Page 1 of 2 Taliban tap into Afghanistan's roots
By Brian M Downing
Discussion of Afghanistan policy is not being conducted with an adequate
understanding of the insurgency there. Insurgents are considered akin to a
crime syndicate that has expanded its influence through intimidation and
violence, or to a religious cult that spreads through hortatory oration. These
views are partly true but will not contribute to sound policy. The insurgents
have expanded rapidly over the past few years because they offer compelling
answers to unaddressed concerns.
Opposition to the Western presence
Foremost among these concerns, paradoxically enough to Westerners who see
themselves as neutral mentors, is the extended presence of foreigners.
Linguistic, cultural, geographic and tribal obstacles have prevented a unifying
nationalism, but common experiences of foreign invasion and tribal warfare have
left an abiding suspicion of foreigners. That outlook has led to common purpose
in expelling intruders - the British or Russians or an adjacent tribe - but
loss of unity and a return to localism soon followed.
Nonetheless, after decades of war and the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, most
Afghans welcomed help from Westerners. They were seen, if only quite warily, as
agents of stability and growth. Eight years on, with little stability or
growth, the welcome is disappearing. Traditional suspicions are falling on
Western powers, and the insurgents are winning over district after district.
Western aid workers enter a region with the best of intentions, but are
off-putting to elders and notables. Westerners carry an unmistakable confidence
in their way of doing things. Youthful ones speak with elders as equals, or
perhaps with a facade of deference. Projects are planned in accordance with
engineering and agronomical principles, not local custom. The benefits of a
project cannot be clearly known, but the estimates of workers and the
expectations of locals will almost always diverge. Right and wrong here are not
relevant; the impact on local sensibilities is.
The number of foreigners on a project today is much higher than in previous
counter-insurgencies. When a French captain was seeking to win the support of
Algerians in his area of control, he could have an irrigation ditch dug or a
schoolroom built simply by calling in a small engineering detachment. Such
projects today involve platoons of aid workers, embassy liaisons, consultants,
security forces, public relations officials, reporters from many countries, and
so on. The necessity of so many personnel is dubious; their impact on local
opinion is not.
Development programs take a long time to begin, let alone come to completion -
if they ever do. Bureaucratic plodding, inter-agency turf wars, banditry,
corruption and warlords all take a toll on timeliness. Insurgent attacks on
development projects, especially schools, are both well known and relevant
here, but many insurgent groups permit projects to go on, if only to position
themselves to take partial credit for them.
Large numbers of often haughty development workers and the delays in completing
many projects leave the impression, eight years after their arrival, that
Westerners have become another occupying force. Resentment builds, as do
insurgent condemnations and entreaties, as do attachments of local men to
insurgent bands.
Western militaries have also played an important, if not leading, role in
developing antipathy toward foreigners. Some North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) countries, owing to their prominent colonial pasts, have long if distant
experience with counter-insurgency and civil operations.
They stress rapport with local people and limit the use of artillery and air
strikes. Other militaries, especially that of the United States, were long
trained for conventional warfare (against the Soviet Union and the Iraqi army)
in which the use of such firepower was central. The US military diligently
avoided counter-insurgency training, during and even after Vietnam, as such
expertise might invite politicians to get involved in another lengthy and
painful insurgency.
The use of artillery and air power against insurgents often inflicts heavy
casualties on an insurgent band, but it also alienates much of the population
and pushes them into supporting the insurgency. In recent years, insurgents
have conducted engagements in a manner to incur civilian casualties at the
hands of Western forces (a tactic skillfully used by the Vietcong). Word of the
effects of Western firepower spreads rapidly. Afghans are increasingly hostile
to the Western presence and become even more so with each incident. Many join
the insurgency even though neither they nor family members have been victims;
they join to avenge fellow Pashtuns and defend their homeland.
The recent US emphasis on counter-insurgency has included orders to reduce the
use of artillery and air power. Whether this will be carried through and affect
the insurgency remains to be seen. Another aspect of the counter-insurgency
program stresses an extended military presence in the villages - a departure
from past efforts that expelled insurgents, began development projects, then
departed to chase down other insurgent bands. As much as the new emphasis might
resonate with counter-insurgency doctrines, Western assurances of a protracted
presence, this late in the war, will only underscore concerns that Westerners
are another occupying power, and become a boon for the insurgency.
The prospect of better government
Insurgents present an alternative to the government of President Hamid Karzai.
They build a shadow government as they move into a district, and win local
support as comparatively honest administrators and judges. This was the case in
previous insurgencies in Asia and North Africa and it is true of the one today
in Afghanistan.
The Taliban's harsh suppression of anarchy in the early- to mid-1990s was
important in their rise to power. In the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet
departure in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet-backed government, former
mujahideen leaders became bandits and warlords, replacing the rule of elders
and notables who had been killed or had fled abroad. There was no government.
The fledgling Taliban defended merchants transiting Kandahar province then
extended their control throughout the province. They ended banditry and
warlordism through armed force and the severe imposition of Islamic law - much
to the relief of most locals.
The expulsion of the Taliban in 2001 had a similarly chaotic aftermath, which
remains in most parts of the country. Indeed, many of the bandits and warlords
suppressed by the Taliban became partners with the Karzai government. Many
others simply resumed their old trade.
In the south and east, offices are awarded disproportionately to members of
Karzai's tribe, the Popalzai, at the expense of other Pashtun tribes - much to
the latter's irritation. The scales of justice tip markedly toward those who
deliver inducements. Officials demand a bribe for almost any request. Even a
death certificate for a loved one will require an extra-legal emolument for the
appropriate functionary.
A government can be quite corrupt yet be competent in delivering services, as
the success of old American machine bosses indicates. Afghans will accept a
high level of corruption. Most will insist on it, as practices deemed corrupt
are ordinary expectations in tribal society. But the machinery of the Karzai
government displays little competence, making it corrupt and useless.
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