The offensive launched last week by United States forces in the southern Afghan
province of Helmand signals the start of a new chapter in the conflict. With
over 4,000 US troops involved, mostly marines, it is one of the largest
operations of the war that began in late 2001 with the ouster of the Taliban.
The goals are ambitious. The campaign first seeks to drive the Taliban out of
the region and then begin a counter-insurgency program - providing services to
the local population to win them over to the government side. The offensive
also likely seeks to disrupt the opium trade in Helmand - which provides
the Taliban - and to throw the Taliban off balance so as to limit a wave of
attacks aimed at disrupting national elections scheduled for August 20.
Two potential problems come to mind. First, though the scale of the operation
is smaller than the big operations of the Vietnam War, it may be sufficient to
cause dismay among the indigenous populace, many of whom are ambivalent about
the Taliban but blame US troops for bringing war to their districts. This
bolsters support for the Taliban, as in the "accidental guerrilla" dynamic
identified by former Australian army officer and now author David Kilcullen.
Second, counter-insurgency doctrine calls for beginning in "easy" districts,
where insurgent support is relatively weak and government control relatively
strong. From there, having benefited from a learning curve, counter-insurgency
operations can spread out into adjacent areas or begin in tougher areas. The
present operation has ignored that tenet and chosen to begin in a Taliban
Perhaps geography trumped doctrine in choosing Helmand to begin the
counter-insurgency. It is relatively flat compared to Kandahar, Paktia and
Kunar provinces, where mountainsides afford insurgents formidable positions to
rain fire on supply lines and helicopter-borne reaction forces. Accordingly,
resupply and responding to Taliban attacks in strength will be less arduous in
Engagements have so far been few and brief, though recent reports indicate
stiffening resistance in some places. It is unclear if the Taliban have
vanished into the population or headed for defensible positions. No one should
believe that the US can now write off Helmand and concentrate on Kandahar or
other strong points.
The experience of other insurgencies offer several tactics to the Taliban.
Among them will be interdiction of supplies coming to forward operating bases
in the province. This can be done through ambushes and improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) which have become a tactic of choice by the Taliban since costly
efforts at large-scale operations in 2007.
The dispersal of US units into small fire bases and checkpoints offer
attractive targets for a few dozen or so Taliban fighters whose fellow
guerrillas will set ambushes for relief forces. The Taliban might also launch
attacks in numerous districts across the country, to pressure the US to
withdraw troops from Helmand and to disrupt the August elections.
Foremost in the Taliban response will be disruption of counter-insurgency
efforts. Insurgents will seek to assassinate elders and others deemed to be
collaborating with US forces. They can also focus on attacking newly founded
local forces before they can coalesce into effective fighting forces, and
destroying logistical centers that store equipment for local development
programs. In every engagement, the Taliban will seek to ensure that US forces
inflict casualties on civilians.
Failing to thwart the counter-insurgency program in Helmand, the Taliban may
well face desertions from the numerous part-timers who flesh out their fighting
forces, and also the threat of shifting local support in the face of an agency
whose resources are foreign but virtually limitless.
Helmand will be a test of Pashtun amenability to counter-insurgency. Will they
respond to government services and participate in security forces, or has the
province become too closely attached to the Taliban over the years? The forces
are in place and the stakes are clear to all. The die has been cast, in
Brian M Downing is the author of several works of political and military
history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change and
The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to
Vietnam. He can be reached at firstname.lastname@example.org.