Page 1 of 3 India plays catch-up in the great game
By M K Bhadrakumar
The Central Asian question is no more the same as it was in the 1990s. No one
speculates anymore that it was inevitable that the region would descend into
anarchy. However, the problems endemic to a critical period of state formation
linger. The transition economies were just about switching gear when the global
economic crisis struck. Growth slackened. Foreign investment dwindled.
Commodity prices crashed.
Regional cooperation has far from gained traction. There is widespread poverty
and deprivation. The glass is half full. On the positive side can be noted an
appreciable consolidation of national independence and sovereignty. The
region's integration into the international system is already advanced. On the
contrary, terrorism and religious terrorism continue to pose a threat to
regional stability, which explains the raison d'etre of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Equally, the SCO provides a forum of collective
security that categorically rejects the ideology of "color revolution". The
international community may have begun to grasp that political reality. (The
SCO comprises China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan.)
The turning point came with the abortive "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan and
the bloody uprising in Andizhan in Ferghana Valley in successive months in 2005
when the SCO moved into the driving seat to dispel the specter of "regime
change". The result is there for all to see.
The Central Asian states have created much strategic space around them so that
they can maneuver to their best advantage. They have made it obligatory for
outside powers to negotiate with them - be it regarding military bases on
lease, the price of natural gas, access routes to Afghanistan or partnerships
with collective security bodies - rather than assume that the terms of
engagement can be dictated from a position of strength.
Clearly, Central Asian states have an important strategic significance in
contemporary world politics.
The region has figured in the geostrategies of major powers in one way or
another. Many players reached out to the region, even as the newly independent
states groped for a way forward in an extremely complicated process of
transition. Among them were pretenders who sought a leadership role on account
of their so-called Turkic or Islamic identity and also big powers.
Of the three major players active today, one is an "external" party - the
United States - insofar as it has no shared borders with the region while the
two others - Russia and China - are neighboring countries. Russian influence
has been historical and remains preponderant. The United States has had its ups
and downs in the more recent past, but remains tenacious about expanding its
presence. China, on the other hand, has had an extraordinary run in making its
way to the top rungs of the big league operating in the region,
circumnavigating with great adroitness the massive backlog of the region's
Soviet history in such a short period of time.
After consolidating its presence in Afghanistan, the United States' policy
toward Central Asia has shifted gear. Through different, flexible modes of
cooperation in the fields of security, transportation and energy as well as
through continued efforts to bring about "regime change" in the region, the US
hopes to remodel the region. Meanwhile, the continuous expansion of US
influence in South Asia has come in handy, as Afghanistan is a vital link that
can connect Central Asia with South Asia.
China: A game-changer
The regional challenge that the US encounters in Central Asia is twofold: One,
Russia's resurgence, and two, China's rise as a world power. The US has been so
far focusing on Russia, while carefully watching the implications of the
lengthening shadows of China.
In the US understanding up until recently, a strategic alliance between Russia
and China in Central Asia within the framework of the SCO was a long way from
materializing and there was scope to work on the differing priorities of Russia
and China within the SCO. Unsurprisingly, the US strategy has been pursuing a
differentiated approach toward China aimed at creating a wedge between Russia
and China, which would prove the nemesis of the SCO.
Washington's comfort level with China was attributable to several factors. In
the short term at least, the US pursued a careful policy to engage China in the
region and assuring that China's emergence didn't clash with US interests. This
indeed helped Washington to focus on the immediate task in hand, namely, to
roll back Russia's traditional stature in the region, which was standing right
in the way of the expansion of US influence there.
However, this state of play may be about to change - or the process may already
have begun - even as China's rapid expansion of influence in the region and its
deep access to the region's energy resources in particular are beginning to
hurt Western interests.
A historic watershed is indeed approaching in the region's transition by the
end of this year when the 7,000-kilometer natural gas pipeline leading all the
way from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and leading
to China's Xinjiang becomes operational. China has also taken an early lead in
gaining access to Turkmenistan's Yolotan-Osman gas fields, apart from its
strident gains in energy cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
To be sure, the West is rattled as its own prospects of gaining access to the
Caspian energy come under threat. Turkmenistan, in particular, is viewed as a
major source of gas for the European Union's proposed Trans-Caspian projects,
which the US has been promoting as a means to reduce Europe's energy dependence
on Russia. But the West has no effective answer to the growing Chinese
influence in Central Asia. Certainly, the US is hard-pressed to find
"counterweights" to challenge China's profile as an all-round stakeholder in
the region. Potential "counterweights" such as Turkey and Japan do not look
convincing either.
