India papers over cracks with Pakistan
By Chietigj Bajpaee
Last week's offer of renewed talks between India and Pakistan remains mere
rhetoric in the absence of any real progress on the core issues plaguing the
bilateral relationship and with the reluctance of either side to seek a new
approach to address areas of contention.
The offer of dialogue notably followed the United States government's decision
to issue a fresh travel alert for India on January 30, warning of possible
terrorist attacks similar to the coordinated attacks in Mumbai in November
2008. It also comes amid a period of renewed militant infiltration across the
Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. These
developments reaffirm the region's precarious security environment and the
possibility of renewed conflict despite the
recent wave of optimism generated by the offer of dialogue.
Negative rhetoric fuels tense reality
A lack of progress on the "composite dialogue" peace process between India and
Pakistan has created a prolonged period of mistrust between both states.
Despite several high-profile meetings between the Indian and Pakistani
leadership over the last year, there has been a lack of substantive progress
aside from a few symbolic confidence-building measures.
The much-touted meeting between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his
Pakistani counterpart Yousuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned
Movement summit in July, which was preceded by a meeting between Manmohan and
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
summit, has created further bitterness amid allegations of appeasement on both
sides rather than reviving bilateral relations.
While Pakistan has filed charges against seven people in connection with the
Mumbai attacks, perceptions persist in India that Pakistan has pursued a
half-hearted effort in pursuing the perpetrators of the attacks. Several
militants including Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, leader of Jammut ud-Dawa, a front
organization for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant group that was held
responsible for the attack, remain at large.
This climate of mistrust has been exasperated by both countries' fundamentally
divergent positions on Afghanistan, with Pakistan favoring rapprochement with
the Taliban, India opposing such an initiative, while the international
community is increasingly leaning toward Pakistan's position in the aftermath
of the London conference last month.
Added to this are several recent symbolic actions and statements that have
fueled a growing sense of acrimony between both states. A speech by Indian army
chief Deepak Kapoor at a training command seminar in December about preparing
the military for fighting a two-front war with China and Pakistan has renewed
perceptions in Islamabad about India's belligerent intentions.
United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' statement in January during a
visit to India that "Indian patience would be limited were there to be further
attacks" suggested that the US would be unable to restrain India in the event
of another Mumbai-style terrorist attack. More likely, this was an attempt by
the US to renew pressure on both states to restart their process of
reconciliation.
Beyond the political and military level, relations have also deteriorated at
the people-to-people level. This was evidenced most recently when no Pakistani
players were picked during the Indian Premier League (IPL) auction for the
Twenty20 cricket tournament in March. While the teams claim that visa and
security concerns deterred them from bidding for the Pakistani players, it has
been interpreted as an insult by some in Pakistan.
Deficiencies remain in security infrastructure
Added to the fragile state of bilateral relations is the precarious security
environment on both sides of the border. Despite the absence of a major
terrorist attack in India in over a year since the Mumbai attacks and reports
that several high-profile plots have been foiled, the growing sophistication of
militant tactics, their growing transnational capabilities, combined with
continued deficiencies in India's security infrastructure make another
terrorist attack on India over the next year a likely possibility.
A sense of alert fatigue has developed in India amid the surge in travel alerts
and security advisories in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks.
Credible threats, such as the alleged plot to hijack an Indian airliner in
December, which prompted stepped-up security across airports in the region,
have been accompanied by more implausible threats such as reports that
militants are attempting to acquire gliders to fly across the border.
The Mumbai police have noted that they have received almost 600 alerts in the
year since the November 2008 attacks, demonstrating the extent to which the
civilian population and security and civilian leaderships remain on edge. The
growing transnational capabilities of Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as
the LeT has increased this sense of vulnerability (and paranoia) in India. This
was most visibly demonstrated with the arrest of David Coleman Headley and
Tahawwur Rana in the United States and Canada, respectively in October and
their alleged links to LeT and the Mumbai attacks.
The government claims that it has averted at least a dozen major terrorist
attacks since the Mumbai one. A national counter-terrorism center and
national-intelligence database are to be established this year following the
establishment of the National Investigation Agency last year in order to
improve intelligence coordination and collection. However, these initiatives
are likely to be slow-moving in overcoming well-entrenched levels of
inter-agency rivalry among India's intelligence agencies.
Kashmir: Return to square one?
At the same time, Jammu and Kashmir, which has been the traditional focal point
of bilateral tensions, faces a renewed deterioration in its security climate.
Despite a significant reduction in terrorist attacks in Indian-administered
Kashmir in recent years, continued grievances by the local population combined
with growing levels of militant infiltration across the LoC set the stage for
renewed hostilities in the disputed territory.
A surge in militant infiltration has led to speculation that militants are
returning to their traditional sanctuaries in Pakistan-administered Kashmir
(PAK) amid ongoing pressure from Pakistani and US military operations in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Although there has been a decline
in the number of militant attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir (IAK) in
recent years, there has been a marked increase in the number of militant
infiltration attempts with 110 people crossing the LoC in the first 11 months
of 2009, up from 57 in 2008.
According to Indian army chief Kapoor, some 700 militants are waiting to
infiltrate across the LoC into IAK. Notably, the attack by two militants in the
Lal Chowk district of Srinagar in January, which was attributed to
Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, marked the first major attack in the state
capital in two years.
