TRIVANDRUM, India - The controversy ignited by a leading scientist who
participated in India's nuclear tests in 1998 has shaken political and
scientific circles in India.
By describing the tests as a "fizzle", K Santhanam has not only challenged the
official claims about the tests but also raised critical questions about
India's nuclear doctrine, its voluntary moratorium on tests, its adherence to
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) [1] and the much-trumpeted civilian
nuclear deal with the United States.
Santhanam said on August 26 that "based on the seismic measurements and also
the opinion from experts there was a much lower yield in the thermonuclear
device test" conducted at
Pokhran in May 1998. In nuclear parlance, a test is described as a fizzle when
it fails to meet the desired yield. Affirming that India would need more tests,
Santhanam cautioned against India being pressurized into signing the CTBT.
Santhanam's statement has divided the scientific community and made the
political establishment nervous. But it's not an entirely new development; the
division in the scientific community in India and abroad on the results of the
1998 tests started within a week after they were conducted.
The official claim was that the thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb had achieved a
yield of 43 kilotons and that "it had been purposely kept at this relatively
low yield to prevent damage to neighboring villages and radiation venting". At
the first press conference after the tests, the leading scientists of the team,
including R Chidambaram, head of the Atomic Energy Agency (AEA) and APJ Abdul
Kalam, director general of the Defense Research and Development Organization
(DRDO), asserted that weaponization was complete.
One of those present at that press meet was K Santhanam, then a senior official
of the DRDO who had played a leading role in coordinating the tests.
These claims were challenged both in India and abroad. In India, though the
scientific community generally took the official line, serious doubts were
expressed by some leading scientists, including PK Iyengar, former director of
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Those who followed the technical debate in
the international nuclear weapons community at that time will recall that
foreign analysts had challenged India's claims and agreed, based on
seismographic studies, that the yield of the thermonuclear device was in the
range of 12 to 25 kt.
Some suggested that Shakti I was a "boosted fission" weapon, not a
thermonuclear device. According to the website of the Federation of American
Scientists (FAS), "Based on seismic data, the US government and independent
experts estimated the yield of so-called thermonuclear test in the range of
12-25 kilotons, as opposed to the 43 kt claimed by India. The lower yield
raised skepticism about India's claim to have detonated a thermonuclear
device."
In November 1998, Nucleonics Week, the international nuclear industry's trade
journal, reported that scientists at the Z division of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California - an industry watchdog responsible for making
estimates of progress in foreign nuclear weapons programs based on classified
data - had concluded that the second stage of a two-stage Indian hydrogen bomb
device failed to ignite as planned.
Chidambaram and others repeated their claims and even expanded them. During a
two-hour briefing for the Indian Science Writers' Association in February 1999,
Chidambaram made a series of claims about the "perfect" character of India's
tests and the country's "high technological threshold". He said that the Indian
scientists had achieved a "perfect three", with the tests: mastering the
optimum emplacement design for the nuclear device; getting specific yield
calculations and ensuring zero radioactive contamination.
It is this claim of perfection that is under serious challenge and generally
believed to be dubious, if not hollow. Prominent scientists such as A
Gopalkrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and P K
Iyengar are in agreement with the criticism of Santhanam and point out that the
single thermonuclear device India tested in 1998 did not function at all as per
design and did not produce anything near the expected design yield.
There was something wrong with the design or prediction method, they argue, and
therefore a re-examination of these aspects to decide whether further tests are
necessary to obtain a "perfect" design approach is called for.
For Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the controversy should have ended
with what he believed to be the final verdict given by former president APJ
Abdul Kalam. Kalam refuted the claims of Santhanam, who was his junior in the
DRDO at the time of the tests.
The credentials of Kalam, then considered the highest authority on the subject,
are questioned by many scientists, including Homi Sethna, another former
chairman of the AEC, who was the guiding force behind India's first nuclear
test in 1974.
The most profound statement made by Kalam, who later became president of India,
immediately after the tests was not scientific - but political. He said how a
nuclear-armed India "will be free of foreign invasions which have constantly
remolded the ancient Hindu civilization". Those who believe that this was the
statement - more than the bomb itself - that endeared Kalam to the leadership
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ruling at that time, may have a valid
point. Sethna has suggested that Kalam's statement refuting Santhanam was that
of a politician.
The fact that the controversy disturbed the political establishment came
through in comments made by India's National Security Adviser M K Narayanan in
an interview to a national daily. While putting on a brave face, Narayanan
dismissed Santhanam as a "bit of a maverick" instead of facing the many issues
raised by the statement.
He said Western analysts had questioned the Pokhran II tests because "they
don't want to recognize that we are a nuclear weapon power, particularly that
we are capable of a fusion device". Narayanan should know. He knows how much
time and energy had to be spent to get India a certificate from president
George W Bush recognizing it as a de facto nuclear weapon state of good
conduct.
