Bleeding on its western flanks and ever watchful of its eastern border with India, the Pakistani military has limited options. Cooperating with the US or NATO is unlikely in the current political climate which ensures that increasing resources are misspent on the lost war pursuing al-Qaeda. Quelling an internal rebellion - no military man actually wants to die in combat, contrary to their popular image - would take an assumption of political power once again in the country with all the baggage this brings.

Taken to a logical extreme, the slippage of the Pakistani establishment to a quasi-vassal relationship with al-Qaeda ideologues appears all the more likely. Politicians will strike deals with extremist Islamic groups and seek to appease their grievances; these range from the heavy handedness of Pakistani police against the militant groups to the regrouping of madrassas across the country.

Meanwhile, the army is also likely to secure its own peace with the terrorist groups by calling off intensive operations and allowing for a return of an expanded Taliban state within Pakistani borders that calls the shots in Afghanistan. I don't believe it will take more than year for the current Afghan government to fall and make way for the Taliban when this happens.

The resulting theocratic state will be run essentially by today's al-Qaeda reservists, with the added advantage of possessing nuclear weapons. As epitaphs go, George W Bush could not wish for anything worse but sadly this does seem to his most likely legacy.

In late 2001, Mullah Muhammad Omar's prospects seemed utterly bleak. The ill-educated, one-eyed leader of the Taliban had fled on a motorbike after his fighters were swiftly routed by the Americans invading Afghanistan ... Eight years later, Mullah Omar leads an insurgency that has gained steady ground in much of Afghanistan against much better equipped American and NATO forces. Far from a historical footnote, he represents a vexing security challenge for the Obama administration, one that has consumed the president's advisers, divided Democrats and left many Americans frustrated.

The multinational approach to Afghanistan is flawed on many counts, but mainly because different agencies assume they are dealing with separate problems when in fact they are dealing with one. NATO forces are dealing with a resurgent Taliban, while various agencies are dealing with the mushrooming problems of opium cultivation, women's rights, health and education and the preservation of culture.

What business can you provide for a people who make their money on opium cultivation? The only alternative that carries sufficiently high margins is tourism, which is particularly suited to the rugged landscape of Afghanistan and its phenomenal history, even if many of the most interesting sites were destroyed by a succession of invaders. In a situation where the tourist industry assumes primacy, local populations have to protect their economic interests, which they achieve by maintaining a more open society. This has certainly been the experience in Turkey and Egypt, where radical Islamists are kept at bay not so much by the "war on terror" as good old-fashioned neighborhood policemen. Terrorists committing heinous acts at Luxor, were for example prevented from re-enacting their methods due to the immediate negative economic impact. Terrorists cannot operate without support from local communities - and failing to recognize this factor makes the process of reconstruction arduous if not impossible.

The primary strategy for the various multilateral agencies is thus to provide suitable incentives for the locals to step in and protect their own heritage. Convince the Afghans that a million tourists will visit any new Bamiyan site, and new Buddha statues will not only spring up, but also be more majestic than the ones destroyed. It might seem like an awfully long-term project, but the idea presents the only proven method of aligning local interests with those of the global community.

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