Aside from a surge in militant infiltration across the LoC into IAK, there has
also been a surge in terrorist attacks in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PAK),
which has traditionally avoided instabilities despite being a sanctuary for
militant groups. PAK has suffered four suicide bomb attacks since June, the
latest being outside a Pakistani army barracks in Tarakhal in January, which
followed several attacks in the state capital Muzaffarabad. The region has also
experienced a surge in sectarian violence with attacks on the Shi'ite Muslim
community, leading to concerns over the growth of Islamic extremist ideology in
the region.
The Indian government for its part has attempted to relax its heavy-handed
security presence in the region. In December, Defense Minister A K Antony
announced the withdrawal of two army divisions comprising 30,000 Indian troops
from the state.
Nonetheless, local grievances continue to act as a catalyst for instabilities;
in 2008 a dispute over the use of land for an annual Hindu pilgrimage (Amaranth
Yatra) sparked widespread unrest. In 2009, the alleged rape and murder of two
women in the town of Shopian in May sparked violent demonstrations, which were
revived in December when India's Central Bureau of Investigation ruled that
they had drowned rather than been murdered. More recently, a curfew was imposed
in Srinagar in February after two teenagers were killed by security forces,
which set off protests in the city.
The state government alleges that the Indian military continues to occupy
50,000 hectares of land in the state while the continued enforcement of the
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in the state is a source of grievance to the
local population.
Political motives drive and deter reconciliation
The silver lining in the current climate may be a narrow window of opportunity
created by a relatively stable government in India, which may accelerate
momentum for renewed dialogue. Indian policymakers have little appetite for
renewed conflict with Pakistan.
With the Indian National Congress (Congress)-led United Progressive Alliance
government holding a strengthened mandate and facing a weakened opposition
following its re-election last May, there is little political pressure on the
government to appease allegations of being "soft on security". However, this
window of stability is unlikely to last as assembly elections in several
high-profile states in 2011-12 could shift the balance of power and revive the
opposition.
At the same time, there is a growing recognition within India's policymaking
elite that instability within Pakistan and conflict with Pakistan is
detrimental to India's security. This was evidenced following the November 2008
attacks in Mumbai when speculation of India taking retaliatory action against
Pakistan prompted the late former leader of the Pakistani Taliban
(Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan - TTP), Baitullah Mehsud, to pledge to put aside
differences with the Pakistani government in order to fight against India.
There is recognition in India that conflict with Pakistan, which would be
accompanied by travel advisories and the evacuation of foreigners from India,
is also not conducive to the Indian government's goals of reviving the economy
in the aftermath of the global economic downturn. The country is still reeling
from the fallout of having several high-profile events, such as the Indian
Premier League and Twenty20 relocated (in the case of the former) and delayed
(in the case of the latter). With the country holding several high-profile
events in 2010, notably the World Cup hockey tournament in February and
Commonwealth Games in October, the government will be deterred from taking any
belligerent action against Pakistan.
However, a fluid political environment in Pakistan and reluctance by elements
of the Pakistani security forces to target militant sanctuaries within the
country and seek a rapprochement with India will act as a continued deterrent
to reconciliation. In contrast to the strengthened mandate of the Congress-led
government in India, Pakistan faces the opposite scenario with Zardari facing
eroding legitimacy.
With the National Reconciliation Order having lapsed last December, the stage
is now set for corruption charges to be reopened against Zardari and several
members of his Pakistan People's Party-led government. This has deterred
progress in improving bilateral relations with the weak civilian leadership in
Pakistan conscious that any progress made in improving relations with India
could be interpreted as appeasement or stepping on the toes of the military,
which has traditionally dominated foreign and security policies. Renewing
tensions with India may in fact offer a means for the government to revive
flagging support.
At the same time, the terms of several key security officials are due to end
this year, including the director general of the Inter-Service Intelligence,
Lieutenant General Shuja Pasha (in March), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee, General Tariq Majeed (in October) and army chief General
Ashfaq Parvez Kiani (in November). Conflict with India could offer a means for
these officials to extend their terms and allow the military to re-exert its
influence over the policymaking arena if the civilian government is seen to be
taking actions that are detrimental to its interests.
Finally, the Pakistani military faces growing international pressure to step up
operations in the other tribal agencies of the FATA in the aftermath of its
offensive in South Waziristan in October. The authorities remain reluctant to
do so, given an unwillingness to target "pro-Pakistani" militant groups such as
the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani group, Hezb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) and
Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir factions of the TTP. This contrasts with its
relative willingness to target "anti-Pakistani" militant groups such as the
Hakimullah Mehsud faction of the TTP based in South Waziristan.
Adding to this are concerns that the surge in the US military presence in
Afghanistan could result in an increase in cross-border military operations
into Pakistan, notably in southern Balochistan province, which is believed to
be the sanctuary of the Afghan Taliban leadership. Renewed hostilities with
India would offer a means to delay or deter any expansion of military
operations against militant sanctuaries in Pakistan.
The fact that the Pakistani military continues to maintain the majority of its
resources on its eastern border with India rather than against militant
sanctuaries along the western border with Afghanistan is evidence of its
continued preoccupation with India rather than the threat of Islamic extremism.
Chietigj Bajpaee is a South Asia analyst at Control Risks, a London-based
political and security consultancy. He has previously worked with the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, the
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and IHS
Global Insight. The views expressed here are his own. He can be reached at
cbajpaee@hotmail.com.
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