The challenge the US faces in the region in countering China's new clout is
comparable to what it faces in Africa. Clearly, the US today has less leverage
to advance its interests than in the 1990s. The US continues to enjoy enormous
"soft power" in Central Asia, which probably no country other than Russia can
match. But China's presence is cutting into its leverage in advancing US
interests in the form of increasing American business involvement or promoting
democracy.
Like Africa, Central Asia has options. Central Asian elites' perceptions have
changed. They no longer see the US in the "uniploar moment" right after the
Cold War. In contrast with America with its financial crisis, they see China as
a rising power with capital surplus and financial muscle and a properly defined
strategy towards the region and its problems.
Thus, China is buying up the region's resources and breaking into Soviet-era
industries that have been in a state of serious disrepair. China complicates
Western aid efforts by undertaking projects across the board. US companies do
not build railways or pipelines or highways and dams. They do not do energy
infrastructure, but they focus on the extractive sectors - oil, gas, minerals -
and the Central Asians take note of the West's exploitative instinct.
Beyond oil, US companies are shirking opportunities in the region. Except for
oil, where investment money goes in no matter what, there hasn't been much
Western investment in recent years. To sum up, the core difference is that to
most Americans, Central Asia is still a region of crisis, whereas to China it
is a region of opportunity with which the fortunes of China's "Go West" policy
is closely intertwined in political, strategic and economic terms.
To the West's dismay, belying the prognosis of most Western analysts and
regional experts, China and Russia have also been harmonizing their regional
policy in Central Asia and no serious contradictions have surfaced. Of course,
Moscow remained vigilant about US ploys to create a wedge between Russia and
China. What emerges is that Russia has been pragmatic enough to come to terms
with the impressive growth of China's influence in the Central Asian region,
while China on its part has taken care not to tread on Russian sensitivities or
to challenge Russia's legitimate interests.
All this may be leading to a rethink in Washington about the Chinese presence
in Central Asia. Indeed, there are potential seeds of discord in China's
relations with the region. Much will depend on how the unrest in Xinjiang plays
out. That external forces have muddied the waters of disaffection in Xinjiang
is beyond doubt. Interestingly, Central Asian countries and Russia have shown a
high degree of understanding towards the Chinese authorities' handling of the
unrest in Xinjiang.
'Reset' in the US's Russia ties
On the other hand, Russian-American relations have plunged to their lowest
point in a quarter of a century. Under then-president and now Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin's leadership, Russia strengthened its statehood, began
modernizing its economy and addressing extensive social tasks, and, most
important, ensuring its security more effectively. Also, for the first time in
its history perhaps, Russia today has the capacity and resolve to cope with all
these tasks simultaneously. Russia has also concurrently strengthened its
positions in the global economy and in global finances. In short, Putin has
created a solid foundation for formulating Russia's foreign policy strategy.
Russia's post-Soviet transformation hasn't gone the way that Washington
scripted. Moscow no longer feels it has to behave in deference to the US.
Russians are now ready to say whatever they want and are bent on rebuilding
their traditional empirical power.
Therefore, the fundamental objective of the US regional strategy in Central
Asia during the recent years has been to weaken Russian influence in a region
which constitutes Russia's "soft underbelly", no matter Russia's legitimate
interests there. From this perspective, the expansion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) will be of profound consequence for the geopolitics
of the Central Asian region. The expansion essentially reflects the American
strategy. Its forays into new areas of activity, such as energy security or
cyber crime, go hand-in-hand with the US's global strategy. The US's
determination to transform NATO as a global organization is never in doubt.
NATO's continued expansion squeezes Russia's strategic space and impacts on its
national-security concerns. On its part, NATO has spared no efforts in recent
years to advance its relations with the countries of the Central Asian region.
The alliance runs into obstacles in its effort to get a firm foothold in the
region, but the US's determination to press ahead remains unshaken.
Despite repeated urgings by Russia through the past three years for a
cooperative relationship between NATO on the one hand and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the SCO on the other, the US has
balked. The US prefers that NATO deals with Central Asian capitals on a
bilateral basis which will not concede any regional leadership role for Russia
or legitimize the aspirations of the CSTO and the SCO as organizations integral
to regional stability and security.
On balance, NATO failed to gatecrash into a region where Russia's traditional
influence is overwhelming and where Russia is determined to keep things that
way no matter what it takes. But the alliance has made incremental gains. Over
the past two-year period, Moscow has rapidly built up the CSTO as a bulwark
against NATO in Central Asia. Some Russian commentators have forecast that the
CSTO is destined to become Warsaw Pact II.
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