strong and nears the intensity reserved for India. Of particular concern is the
response of Islamist personnel in the army and Frontier Corps, whose affinities
with the TTP may conflict with professional discipline and lead to balks or
worse.
Political-military cooperation and public opinion allow the opportunity to
pursue a counter-insurgency program in parts of the NWFP, perhaps only in the
Swat Valley. Such a program would likely violate constitutional principles or
at least long-standing customs in the tribal agencies, and some areas are
likely beyond reclamation from the TTP for now. Some army and security forces
will remain in towns and villages to keep the TTP at bay, help local police
develop intelligence networks and protect development programs that will ensue.
The government would do well to use foreign aid to bring government services to
Swat. Development programs and medical-veterinary services are straightforward,
but the matter of schools presents critical opportunities.
Madrassas (seminaries) have been boot camps for insurgents on both sides
of the frontier ever since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s
when foreign money poured into their coffers. They continue to supply
insurgents but in many regions they are the only means of education and
advancement. An alternate school system could build rapport between government
and society and reduce the number of insurgent recruits as well.
Land reform presents another opportunity. Islamist insurgencies are usually
based on religious passion, armed intimidation or hostility to a foreign
presence. The TTP, however, have mobilized support from those lacking economic
opportunity and their own land to till. As with education, the government can
make headway against a TTP resurgence by pushing through land reform over the
objections of landlords.
For now, the TTP is being driven back and may be in full retreat. Pakistani
reports provide casualty figures that are unreliable if not fantastic, but the
TTP has undoubtedly been unable to hold ground or inflict high casualties on
government forces.
Reports from Afghanistan indicate an influx of TTP fighters, especially in
Kunar province just west of the Swat Valley. Bloodied by their foray into the
Punjab, the TTP will add numbers to the Afghani Taliban offensive, which is
what the Pakistani government wanted when it made the short-lived agreement in
February. Whether the TTP have lost their reckless zeal or will forge a lasting
agreement with Islamabad is unclear.
US/NATO forces may seek to drive the TTP back across the frontier, re-engaging
them with Pakistani forces and perhaps precluding another short-lived
agreement. Caught between a hammer and anvil, the TTP may find negotiating -
and abiding by - a settlement to its benefit - perhaps one leaving them
latitude in one or more of the tribal agencies. And the US/NATO side will have
stripped away one part of the insurgency along the Durand Line.
Brian M Downing is the author of several works of political and military
history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change
and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to
Vietnam. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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