Yet another claim made by Chidambaram and others at the time of the tests was
that India could develop simulation technology. Their statement on May 16
referred to this and other sub-critical experiments. It was apparently the
confidence in developing simulation technology that also made them claim that
no further tests were necessary. This claim also was disputed at that time.
France, in spite of almost 200 tests in the Pacific, could not develop
simulation technology.
To ensure support for the CTBT, the US made secret arrangements with France to
provide it technical assistance as well as cooperation with US nuclear weapon
laboratories to enhance computer simulation to maintain the reliability of
nuclear weapons. There have been reports that soon after the tests, India
approached the US for similar assistance. This was a non-starter in Washington
as providing such assistance to a non-nuclear weapon state would be a violation
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Scientists who now say that the 1998
tests failed are clearly stating that the establishment of a validated computer
simulation model cannot be done without more weapons tests.
The nuclear tests were carried out in a doctrinal vacuum. There was neither a
doctrine that guided the tests nor a consensus after the tests as to what
India's nuclear doctrine should be. On August 4, 1998, prime minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee stated in parliament, "We have now declared our nuclear
doctrine." He then said that India's nuclear doctrine would be "no first use
based on minimum deterrence".
One year later, on the eve of elections to parliament, the government released
the Draft Nuclear Doctrine proposed by the newly formed National Security
Advisory Board. Nothing much was heard of this precious document for a long
time, though it was known later that it was disowned by foreign minister
Jaswant Singh as "unofficial" in his negotiations with Strobe Talbott, former
US deputy secretary of state.
After virtual silence on the nuclear doctrine for a long time, a government
press release on January 4, 2003, "shared with the public" the Cabinet
Committee on Security's review of the operationalization of India's nuclear
doctrine.
It spoke of "building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent", "a
position of no first use" and "a second-strike capability that will be massive
and designed to inflict unacceptable damage in the event of a nuclear attack".
The doctrine says, "The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to
deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity
against India and its forces anywhere." (Emphasis added).
What will be the minimum deterrent required for credible second-strike
capability and for punitive retaliation against any state or entity which could
include the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?
More importantly, the doctrine speaks about attacks "against India and its
forces anywhere". Those who advocate more nuclear tests see a mismatch between
the doctrine and weaponization. The question of whether India needs an array of
thermonuclear weapons for deterrence also is relevant. So far, not even a
limited discussion on requirements for deterrence has been attempted in the
public domain.
Santhanam has made it clear that the purpose of his statement was to prevent
the Indian government from being railroaded into signing the CTBT as the Indian
government will be under increasing pressure from the Barack Obama
administration. Until the time of the nuclear tests India had opposed the CTBT.
In the statement on India's nuclear policy presented to parliament on May 27,
1998, it was said that the government had announced India's desire to observe a
voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear
explosions.
It also signaled a willingness to "move towards a de jure finalization
of the declaration" thus meeting the basic obligations of the CTBT. Within
hours of the test, Brajesh Mishra, the prime minister's principal secretary,
said that India was ready to adhere to certain provisions in the CTBT. Brajesh
added, "This cannot be done in a vacuum."
What India wanted from the US were concessions, especially in the matter of
high technology and lifting of sanctions. Talbott wrote later in his book Engaging
India, "India was prepared to find a modus vivendi with the US
and with the global nuclear order through participation in a number of arms
control agreements. India reiterated its 'de facto adherence to the spirit of
the CTBT'. In exchange of lifting of sanctions, India might take the next
steps, de jure formalization of our position and acceptance of the
letter of the treaty."
India had come almost to the point of signing the CTBT when the US Senate
refused to ratify it. India had to wait until the George W Bush administration
left office to make a deal with the US. There is more than implicit acceptance
of the CTBT by India in the nuclear deal. The voluntary moratorium of India has
been turned into a virtual ban on future tests and thus a condition of the
civilian nuclear agreement with the US.
The Obama administration is keen to get the CTBT ratified by the senate. Once
it is done, there will be much pressure, not only from the US but also from
member states of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, on India to sign the treaty.
Although India's official position is that it can conduct tests, in practice it
is not allowed to do so. If India conducts tests, the nuclear agreement will be
terminated by the US; and if it does so after the deal is implemented, there
will be enormous loss for India. Therefore, those who ask for more tests argue
this is the best time to do it.
The debate now is between those who make a case for further tests to have a
"credible nuclear deterrent" and an officialdom hamstrung by the nuclear deal
with the US. The voice of those who are gravely concerned about the nuclear
arms race in the volatile sub-continent is yet to be heard.
Note
1. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions
in all environments, for military or civilian purposes. It was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on September 10, 1996, but it has not yet
entered into force.
Ninan Koshy, a political commentator based in Trivandrum, Kerala, India,
and formerly Visiting Fellow, Harvard Law School, is the author of War
on Terror: Reordering the World and Under the Empire: India's New Foreign
Policy.
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