Why Pakistanis see US as the bigger threat
By Muhammad Idrees Ahmad
PESHAWAR - To the west of Peshawar on the Jamrud Road that leads to the
historic Khyber Pass sits the Karkhano Market, a series of shopping plazas
whose usual offering of contraband is now supplemented by standard issue United
States military equipment, including combat fatigues, night vision goggles,
body armor and army knives.
Beyond the market is a checkpoint that separates the city from the
semi-autonomous tribal region of Khyber. In the past, if one lingered near the
barrier long enough, one was usually approached by someone from the far side
selling hashish, alcohol, guns, or even rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
These days such a salesman could also be selling US semi-automatics, sniper
rifles and hand guns. Those who buy do so less for the
quality of the weapons - the AK-47 remains the weapon of choice here - than to
acquire mementos of a dying empire.
The realization may be dawning slowly on some US allies, but here everyone is
convinced that Western forces have lost the war. However, at a time when in
Afghanistan the efficacy of force as a counterinsurgency tool is being
increasingly questioned, there is a newfound affinity for it in Pakistan.
A survey conducted by the US-funded International Republican Institute (IRI) in
July 2009, which excluded the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
parts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) - the regions directly
affected by war - found 69% of respondents supported the military operation in
Swat (NWFP) in May.
A different survey undertaken by the US polling firm Gallup around the same
time, which covered all of Pakistan, found only 41% supporting the operation.
The Gallup poll also found a higher number - 43% - favoring political
resolution through dialogue.
The two polls also offer a useful perspective on how Pakistanis perceive the
terrorist threat. If the country is unanimous on the need to confront
militancy, it is equally undivided in its aversion for the US. Yet both threats
are not seen as equal: the Gallup survey found 59% of Pakistanis considered the
US as the bigger threat, compared to 11% for the Taliban; and, according to the
IRI poll, fewer saw the Taliban (13%) as the bigger challenge compared to
spiraling inflation which is wrecking the economy (40%).
In 2001, when the United States launched its "war on terror", many among
Pakistan's political elite and intelligentsia supported it, miscalculating the
public mood, which was overwhelmingly hostile. This led to the protest vote
which brought to power the religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in
two of the frontier provinces. The MMA had been alone in openly opposing US
intervention.
However, as Afghanistan fell, things went quiet and passions subsided. Pervez
Musharraf, the military dictator, was able to present his decision to
participate in the "war on terror" as a difficult but unavoidable choice.
Internationally, his isolation ended, and as a reward the various sanctions
imposed on Pakistan after the nuclear tests of 1998 were lifted.
The economy grew, and so did Musharraf's popularity. When, under intense US
pressure in 2004, he sent the Pakistani military into the restive FATA region,
people barely noticed. He managed to retain his support despite reports of
atrocities, which, according to Human Rights Watch, included indiscriminate use
of force, home demolitions, extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances.
Indeed, if he was blamed at all, it was for not going far enough.
Things changed when, on Musharraf's orders, soldiers stormed a mosque in
Islamabad held by Taliban sympathizers in August 2007, which resulted in the
deaths of many seminarians. The Taliban retaliated by taking the war to the
heartland and terrorist attacks hit several major cities.
Musharraf was blamed, and with an emerging challenge from civil society in the
form of a lawyers' movement and an insurgent media, his popularity went into
terminal decline. Meanwhile, in the Malakand region, Swat and Dir emerged as
new flashpoints. The threat from Taliban militants could no longer be ignored,
but opinions differed as to how best to confront it. The majority supported a
negotiated settlement.
The turning point came in May, when, after a peace deal between the government
and militants had broken down, the military embarked on a major offensive in
Malakand. Though the truce had temporarily brought calm to the region, both
sides had failed to live up to their commitments.
Yet, in the aftermath the Taliban alone were blamed, and in the media a
consensus developed against any further negotiations with the militants. The
operation was hailed as a success despite the loss of countless lives and the
displacement of up to three million people.
However, in the frontier itself, analysts remained less sanguine. Rahimullah
Yusufzai, deemed the most knowledgeable commentator on frontier politics,
considered it an "avoidable" war. Another leading analyst, Rustam Shah Mohmand,
wondered if it was not a war against the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in
Afghanistan and the NWFP, since no similar actions were considered in other
lawless regions.
Roedad Khan, a former federal secretary, described it as an "unnecessary war"
which was "easy to prevent ... difficult to justify and harder to win". In the
political mainstream, all major parties felt obliged to support the war for
fear of being labelled unpatriotic. The opposition came mainly from religious
parties, and from cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan's Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice).
Opinions were reinforced in favor of a military solution when militants
launched a wave of terrorist attacks in anticipation of the Pakistani army's
new operation in FATA.
While the effects of the atrocities were there for all to see, the consequences
of months of aerial bombing and artillery shelling that preceded the operation
were less known.
A third of the total population of South Waziristan - site of the government's
newly launched anti-Taliban offensive - has been displaced, and it has received
little relief. When an Associated Press crew met the refugees, they expressed
their anger at the government by chanting "Long live the Taliban".
Instead of winning hearts and minds, the Pakistani government is delivering
them to the enemy.
Despite the best efforts of sections of the elite to take ownership of the war,
the view persists that Pakistan is fighting an American war. That the military
operation in South Waziristan follows an inducement of an annual US$1.5 billion
from the US government, and is supported by US drone surveillance, does little
to disabuse skeptics of their notions.
Following the bombing of the International Islamic University in Islamabad last
week, an al-Jazeera correspondent - a Scot - was accosted by an angry student
who, mistaking him for an American, held him responsible for the attack.
Pakistanis are acutely aware that before 2002 there was no terrorist threat,
and they remain equally convinced that the threat will vanish once US forces
withdraw from the region. But before that happens, some fear, Pakistan will
have compromised its long-term stability.
Muhammad Idrees Ahmad is the co-founder of Pulsemedia.org.
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