Warmongers in China, India miss the mark
By Bhartendu Kumar Singh
NEW DELHI - China and India had only just concluded their 13th round of special
representatives' border talks this month when a Chinese strategist suggested
the "Balkanization" of India into several parts to prevent any possible
challenge to Chinese supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
Officials from both countries dismissed the hypothesis, but such reports are on
the rise on both sides of the border. On June 11, the Chinese state-run Global
Times published an editorial on "India's unwise military moves" in reference to
the announcement earlier that month by the governor of Arunachal Pradesh that
some 60,000 Indian troops would be deployed along the Sino-Indian Line of
Actual Control in that Indian state.
The Global Times article was certainly not in good taste, factually
or logically, but there is no dearth of similar war cries in India. For
example, an article by an editor of a leading defense magazine predicted a
Chinese attack on India before 2012. Another article in a Delhi-based newspaper
a few months back claimed that China would attack India in 2017.
No officials or experts from the two countries have taken such talk seriously.
Yet, the media in the two countries have publicized these theories, and there
are reasons for this.
Firstly, the border talks at the special representatives' level over the
unresolved demarcation of the 3,500-kilometer border between China and India
have been preceded by several others, but none have yielded any significant
results.
Both countries are also consolidating their positions in the world's great
power club, so competition for power and influence is spilling over into other
areas. The latest example was a spat at the Asian Development Bank (ADB), where
in May China objected to a loan program from the ADB that included a proposed
flood-control project in Arunachal Pradesh, much of which China claims as
"southern Tibet".
China lays claim to about 90,000 square kilometers of territory in India's
northeast, roughly approximating the state of Arunachal Pradesh. During a 1962
border war, China advanced into and briefly occupied territory there before
announcing a unilateral ceasefire and pulling back to the McMahon Line that
India recognizes as its border with China. In 1987, there were serious
skirmishes at Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh.
Above all, it is mutual ignorance, misperceptions and mistrust that create
space for speculation of war. Two decades of political, economic and military
relations since former premier Rajiv Gandhi's epic China visit in 1988
notwithstanding, the two countries are yet to institutionalize and expand
relations. This mutual apathy has prevented genuine research into each other.
While war can never be ruled out in an anarchical international system, more so
since China and India fought in 1962, there are genuine reasons that make
another war between the two countries highly unlikely.
First, China and India have come a long way towards building a cobweb of
relations, criss-crossing many areas, and both have made genuine investments in
reaching out to one another.
Second, the growing complexity in international relations and a mutual
interdependence have escalated the costs of war. China and India are part of
this process. There are fewer wars between great powers, and India is
relatively better prepared and may deny another victory to China.
Thirdly, the unresolved border that could lead the two countries to another war
has been subject to special negotiations. If the talks have not succeeded,
neither have they failed. Perhaps, the results will be incremental.
If some Chinese scholars fantasize over a Chinese attack on India and its
disintegration into smaller states, it only reflects their desire to carve out
China's own area of influence, where no amount of power games by India or the
United States will undermine China's leadership.
China's sustained investment in military modernization and recent attempts to
expand its area of operation into distant waters, such as the Gulf of Aden,
unfortunately add weight to such apprehensions. China's military modernization
is clearly no longer targeted solely at Taiwan; but aimed at playing a larger
role in the Asia-Pacific region. Here, a rising India could claim its own
sphere of influence, if not compete with China, and this annoys Beijing.
For Indians, the only thing that unites them is the rising importance of China
in Indian foreign policy. However, policy suggestions are often quite opposite,
with some proponents still dreaming of "Chindia", not having learnt the bitter
lessons from the bhai-bhai (Hindi for "India and China are brothers")
fiasco.
Others see relations with China as being full of conflict, with some creating
the ghost of a looming attack from China sooner rather than later. Such a
militant attitude, from Chinese or Indians, will only derail the painfully
constructed relations between the countries.
China could be a threat, but the best way out is to enhance India's capacity to
manage relations with China. While numerous hypothetical factors could lead the
two countries to war, much depends on the ongoing border talks and the
communication channels between the respective political leaderships.
As rising powers, China and India will compete for power, influence and
resources, but perhaps the neighbors can live with a fair amount of healthy
competition.
Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh is in the Indian Defense Accounts Service. The
views expressed are personal.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
